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ABSTRACT
Atheists in the United States are a gradually growing population representing an
increasingly important percentage of the population (Pew Research Survey, 2012). The
United States, a largely religious country, and its citizens cultivate many negative positions
and principles towards Atheists that progress into discriminatory actions of varying
degrees. To date there have been limited attempts to assess how Atheists experience and
perceive discrimination in a generally religious country that does not trust Atheists or feel
that they fit with the paradigms of what it means to be an American. The purpose of this
dissertation project was to create an instrument to support in this process of
understanding Atheist discrimination employing the scholarship surrounding
Microaggressions (e.g., Sue, 2010a; Sue, 2010b) and associated forms of contemporary
racism (e.g., Gaerner & Dovidio, 2005). Herein scale construction procedures, scale
descriptors and properties, implications of its use and its limitations are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Literature Overview
Individuals that do not identify with a religion are a growing phenomenon in the
United States. For the first time in the history of the United States, a recent survey
estimated Protestant Christians as representing less than 50% of the population,
approximately 48%. Those that do not identify with a religion is approaching, according
to the same estimate, 20% (Pew Research Survey, 2012). However, previous surveys still
place the majority of Americans, approximately 78%, with some denomination of
Christianity (Gallup, 2009). This means that the non-religious are becoming a significantly
sized minority in the United States.
The profile of non-religious now incorporates more than 13 million Atheist and
Agnostic identifying individuals (almost 6%) as well as virtually 33 million people who
report they have no specific religious membership, which is approximately 14%. Atheists
are estimated to make up approximately 2.0% of the world population and about 2.4% of
the United States (Gallup, 2009; Pew Research Survey, 2012). Zuckerman (2007) reports
that non-religion by some estimates make up almost half a billion of the world’s
population—representing the fourth largest religious group in the world, trailing behind
Christians, Muslims, and Hindus.
Unfortunately, when majority and minority dynamics are at play, the minority
group is sometimes disenfranchised and discriminated against. This is true for a specific
1	
  
	
  

section of the non-religious—Atheists. Many individuals have been shown to harbor
discriminatory beliefs towards Atheists. For example, Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann
(2006) found that after surveying over 2,000 Americans Atheists were considered to be the
least fitting with their “vision of American Society.” The authors argue that although
tolerance and diversity are slowly improving in the United States, those considerations are
not always extended to Atheists and the non-religious.
A more novel way of examining prejudice and discrimination is utilizing the theory
of Microaggressions. Microaggressions are subtle indignities and acts of discrimination
that are perpetrated by a majority member towards a minority member. Microaggressions
are so subtle and covert sometimes that the message of discrimination is not expressed or
even necessarily received consciously (Sue et al., 2007; Sue, 2010a; 2010b).
Microaggressions were originally studied in the context of contemporary forms of racism
and bigotry, involuntarily and unknowingly expressed, used to perpetuate the racial status
quo (Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez & Wills, 1977). The theory of Microaggressions has
been used mostly to study the discriminatory experiences of racial and ethnic minorities to
date. Studies include both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Before expanding on
how the theory of Microaggressions can be applied appropriately to a non-religious
minority—Atheists, it is first important to review how Microaggressions are applied to
other minorities.
The Study of Microaggressions
Microaggressions were originally conceptualized as a reaction to contemporary
forms of racism. Racial oppression has moved away from explicit and overt forms of
bigotry. For example, those that study microaggressions may examine professions of
2	
  
	
  

equality and objectivity for all racial and ethnic minorities belying, perhaps unconsciously,
discriminatory beliefs leading to subtle discriminatory actions (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2004;
Kovel, 1970). Before Microaggressions took center stage in discussion of contemporary
racism there were three previous conceptualizations of contemporary racism: Aversive
racism, Symbolic racism, and Color-Blind racism.
Contemporary forms of racism. Aversive racism occurs when a majority, be it a
group or individual, distances themselves from a minority individual or group. In this
sense, those apart of a majority feel aversive and avoidant of those that are different,
valuing the security, comfort and simplicity of being around those within the same group
(Blank, 2004). It is the silently held, but powerfully impactful discriminatory beliefs that
promote the avoidance of the uncomfortable and possibly painful feelings that result from
contact with a minority individual or group (Dovidio&Gaertner, 2005). Contact and
avoidance between White and Black individuals were manipulated in a study by Dovidio
and Gaertner (1981) whereby they examined the phenomenon of racial minorities in
supervisory positions having their supervision questioned more often. They found that
White supervisors were more willing to help Black subordinates than White subordinates.
The authors believe this interaction was found because helping Black individuals in a
subordinate position is congruent with inherent power dynamic within society—that
White’s are superior in more demanding positions and that Black individuals need White
assistance to get anything done.
Symbolic racism is the second form of contemporary racism that preceded the
current study of Microaggressions and is perhaps the most clearly related to the dynamic
of trust as a facet of Atheist prejudice (Edgell, et al., 2006). Symbolic racism occurs when a
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minority group rebels, challenges or contradicts the majority’s ideals and principles (Sears,
1988). For example White individual’s value of individualism and self-reliance contradict
with traditional cultures of other racial and ethnic minorities that have immigrated to the
United States. Symbolic racism has been shown to be a significant contributor and
predictor of how some native-born Americans increasingly oppose legal immigration, costs
for college and citizenship for U.S born children of immigrants (Berg, 2013).
Finally, color-blind racism describes the idea that if skin color is not seen, observed
or taken into account then actions, rationales and behaviors based upon this idea could not
be described as racist or prejudiced (D’Souza, 1996). Bonilla-Silva (2003a) writes that the
structure of our post-civil rights country promotes this idea through the disowning of
discrimination, the extension of liberal principles to mostly all matters of race (e.g.,
opposing affirmative action based upon the ideal of equal opportunity), the naturalization
of racial matters (i.e., the belief that current segregation and inequalities is natural) and the
cultural explanation of minorities standing (very similar to symbolic racism). The part of
avoidance discussed earlier and these components in the context of aversive racism
perpetuates this idea of color-blind racism by allowing majority members to distance
themselves from the experiences and narratives of the minority (Bonilla-Silva, 2003b).
Taxonomy of microaggressions. The original taxonomy of microaggressions
were proposed by Sue, et al. (2007), they are Microassaults, Microinsults and Microinvalidations.
Microassaults are least subtle form of microaggression, often pronounced or behaved
explicitly. The goal of perpetrating microassaults is often to hurt and degrade the intended
recipient of the microaggression. Examples might be using racial epithets or specific
racially motivated actions such as unmistakably following an individual of color in a
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department store. Microinsults generally communicate insensitivity and insult towards the
intended target. An example might be a White individual asking a well-dressed person of
color at a hotel to take his or her baggage, assuming this person is a bell-hop.
Finally, microinvalidations express the nullification and exclusion of other’s
thoughts, feelings or experiences. Much like microinsults, microinvalidations are generally
subtle and take place unnoticed. Taking a color-blind is an example of this form of
microaggressions as it invalidates individuals ‘experiences as a racial or ethnic minority. Sue
et al. (2007) report that microinsults and microinvalidations are generally the prime focus
of microaggression research because of their shrewd and insidious nature.
Microaggression theory has since expanded to investigating the experiences of
other minorities through qualitative and quantitative studies. For example, Balsam,
Molina, Beadnell, Simoni and Walters (2011) created a scale that measures LGBT people
of color’s experience of microaggressions as it relates to forms of racism and heterosexism
resulting in a psychometrically sound instrument. Keller and Galgay (2010) summarized
the experiences of discrimination that individuals with disabilities experience through a
microaggressions lens. They were able to take qualitative data obtained through
interviewing individuals with disabilities and fit a majority of them into the framework of
microaggressions proposed by Sue et al. (2007) thus promoting the need for multicultural
theory to better encompass disability as an aspect of diversity.
Recently, religion and non-religion have been considered as aspects of diversity
susceptible to microaggressions. Nadal, Issa, Griffin, Hamt and Lyons (2010) wrote that
identifying as a religious minority (e.g., Muslim, Jewish, Hindi, or Atheist) also comes with
the chance of discrimination as the power dynamics seen between Whites and racial
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minorities is somewhat analogous to the dynamics seen between Christians and nonChristians in America or even Religious people and non-religious people. Nadal et al.
proposed 6 hypothetical themes based on previous microaggression literature as well as the
work done so far on the discrimination that religious minorities face. Those themes are
“Endorsing Religious Stereotypes, Exoticization, Pathology of Different Religious Groups, Assumption of
One’s Own Religious Identity as the norm, Assumption of Religious Homogeneity and Denial of Religious
Prejudice” (p. 300-304). Microaggressions from the theme of Endorsing Religious Stereotypes
occur when religiously biased statements against minority groups or individuals are
perpetrated that perpetuate a stereotype. The theme of Exoticization describes
microaggressions that imply religious minority individuals and their beliefs are weird,
bizarre or imported. Pathology of Different Religious Groups is the theme that describes when
religious majority individuals describe members of a religious minority and their religious
beliefs as abnormal or even deviant. When individuals commit microaggression in the
theme of Assumption of one’s own Religious Identity as the Norm they are making the assumption
that everyone adheres to the same religion or set of religious beliefs. The theme
Assumption of Religious Homogeneity describes microaggressions that illustrate the belief of all
individuals from a religious minority group, think and act the same. The final theme,
Denial of Religious Prejudice occurs when individuals espouse egalitarian ideals about different
religious groups, but likely lack insight into their own inherent religious biases. Biases may
surface as unintentional behaviors or slights that the perpetrator is not aware of when
operating within this theme.
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Cumulative Effects of Microaggressions
Sue (2010a; 2010b) and Sue, et al. (2007) have hypothesized that the real harm of
racial and ethnic microagressions occur because of their cumulative impact over time. A
single microaggression perpetrated, something subtle that is not obviously committed or
received necessarily, will have less of an impact that a lifetime of microaggressions
received, unchallenged by a society inherently biased and prejudiced toward certain groups
of people. Previous research has demonstrated the harmful impacts of discrimination and
racism on the minds and bodies of other minority groups and individuals.
One important study completed over a period of 13 years (Jackson, Brown,
Williams, Torres, Sellers, & Brown, 1995) found that for African American men and
women that exposure to racism was strongly associated with both direct and cumulative
effects to mental and physical health. Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson (1997),
studying over one thousand, ethnically and racially diverse participants, also found similar
evidence for the association of race-related stress with both poorer mental and physical
health outcomes. This may not be surprising given the documented pattern of increased
mortality and disease in African Americans (Krieger, 1987).Williams et al. provide
rationales for further understanding the positively correlated lowered social economic class
with race related stress, access to healthcare and education as they relate to racial and
ethnic identification.
More recently, microaggressions have been applied to many diverse populations.
Ong, Burrow, Fuller-Rowell, Thomas and Sue (2013) found that over 14 consecutive days,
Asian Americans' experience of different forms of microaggressions was predictive of
increased somantic symptoms and negative affect. Another interesting article foud that
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perceived racism by African American pregnant women during their life, including
childhood, negatively predicted the birth weight of their newborns, in addition the effects
of medical and sociodemographic factors accounted for (Dominguez, Dunkel-Schetter,
Glynn, Hobel, & Sandman, 2008). These two articles provide evidence for both the short
and long term effects of cumulative microaggressions.
Diener, Tay and Meyers (2011) investigated why developed countries with high
amounts of religious freedom actually have more people leave religion despite a lot of
evidence of religion being associated with subjective well-being. Over two lengthy studies
involving participants from all of the world, they found that Atheists in the U.S experience
less well-being confirming some of Edgell et al’s findings. Diener et al., found that low
SES and a high amount of religiosity of the country one lives in predicts the non-religious
not enjoying as much social support, feeling respecting and finding meaning in their lives.
The slight positive association of subjective well-being with religiosity varies Diener et al.
report, based on a number of factors including SES and other markers of overall life
quality. In the case of the U.S, they believe that the moderate religiosity of the U.S
generally leads to lower subjective well-being in the non-religious, especially in states with
high poverty rates, which translates into higher significance of religion.
Discrimination towards Atheists and Atheism
The discrimination and prejudiced beliefs about Atheists and Atheism are not the
same as the beliefs held towards racial and ethnic minorities however modern forms of
racism and current societal expressions of discrimination that study racial and ethnic
minorities can be used in a parallel fashion to examine the discrimination Atheists
experience. It has been found that there are a number of factors that can predict who
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holds discriminatory beliefs towards Atheists. Edgell et al. (2006) found that Women,
African Americans and the elderly are more likely to reject atheists whereas those with
higher levels of education and whose fathers had more education are more accepting of
Atheists as belonging in American society. Other significant factors they found that predict
the lack of public acceptance of Atheists are religious involvement, identifying as a social
conservative, identifying as Protestant, believing in the inerrancy of the bible, believing
that God controls the development and passage of our lives, and that laws should be based
on God’s law.
This high degree of fundamentalism has been shown to predict discriminatory
beliefs towards Atheists. Galen, Smith, Knapp and Wyngarden (2011) investigated the
extent to which religious fundamentalism affects impressions made on both religious and
non-religious individuals. This was a reaction to widely held beliefs that religion and a
belief in God is a requirement for individuals to have strong morals (e.g., children cannot
grow into moral adults without the guidance of religion and direction of God (Farkas,
Johnson &Foleno, 2001)). Their results showed that an assessment of a target’s social
characteristics (affiliation with religion) and a desire to associate with those that are similar
to you can be affected by the perceiver’s religious identification. They found that those
that are rated as high in religious fundamentalism prefer to affiliate with other religiously
fundamental individuals whereas those that are rated as low on religious fundamentalism
tend to show less of a preference with the exception of associated with non-religious
individuals. Perhaps more surprisingly is that highly religious individuals were shown to
base their attributions of morality based upon the target’s professed religiosity regardless if
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other aspects of the non-religious target were manipulated (explicitly non-religious clothing
worn or not).
Those living in communities with a lower SES and more diversity are more likely
to reject Atheists as belonging to American society as well. Edgell et al. (2006) believe this
because in small communities, trust and acceptance are far greater concerns. Exploring the
concept and importance of trust as a factor of Atheist prejudice, Gervais, Shariff and
Norenzayann (2011) examined the factors of Atheist prejudice though multiple
experiences. Respondents that identified God as very important in their lives in their first
study were shown to rate Atheists as more distrustful than another marginalized group in
the U.S, gay men. In their second study Atheists and rapists were found to be immorally
equivalent when presented as options amongst Christians and Muslims for participants to
choose as a described individual that commits a selfish deed in a vignette. Atheists were
also found to be less trustworthy than Jewish and feminist hypothetical vignette characters
as well.
Purpose of Study
As it has been demonstrated that the growing population of Atheists in the United
States and around the world experience unique forms of discrimination, the importance of
being able to quantitatively measure their experiences is of paramount significance. The
purpose of this study is to collect a confirmatory, validation sample for the pilot version of
the Scale of Atheist Microaggressions (SAM: Pagano, McCullagh, Fuller, & Williams,
2012). The validation sample was utilized during a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in
order to provide evidence for the pilot scale’s factor structure. The pilot scale of the SAM
was constructed following the process outlined by DeVellis (2003) and additionally
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informed by other best practices in scale construction (e.g., Bradburn et al., 2004;
Worthington &Whittaker, 2006). Prior to this dissertation project the scale went through
an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), informed by Kahn's (2006) work on scale
construction in counseling psychology. The scale utilized microaggressions theory to
inform its structure. Specifically, the SAM's construction hypothesized the presence of the
six themes presented by Nadal et al. (2010) adapted to fit Atheists and Atheism. See
chapter III for more detailed information regarding the construction of the SAM.
After performing the EFA, four of the six hypothesized themes were represented
in the data—Pathology of Atheist Individuals, Assumption of Religious Identity as
Normal, Endorsing of Atheist Stereotypes, and Denial of Atheist Prejudice. Utilizing a
principal axis factoring and oblique (specifically promax) rotation, the four factors yielded
a total explained variance value of 56.63% for the pilot SAM. It was established that the
four factors had both theoretical and statistical independence while demonstrating
sufficient levels of internal consistency. Overall, the pilot version of the SAM had a
Cronbach’s alpha of .90 (please see chapter III for more details).
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Microaggressions are indirect, slights, indignities and insults that serve to demean
and marginalize minority-identifying individuals. There is a standard taxonomy of
microaggressions that has been utilized for examining the discriminatory experiences of
racial and ethnic minorities. This taxonomy has now been applied to other minorities such
as LGBT identifying individuals and persons with disabilities. The purpose of this project
is to develop a scale that measures the experiences of non-religious minorities, specifically
Atheists, utilizing the microaggressions framework. This literature review will examine the
history and study of microaggressions as well as research on how and why Atheists are
discriminated against. For the sake of this project Atheism is defined as a definitive
proclamation that no god or gods exist (Baker & Smith, 2009). Finally, proposed
hypotheses steeped in literature about the construction and nature of the proposed scale of
Atheist microaggressions is provided. Also reviewed are related scales that are able to serve
as models for scale development.
Microaggressions
Microaggressions are the subtle, often discreet, insults and ignominies performed
by groups or individuals in the majority against minority individuals and groups (see Sue,
Capodilupo, Torino, Bucceri, Holder, Nadal, & Esquilin, 2007). The study of
microaggressions was born out of a necessity related to the context of contemporary
forms of racism. Understanding the development and conceptualization of Atheist
12	
  
	
  

Microaggressions requires an understanding of the progression of racial oppressions and
development of racial microaggressions.
Contemporary Forms of Racism
Microaggressions are a form of contemporary discrimination and oppression,
originally conceptualized to better understand contemporary, racial oppression. Racial
oppression has grown from more overt forms of bigotry and discrimination to more subtle
forms of marginalization and oppression. Contemporary racism (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2004; Kovel, 1970) is a form of racism that occurs when individuals may consciously know
that all people are equal and should be treated as such under the word of the law but will
at times unconsciously harbor discriminatory beliefs and perpetrate bigoted actions that
they may not be aware of. That same form of discrimination has been shown to be
prevalent for Atheists as well (Edgell et al., 2006; Jones, 2007).
Aversive racism. Aversive racism is a form of contemporary racism that is not
often perpetrated directly or overtly, it is rather a result of the unconscious concealment of
negative values and feelings towards the minority while outwardly expressing egalitarian
ideals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). As a result of these negative feelings towards the
minority, the majority may avoid interactions with minority members, finding comfort in
their own racial or ethnic group. Therefore aversive racists will rarely make outright,
discriminatory decisions in public and deny racially motivated behavior. Mostly
importantly they are not willing to violate the egalitarian image they value presenting to the
world. As they still hold discriminatory beliefs they may be more likely to take advantage
of situations in which they can rationalize or justify discriminatory decisions (see Gaertner
& Dovidio, 1986; 2005). These situations may likely occur when the standards for
13	
  
	
  

appropriate social behavior are ambiguous or when there is little to no threat to their
egalitarian values (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).
Dovidio and Gaertner (1981), in one of the first studies examining aversive racism,
found that the competence of racial minorities is often questioned when they are in
supervisory position over White individuals. White individuals would do this in order to
challenge the apparent reversal of a conventional African American-White relationship
with the African American in a subordinate position. In this study they found that White
individuals in supervisory positions showed a greater willingness to help individuals in
subordinate positions, who were African American than those who White. This allowed
the White supervisors to continue engaging and perpetrating the traditional relationship of
Whites being able to assist African Americans due to their superior position, while still
appearing helpful and supportive.
In another study, Kuntsman and Plant (2008) discovered that in very grave
emergencies White participants came to the aide of African American victims significantly
slower and even slightly less often. White participants were even shown to interpret what
might have been considered a race-neutral, serious emergency, as less serious. This is
significant because if White participants were able to interpret serious emergencies as less
serious they were effectively lowering their pro-social responsibility to provide assistance
to African Americans. This finding speaks to the theory of aversive racism because not
being responsible to provide assistance makes it much easier to avoid contact with
someone outside of your racial and ethnic group. The findings of this study build on
earlier work by advocating that when aversion is high, White people may infer the situation
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to justify not providing assistance and alleviate any tension experienced from not helping
an African American.
Additionally, it has been proposed that “in-group/out-group” thinking may be at
the source of how this form of prejudice manifests (Allport, 1979). At a very young age
we are taught that we belong to various social groups, including political parties, families,
gender, and of course, racial and ethnic groups. He argued that we are rewarded for
automatic membership in the group, and actively cohering to the group in order to
preserve group foundations and boundaries, especially White individuals. The out-group is
anyone that is not included when the majority in-group’s use of “we” does not apply.
From this perspective discrimination by aversive racists, are actions that allow White
people to respond favorably to their own racial in-group while excluding African
Americans (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Gaertner et al., 1997). The in-group/out-group
paradigm has also been used to study Atheists as a nonreligious, out-group (Gervais, 2011;
Hunter, 2001).
A common component to modern and aversive forms of racism Kliener (1988)
argued is how conversation within the majority occurs. He wrote that conversation about
unmentionable topics like religion, politics and especially race is generally held between
friends or at the very least, “safe” individuals (located within an in-group). These
individuals or group can be presumed to hold similar beliefs. By limiting the audience to
which individuals articulate their racist and discriminatory beliefs they do not risk exposing
their “pseudo-argument” to scrutiny, argument, and other social pressures. He defined
“pseudo-argument” as discourse veiling invalidating and minimizing statements of
minority experiences. In this way, the articulation and discourse within the in-group that
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often perpetuates racism is effectively masked and disguised as non-racist and even
classless from the in-group or majority perspective. Part of the power that the majority
(White individuals, in Kliener’s example) has is that they keep their conversations one
sided, they control negative influence against it and the minority’s voice is effectively
dismissed or silenced. Control for negative influence protects the in-group mentality,
membership and boundaries.
Symbolic racism. Another form of contemporary racial oppression that has been
argued to have replaced “old fashioned” racism is symbolic racism. Symbolic racism is a
source of resistance found in a post-segregation society. As a result of segregation ending
White people, especially Northern Whites, for the first time felt the effect of more racially
liberal government laws. Subsequently many White Americans expressed symbolic racism
because of their belief that African Americans challenged the very “symbols” or societal
values they held such as obedience and discipline (Sears, 1988). Examples of this may be
reactions to African Americans rebelling against the White ideals of rugged individualism,
subservience and self-reliance—all traditional and conservative American principles that
are valued differently by African Americans. White groups not appreciating the different
ways that African American value speech and self-expression for example provide a
foundation for symbolic racism. African American and other minority cultural values are
thereby pathologized. It is in this way that moral and value based disagreements, instead
of racial or ethnic ones may be more likely to activate symbolic racism. This theme of
“pathologizing cultural values,” viewing non-majority, non-White cultural values deviant or
less deserving of respect and consideration is also explored in the theory of
Microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007).

	
  

16

Attitudinal predispositions towards minorities can be provoked or activated by
political symbols (Sears, 1993) and as such symbolic racism has been studied more
thoroughly in the realm of politics and government proceedings (Sears, 1988; Sears, Van
Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman, 1997). In 1981, common political beliefs that revolved around
issues of race held by the White majority were that the country’s African American
population was receiving more government assistance than they deserved. This upset many
Whites because it challenged their egalitarian values (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Racial
attitudes have been also shown to affect other political beliefs such as taxes, crime rates, as
well as other civil rights issues such as busing and undocumented immigrants (Berg, 2009;
Krysa, 2000; Sears, Hensler & Speer, 1979; Sears, 2001).
Ford, Maxwell and Sheilds (2010) examined the election environment in two
southern states (Georgia & Arkansas) during the election of then senator, Barack Obama.
These two states were chosen due to their historical and socio-political background, a
“unique opportunity to examine the influence of race, and symbolic racism” (p. 287) they
wrote. According to the U.S 2010 Census, both Arkansas and Georgia are predominately
White states making up approximately 77% and 60% of the total population respectively.
Despite Arkansas’s surprising history with electing Democratic officials and Georgia’s
favorable Democratic-leaning during the primaries, the two states gave their votes to
Senator John McCain. Ford et al. hypothesized that Barack Obama lost those states due to
his race which activated attitudes and behaviors associated with symbolic racism. Their
study, which examined samples of individuals from both Georgia and Arkansas, found
that those who endorsed John McCain for presidency scored significantly higher on an
assessment of symbolic racism, than Obama supporters. Support of George W. Bush in
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the previous election and high levels of symbolic racism also negatively predicted support
for Obama’s candidacy. This study showed that symbolic racism might be a strong factor
for southern voters. From a symbolic racism standpoint, voters may have believed that the
election of the country’s first African American president could challenge traditional,
White-American values.
Color-Blind racism. Another facet of contemporary racism is referred to as
“color-blind racism.” Color-blindness occurs when racial and ethnic minorities’
experiences of racism and discrimination are invalidated and disregarded (Bonilla-Silva,
2010). Racial and ethnic minorities’ experiences of oppression in many cases may for
example be considered an overreaction. If individuals in a society cannot see race or is
blind to skin color then the maintenance of racial disparities in society is allowed to
continue because they have been rendered invisible. In this sense maintaining a color-blind
attitude allows for privileged groups and individuals to espouse values of fairness and
equality while acting unconscious but firmly implanted racial and ethnic biases (Murrell,
Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner & Drout, 1994; Sears et al., 1979). Color-blind racism like
symbolic racism is similarly operationalized in cultural practices (e.g., African American
people lack a drive towards learning and accomplishment).
Having so entrenched itself in privilege, Doane (2003) argued, White people, their
culture and their values cannot be studied independently from contemporary forms of
racism. Historical events and changes lend support to color-blind racism through means of
affording generally White individuals the ability to negate, misrepresent and dismiss the
significance of race and racism (Neville, Spanierman, & Doan, 2006). Within the history of
immigration in the United States we can begin to see just one of many reasons why color-
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blind racism may have developed. As the influx of European immigrants came to the
United States in the middle of the 19th century it was often to the benefit of many
individuals and families to assimilate in to Protestant, White, Anglo-Saxon culture quickly
(Doane, 2003). Gallagher (2010) writes that the influx of European Whites did not
comfortably fit into the racial categories in America reserved for African Americans and
Asian immigrants, so a “white washing” of ethnic lines occurred to reduce the confusion
of how to identify the new immigrants. Prior to this religion and language (e.g.,
Catholicism and Italian) were often used interchangeably as both ethnic and racial
indicators. As many different White European cultures incorporated into American
culture, Carr (1997) argues that White ethnic identity slowly became a choice. Being able
to flexibly turn on and off ones ethnicity for White individuals, like claiming Irish heritage
at Notre Dame football game or Italian heritage while at an Italian restaurant is a very
powerful tool that allows the White majority to maintain power in society.
By defining race only as cultural representations as was done with some European
immigrants (Gallagher, 2003; 2010) Whites today are potentially able to see race and
ethnicity as little more than a nonthreatening cultural indication that has been distanced
from forms of institutional and established oppression. Gallagher writes that color-blind
racism partially operates from the myth that America is a meritocracy, which many Whites
connect to their ethnic immigrant past. The belief might be that because my White
European, minority ancestors were able to triumph over adversity so should other
minorities. The myth that the United States is a meritocracy is also a theme in the study of
microaggressions (see Sue et al., 2007) that will be elaborated on later.
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Gallahger (2003) asserts that the color-blind ideology operates on the belief that
racial minorities can achieve greater success by relieving themselves from any differential
treatment or privileges. By overcoming the hardships of being European Immigrants,
Gallagher argues race was reduced as a hindrance to success in this country, which in turn
became one of many reasons that the color-blind ideology may have developed in the
United States. Religion has been cited to be just as flexible of an identity.This flexibility
allows individuals to pick and choose from an overwhelming amount of denominations
that are difficult to pinpoint and measure (Alwin, Felson, Walker & Tufiş, 2006; French,
2003; Sullivan, 2009), allowing religion to maintain a considerable amount of power and
influence in the United States.
Color-blindness, according to Bonilla-Silva (2003) occurs when the majority group
(Whites) operates within “racial scripts” (p. 131) the perpetuate the status quo, allowing
the majority group to maintain benefits and systemic rewards afforded to the
confrontation of minorities’ fighting to subvert that same status quo. Additionally, BonillaSilva stated that while there are no more systemic, governmental and environmental
policies directly related to race such as water fountains in courtrooms clearly labeled
“WHITES only” and segregated school systems there are White realtors, carefully steering
African American individuals and families away from traditionally White neighborhoods. A
colorblind society is not a perfect place where race has no significance, but a place where
race and ethnicity are not discussed. Whites are able to be viewed as individuals and not
profiled as belonging to a group. A colorblind attitude makes it nearly impossible for nonmajority members to gain any momentum in fights for their political and social equality
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because it allows individuals to ignore the inequalities due to what cannot be changed—
skin color.
The study of color-blind racism also critically examines the use of language and
argument according to Bonilla-Silva (2002). Discussion between White individuals and
groups about race and racism has become a “rhetorical maze” (p. 42) to be navigated,
outlined and explored. Some examples he cited greatly revolve around themes explored by
the theory of microaggressions. These examples are the tendency of White, majority
individuals to deny that they are not racial beings (not acknowledging the privilege of their
White skin) and are incapable of being racist because of egalitarian views they promote or
by virtue of having an African American friend or a bi-racial relative. He also shared other
examples of White individuals stammering, giving lengthy pauses, and other evidences of
being uncomfortable about discussing race. Bonilla-Silva examines this discomfort as
support for racial inequality still being an important issue, despite the otherwise “colorblind” ideologies that many Whites seem to strong support. Race is very emotional and
complicated issue he wrote and the incoherence, contradictions and repetitions seen in
conversations about race are a result of the incongruence of discussing race “in a world
that insists race does not matter…” (p. 62).
As discussed earlier, ethnic minority success can lead an assumption that race is no
longer an obstruction to success and a contemporary example of color-blind racism can be
found by examining the two most recent United States Presidential elections. Bonilla-Silva
and Dietrich (2011) argue that the election of Barack Obama allowed “the tentacles of
color-blind racism [to] reach even deeper into the crevices of the American polity” (p.
109). They argue that having a single non-White, African American man in a very powerful
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position in world politics does not mitigate the disparate racial and ethnic inequalities still
present in the United States. Drawing from a symbolic racism framework as well, they
wrote that Obama’s ability to claim the traditional American, philosophical symbols of
hard work, determinism, social status elevation, may have only served increased White’s
buy-in to the misconception that the United States is an equal and open nation with
equivalent opportunities for all. Obama’s meritocratic rise to the presidency encourages
others to discount or invalidate the experiences of racism and inequality that other racial
and ethnic minorities encounter.
Original Taxonomy of Microaggressions
Microaggressions are defined by Sue et. al (2007) as “brief and commonplace daily
verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person
or group” (p. 271). The concept of microaggressions incorporates three factors:
microinsults, microassualts, and microinvalidations. A microinsult is a statement or
interaction that expresses discourtesy and inattentiveness in such a way to disgrace a
person’s identity or beliefs. A microassault is often conscious and more unambiguous. It
is intended to cause hurt to the marginalized person or group. A microinvalidationis a
message that overwhelms or disaffirms the experiences, thoughts and feelings of
marginalized individuals and groups (Sue, 2010). Nadal et al. (2010) proposed taxonomy of
themes to describe religious minority microaggressions that will be adapted to fit Atheists.
The cumulative effect of the day to day experiences of microaggressions has been
hypothesized to cause ill health (Sue et al., 2007). Covert, subtle racism in the form of
microaggressions and internalized oppression have all been connected to poor mental and
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physical health (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2012). Psychotic and mood disorders, as well as
heart disease have been connected to the experience of discrimination (Burke, Davis, Otte
& Mohr, 2005; Smith, Ben-Shlomo, Beswick, Yarnell, Lightman & Elwood, 2005). The
experience of discrimination can also lead to increased rates of suicidal ideation (Hwang &
Goto, 2009).
The microaggression literature initially focused on the study of racial
microaggressions against racial and ethnic minorities in the framework of assessing the
quality multicultural counseling in mental health settings (Sue et. al, 2007). It surfaced from
the injurious impression of contemporary forms racism: aversive racism, symbolic racism,
and color-blind racism. Traditional racism is very overt and violent whereas the concept of
aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) is based on the idea that judgment of
minorities is characterized by a persistent avoidance of contact with that group due to
underlying negative feelings towards minorities. Symbolic racism occurs when a minority
group challenges the “symbols” of tradition and values held by the racial majority (Sears,
1988). Color-blind racism (D’Souza, 1996) occurs when individuals and groups are blind to
the significances of race, making it difficult to effectually tackle racial inequities. The field
of Microaggressions is one of the primary vehicles to portray and spread pro-majority,
anti-minority beliefs and behaviors. Microaggressions for racial, ethnic and religious
minorities can be perpetrated verbally, behaviorally (non-verbally), and environmentally.
An impediment still not crossed in the fields of multiculturalism and diversity is one that
relates to not only religious minorities (e.g., Muslims) but also the irreligious or nonreligious, specifically Atheists.
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The study of microaggressions came from a desire to acknowledge and establish
uncounsciously held, involuntarily expressed beliefs as a major channel to perpetuate
racism. Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez and Wills (1977) wrote “the chief vehicle for
proracist behaviors are microaggressions. These are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and
nonverbal exchanges which are ‘put-downs’ of African Americans by offenders”(p 65).
The accumulative psychological and health effects of every day, innocuous racist
transgressions on non-White, non-western oriented individuals have also been of
paramount concern as racism and bigotry is still pervasive and divisive in America (see
Sue, 2010a). Microaggressions theory utilized and built upon the recognizably modern,
symbolic and aversive forms of racism to establish its case for formalizing a coherent and
tangible theory with which to examine a plethora of race, gender, sexual orientation
concerns. Microaggressions were originally studied in the context or race and ethnicity,
derogatory and negative statements towards African Americans perpetrated by Whites.
Sue (2007; 2010a; 2010b) indicated that researchers of microaggressions give
prominent attention to analysis of the vibrant interaction between perpetrator and victim.
Research catalogs everyday manifestations of racist beliefs. This involves unfolding
concealed racist messages and investigating both the internal and external consequential
significances. Multidimensional scales are commonly utilized to measure and deconstruct a
breadth of related phenomenon (such as behaviors and attitudes), each dimension acting
as a single scale in and of itself (Clark & Watson, 1995; Devellis, 2003). Commonly seen in
scales utilizing the theory of Microaggressions is the use of a taxonomy created by Sue et
al. (2007). Originally intended for race and ethnicity, the broad taxonomy that further
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defines and expresses the reality of oppressed minorities is comprised of “microassualts,
microinsults, and microinvalidations.”
Microassault. A microassault is a communication perpetrated by a majority group
or individual that is more often conscious and explicit (Sue et al., 2007). A microassault is
generally intended to cause hurt in the minority individual or group. Microassualts can also
be used to bully, frighten and make individuals or groups feel unwelcome and unsafe.
Common, everyday examples of microassaults that many are familiar with through popular
media and interpersonal experiences are inappropriate jokes. These jokes serve the
purpose of making minority members feel less than those in the upper echelons of society.
Racial, gender, and sexual orientation epithets, sometimes encountered in the context of a
joke would also be considered forms of microassaults. Microassaults are most likely to be
considered older forms of racism. They may be perpetrated more often when perpetrators
feel some sense of anonymity, are in a safe environment (much like an in-group) or when
our barriers to privately held beliefs are broken down for some reason (Sue, 2010; Sue &
Capodilupo, 2008).
Microinsult. A microinsult is a communication that expresses discourtesy and
inattentiveness from a majority person or group in such a way to demean a minority
individual or group’s identity or beliefs (Sue et al., 2007). Microinsults may represent the
most subtle and unconscious forms of microaggressions. As the broad term microinsult is
broken down there are additional themes within that have been identified in the literature
from studies on race and ethnicity (see Sue, et al., 2007). They are “Ascription of Intelligence,
Second Class Citizen, Pathologizing Cultural Values and Communication Styles, and Assumption of
Criminal Status.”
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Ascription of intelligence. The theme “Ascription of Intelligence” is a form of
microinsult that occurs when a majority individual credits a minority individual or group
with some level intelligence group based solely based on the race or ethnicity of the
individual (Sue et al., 2007). A common message in this theme may imply that non-White
individuals and groups are not as intelligent. Another message in this theme is a
contrasting one where minority individuals are assumed to be intelligent (e.g., Asians are
intelligent and good at math). These types of microinsult are an unfortunate part of the
history of psychology. Eurocentric intelligence assessments for example provided support
for the intellectual superiority Whites for decades. It was widely proclaimed that African
Americans and other non-Whites occupy the bottom rung of the intelligence quotient
ladder. Psychology’s scientific racists fought hard to provide statistical evidence to prevent
racial integration in public schools (Boake, 2002; Cohen, 2002).
That example is all too common for Asian Americans and Asian immigrants, as
they are often referred to as the “model minority” (Taylor & Stern, 1987; Dharma, 20011).
Asian Americans and immigrants were given the title of “model minority” in part because
it justified the privilege and power enjoyed by White Americans by offering other racial
and ethnic minorities a rebuttal to complaints about unfair and racist politics and
institutions (Osajima, 2005). Even though Asian immigrants were initially presented as
good, moral people that value hard work and education, because they were used in direct
comparison and pitted in competition against African Americans and Latinos/as they
would never reach equal footing with White Americans (Osajima, 2005). White Americans
were and still are above competing with racial and ethnic minorities, an untouchable
hegemony. Religious adherents, especially those identified as conservative or traditional,
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have also been said to enjoy the privilege of being untouchable by virtue of majority status
and silent, unquestionable power in many facets of various cultures around the world
(Benavides & Daly, 1989; Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004).
Second class citizen. The theme “Second Class Citizen” is a microinsult that
contains the unconscious message that a minority individual or group is either less
significant or deserving of fair consideration in both commonplace and significant
situations (Sue et al., 2007). This theme of microinsult often occurs when minority
individuals are given discrepant treatment (e.g., a racial minority being ignored by a
customer service representative in order to first serve a White customer). Messages from
this theme might imply that people of color are inferior and are to serve Whites or be in a
subordinate role or that majority members are more valued; Pathologizing cultural
values and communication styles. The theme “Pathologizing Cultural Values and
Communication Styles” is a theme of microinsult that expresses that belief that the values
and communication styles of racial and ethnic minority groups and individuals are deviant
or not valued (Sue et al., 2007). This theme of microinsult is closely related to symbolic
racism (Sears, 1988). The main message form this theme of microinsult is that White
culture and expressions of it are preferred. A common example is when someone asks an
African American person to be quiet and to stop being so loud when they speak;
Assumption of criminal status. The theme “Assumption of Criminal Status” is a type of
microinsult that is perpetrated by majority individuals and groups when it is assumed that
minority groups and individuals are criminal or dangerous to others based on their race or
ethnicity (Sue et al., 2007). Common occurrences of this theme are White women
clutching their purse when an African American walks by and a store employee following
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and watching carefully, a person of color as that person shops. The message that these
occurrences imply are that non-White minorities are going to steal and that they don’t
belong because they are dangerous.
Microinvalidations. Microinvalidations are communications from a majority
person or group that suppresses or disaffirms the experiences, thoughts and feelings of
minority groups and individuals (Sue et al., 2007). As with Microinsults, within the
concept of Microinvalidation there are additional, specific themes commonly identified
with racial and ethnic minority microaggressions (see Sue et al., 2007). It is believed that
this broad type of microaggression may be the most damaging, albeit subtle, according to
Sue (2010) as they deny the very reality of minorities. They are “Alien in One’s Own Land,
Color Blindness, Myth of Meritocracy, and Denial of Individual Racism.” This kind of
microaggression is most closely linked to the ideas of Color-Blindness (see Bonilla-Silva,
2002 for examples) and is even the name of one of the themes.
Alien in one’s own land. “Alien in One’s Own Land” is a form of
microinvalidation perpetrated a majority individual or group that implies that a minority
individual or group is less patriotic or more foreign (Sue et al., 2007). This specific form of
microinvalidation is based on the minority individual or group’s race or ethnicity. A
common experience for Latino/Americans is to be told to “go back to Mexico” if they
disagree with an American policy the implied message being that they may owe fidelity to a
different country; Color Blindness. “Color Blindness” is a type of microinvalidation
occurs when an individual or group, presumably of the majority, does not acknowledge
race or ethnicity (Sue et al., 2007). This theme of microinvalidation implies that race,
ethnicity and culture are not significant elements in the lives of groups and individuals.
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This theme of microinsult invalidates and denies individual and group ethnic and racial
experiences. Color blind attitudes deny marginalized individuals and groups as a “cultural
being” (Sue, 2010, p. 32). A common experience of color blindness might be hiring
practices at a business or admissions to a graduate program.
Myth of meritocracy. The “Myth of Meritocracy” is a form of microinvalidation
that is perpetrated by majority individuals and groups when they communicate that
minority individuals and groups owe their successes in life solely to their race or ethnicity.
The implied message is that certain people are given unfair benefits to success because of
their minority status or identification. A common experience of minorities may be to hear
that there is a level playing field for social, occupational and political achievement. This
fissure in many individuals understanding of how the system actually works and what they
believe to be true has been under scrutiny as it relates to the philosophy of the American
Dream (McNamee & Miller, 2009); Denial of individual racism. The theme of “Denial
of Individual Racism” is executed when an individual denies holding racist or
discriminatory views but can still be found engaging in racist behavior, or playing a role in
the continuation of racism. A common statement aligned with this theme may be that “I
treat everyone equally.” The message implied here may be that this individual is free from
bias and incapable of committing racist acts, thus denying the reality of very many
minorities.
Environmental Microaggressions. Most scales utilizing the theory of
Microaggressions utilize the above listed taxonomy and variations of the taxonomy. These
scales oftentimes have verbalized statements or physical behaviors as the most common
forms of microaggressions that minorities are asked to identify or endorse. Less identified
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in microaggression scales are environmental microaggressions. They occur when various
cultural settings--vocational, educational, or political are steeped in marginalization and
prejudice (Sue, 2010a; 2010b). Environmental microaggressions may be perpetrated
visually, such as having a Christian cross on the door of a manager work, implying that
other forms of religious and spiritual beliefs may not be valued in the work environment.
Environmental microaggressions may also be expressed as a climate or philosophy of an
organization, workplace, or educational system (Sue et al., 2007).
A recent example of an environmental microaggression towards women and the
poor, posited by Sue and Rivera (2011) relates to the federal budget and the debate
surrounding Planned Parenthood funding. They write that the political rhetoric used
during the debate, really the very fact that there was a debate about funding women’s
health at all, implied that women are “lesser beings and reduces their self-determination
concerning health issues.” They write that the neglect of women’s health is worsened
when political ideology is used to motivate defunding services that traditionally help
marginalized populations like women and the poor. When an environmental
microaggression occurs at the national level and is heavily publicized the entire cultural
landscape that places value on minority individuals and groups is altered. When the
message of providing healthcare to women and the poor is portrayed as sapping valuable
federal resources it becomes internalized inside for the majority in power. This leads to
those that have internalized the message to treat marginalized individuals and groups with
discrimination.
The majority of the research conducted on microaggressions toward other
minority groups was initiated with analogous taxonomies. Research has shown that the
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subtle forms of discrimination and marginalization studied in the literature of racial and
ethnic minorities can serve as a model to examine other minorities. This research led to
qualitative investigation of the proposed theories that have since been validated. Research
on microaggressions has since been expanded to address other marginalized populations
outside of race and ethnicity such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people (Nadal,
Issa, et al., 2011); women (Capodilupo et al., 2010); and people with disabilities (Keller &
Galgay, 2010). Research has even been conducted to explore the experience of multiple,
minority-identifying individuals with intersecting identities such as race and sexual
orientation (Balsam, Molina, Beadnell, Simoni & Walters, 2011). Religious minority
microaggressions are now being considered a worthwhile pursuit within the field of
multiculturalism.
Religious Minority Microaggressions
The study of religious minority microaggressions is relatively new compared to the
study of racial and ethnic minority microaggressions. A religious microaggression is
defined as “any subtle behavioral and verbal exchange (both conscious and unconscious)
that sends a denigrating message to an individual(s) of various religious groups” (Nadal,
Issa, Griffin, Hamit & Lyons, 2010, p. 297). Nadal et al. developed six additional
microaggression themes proposed that address the experiences of religious minorities that
addresses microaggressions perpetrated by religious majority members towards religious
minority members. The themes are “Endorsing Religious Stereotypes, Exoticization, Pathology of
Different Religious Groups, Assumption of One’s Own Religious Identity as the norm, Assumption of
Religious Homogeneity and Denial of Religious Prejudice” (p. 300-304).
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Endorsing Religious Stereotypes. This theme of microaggression occurs when
religious majority groups or individuals verbally, behaviorally or environmentally endorse
and perpetuate religiously biased statements against religious minority groups or
individuals. An example might be calling a Mormon a polygamist. Messages from this
theme of microaggression may imply that religious minorities do not deserve to be learned
about and that they are inferior to other religions (Nadal et al., 2010).
Exoticization. This theme of minority microaggression happens when members
of the religious majority believe that members of a religious minority are imported, bizarre
or strange. Minority religions may even be viewed as a trendy or as a fad. Examples of this
theme may involve a soon to be married couple adopting the religious ceremonies of a
religion to which they do not belong because they saw it in a movie. This kind of
microaggression sends the message that some religions are not to be taken as seriously and
that it can be played with like an ornament or decoration (Nadal et al., 2010).
Pathology of Different Religious Groups. The “Pathology of Different
Religious Groups” is a theme of microaggressions that refers to the belief held by religious
majority members that there is something wrong, abnormal, and potentially deviant with
individuals of a different religious group. Examples of this theme may involve not taking
into consideration the religious holidays and traditions of minority religions when creating
academic, social and work calendars. The implied message is that your religion is not
valued. Microaggressions within this theme may also eventually lead to religious minorities
being mistreated and punished (Nadal et al., 2010); Assumption of one’s own Religious
Identity as the Norm. The “Assumption of one’s own Religious Identity as the Norm”
is a theme of microaggression that describes the assumption those apart of the religious
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majority may make in which they presume that everyone belongs or adheres to the same
religion. A common example of this theme would be someone wishing everyone a “Merry
Christmas” without knowing if specific individuals or groups are Christian. The implied
message in this category is that everyone must belong to the same religion. This theme
plays on the lack of insight that comes with identifying as a majority, in-group member. It
is difficult for individuals in the in-group to imagine different possibilities, as they cannot
always see outside of the reality of their own group (Nadal et al., 2010).
Assumption of Religious Homogeneity. The theme “Assumption of Religious
Homogeneity” is illustrated when religious majority individuals and groups believe
everyone that identifies with a certain religion or spiritual belief system behaves and thinks
similarly. An example might be asking why a female Hindu is not wearing a Bindi all of the
time. The implied message in this theme of microaggression is that everyone in the same
group must look and dress the same. Another example would be assuming all Atheists do
not have morals (Edgell et al., 2006; Nadal et al., 2012); Denial of Religious Prejudice.
The microaggression theme of “Denial of Religious Prejudice” is relatable to the concept
of racial or ethnic colorblindness. This form of religious microaggression occurs when
religious majority groups and individuals deny the existence of their own religious biases or
they lack insight regarding their religious biases. An example of this may be an individual
staring at a female Muslim that is wearing a Hijab. While the individual may advocate
treating everyone equally this individuals staring suggests otherwise.
Physical and Psychological Effects of Microaggressions
The lack of quantitative research examining the theory of microaggressions and its
role in perpetuating physical and psychological ill health is a major critique to contend with
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(Lau & Williams, 2010). The majority of the literature utilizing this theory has largely been
qualitative. There are many quantitative studies however that look at internalized
oppression and the experience of racist events more broadly that are demonstrably linked
to the experience of microaggressions. Explaining and exploring the mental and physical
health effects of discrimination is not only an important social justice issue to pursue, but
also requisite process to strengthen the theory of Microaggressions. Scales that measure
racial, ethnic and religious minority experiences of oppression and discrimination are
crucial to this endeavor. A scale that measures Atheist’s experiences of Microaggressions
could also aid in measuring the mental and physical well-being of Atheists.
Sue et al. (2007) argue that the cumulative effects of microaggressions have a
substantial effect on the physical and mental health of marginalized groups. Over time
microaggressions can erode the body and the mind of minority identifying individuals.
Everyday stress from stigma and racism when compiled, can have a deleterious effect on
the immune and endocrine system (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2000). If we apply this knowledge
to minorities that experience stressors in multiple, subversive ways we can understand
some of the physical and mental health disparities found. Race, in addition to social class,
has been one of the leading, studied factors when power, privilege, living conditions,
material resources and access to healthcare in the U.S are examined (Williams, 2006).
Multiple forms of racism, including the subtler, aversive and symbolic forms in addition to
environmental forms have been detrimentally linked racial and ethnic minority health.
There have been a number of studies that attempt to elucidate the connection
between racism and its negative impact on the health of ethnic minorities. Harrell, Hall,
and Taliaferro (2003) stated that laboratory studies are the most prevalent way of
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examining the impact of racism on the physiology of racial and ethnic minorities. Though
laboratory studies are the most common the contribution of several other important
survey research designs utilized by psychologists cannot be ignored in the context of
measuring the harmful effects of racism. Many different kinds of research methodologies
have demonstrated that the recall of racist and discriminatory events or simply the
exposure to referents to racist events lead to negative health impacts. Harrell et al.
described four research designs common to studying the physiological effects of racism.
They are: self-report correlational, basic psychophysiology, moderated psychophysiology and mediated
psychophysiology.
Self-report correlational is the research method that is most commonly used to
measure the harmful impact of discriminatory experiences that minorities undergo. These
experiences are then correlated wither alterations in physiological arousal. Basic
psychophysiological studies create situations in which cause and effect statements about
the physiological impact of racism can be made by creating stressful experiences of
artificial racial events. Moderated psychophysiological studies utilize personality measures
to assess individual differences in physiological reactions to racist events. Finally mediated
psychophysiological studies would involve administering drugs that would serve as neural
blocks as simulated, racially stressful events occur. Harrell et al. (2003) reported that no
studies of this kind had been conducted on the effects of racism. Survey study results have
at times led to inconsistent results Harrel et al. (2003) and Okazaki (2009) cite, with some
results reporting strong positive associations and others revealing no associations. Harrell
et al. recommend grounding and refining measures of racism in modern theories of racism
(including Microaggression theory) to refine the measures and further clarify the relation
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of racism and health. They suggest that measures also be tested for social desirability that
is making sure that individuals are not influenced by the survey to deny or embellish
discriminatory events.
Racial discrimination has been connected with worsening mental health in multiple
racial and ethnic minorities, including but not limited to African Americans (see Carter,
2007), two-spirit American Indians and Alaskan Natives (Chae & Walters, 2009), Asian
Americans (Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal & Torino, 2009), and Latinos (Gee et al, 2006). A
meta-analysis has further demonstrated the connection between perceived discrimination
and both mental and physical health (Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 2012). It was found that
the perception of discrimination is connected to intensified physiological stress responses,
more adverse psychological stress reactions, more frequent participation in harmful
behaviors, and diminished participation in healthy behaviors. Not only does the wear and
tear of stigmatization and discrimination prejudiced minorities experience everyday affect
the severity of illness, it has been found to increase the rate at which they become ill as
well (McEwen, 2006). The increased levels of chronic stress encountered by minorities
may also elevate the amount of cortisol in the body to harmful levels which may in turn
lead to the development of mood disorders like depression, psychosis, and even heart
disease (Burke, Davis, Otte & Mohr, 2005; Smith, Ben-Shlomo, Beswick, Yarnell,
Lightman & Elwood, 2005; Walker & Diforio, 1997).
Minorities that internalize oppression, therefore buying into some of the harmful
messages of systemic and personal experiences of discrimination are more likely to
experience negative health effects according to Chae, Nuru-Jeter, and Adler (2012). They
demonstrated that internalized, perceived anti-African American bias (higher levels of
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internalized oppression) combined with high levels of perceived racial discrimination (not
either alone) put African American, midlife men at higher risk for hypertension. They
found that together, those two factors are important to consider when both risk and
protective factors for racial minorities are examined. Another significant finding is that
individuals with a more pro-African American bias can serve as a protective factor or
buffer against the negative impacts of racial discrimination.
Mulia and Zemore (2012) found that exposure to racial stigma and unfair
treatment correlates with alcohol dependence through means of depressive symptoms.
Vulnerability to alcohol dependence and depression were found to be the same among
White, African Americans and Latinos, however Whites did not develop as high of a rate
of alcoholism and depressive symptoms they found because they were not exposed to as
great of an amount of social adversity. Individually perceived racism and prejudice have
been shown to have an adverse effect on mental health of African American, and Mexican
American adolescents as well (Gee, Ryan & Laflamme, 2006). In school environments
microaggressions have been shown to cause anguish in racial and ethnic minority college
students.
In order to provide a healthy, productive college environment Solórzano (2000)
argues the overall, racial climate of university campuses must be assessed as more and
more ethnic and racial minorities are able to attend top-tier universities. Utilizing a focus
group research design for their study, racial microaggressions perceived by African
American, undergraduate students were examined. He found that there were prominent
themes of feeling invisible and ignored due to invalidating microaggressions. Faculty
reportedly stereotyped African American students to the point of inducing great, self-

	
  

37

doubt. These events were reported to provoke strong feelings of stress, “being drained,”
emotionally uncomfortable, and feeling persecuted. This lead to African American
students dropping classes and abruptly changing majors.
A study of 36 African American male students from universities around the United
States identified strongly with what Smith, Allen and Danley (2007) would refer to as
“racial battle fatigue” (p. 552). They proposed that the racial battle fatigue concept can
serve as a framework to understand the experiences of African American students in
traditional White institutions of higher learning. Focus group interviews were conducted
with the students that focused on examining the psychological health of the students in the
context of racial microaggressions and its cumulative effects. Using the constant
comparison method two major themes emerged: (1) anti-African American male
stereotyping and marginality and (2) hypersurveillance and control. African American
males described themselves as being perceived as an outsider and not belonging or fitting
the description of very negative, African American male stereotypes. An assumption of
criminality was a common microaggression experienced by the men interviewed and their
peers groups. The psychological effects of these experiences were noted to be ones of
shock, resentment, frustration, anxiety, desperateness and fear. These emotions are also
physiological reactions to the experience of racial microaggressions the authors note, all a
part of a style of coping that African American, male students are forced to used.
Similar experiences were found to have happened to Chinese-American
undergraduate students as well (Yosso, Smith, Ceja & Soloranzo, 2009) with a similar
research design. Common emotional states reported by the students involved feeling
unintelligent in the classroom, guilty for not participating in racist humor, self-doubt, and
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alienation. The accumulation of the microaggressions, predominantly microinsults, the
authors report, have led to the students feeling as if they are trespassers. Looking
specifically at both Asian-American and Latinos populations Hwang and Goto (2009)
wanted to explore emic and etic differences in trait and state anxiety, suicidal ideation, and
depressive symptoms as responses to discrimination Latinos and Asian American college
students face in their day to day lives.
Their results showed that generally less education was significantly and positively
associated with increased psychological distress. Both groups, Latinos and Asian
Americans experienced rates of suicidal ideation, but there were no significant differences
between the two groups. Asian Americans were shown to experience significantly higher
risk for trait anxiety. Those at significantly higher risk for depression were women and
those exposed to more discrimination. These results are important because the two
groups were indicating that a variety of discriminatory events were occurring at least “once
in a while” or “sometimes.” Discrimination is an authentic and real experience for these,
very visible minority groups that have clear consequences. Understanding discrimination
from the perspective of Asian-Americans, for examples, is very important because it is
sometimes wrongfully assumed that they do not experience discrimination due to their
“model minority” status (Wang, Siy & Cheryan, 2011).
Latino’s have also been shown to be affected by the frequency and level of stress
caused by discriminatory events. Huynh, Devos, & Dunbar (2012) gathered 168 Latino/a
undergraduate students and asked them to rate the frequency and stressfulness of racist
events. They were then asked to complete an inventory of depressive symptoms. Their
results demonstrated that low stress event, frequency predicts psychological distress,
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whereas frequency does not predict the distress associated with high stress events. This
article’s results are significant because real discriminatory experiences of low stress events,
as Sue predicted, can and do build up over time—greater frequency leads to higher
distress. Highly stressful events however, lead to psychological distress regardless of the
frequency of the events they found. The evidence from this study also suggests that
individuals who experience racially discriminatory event, even if they consider it “lowstress” may not necessarily have an awareness of the harmful effects of these seemingly
day to day events, giving evidence to the subtle, unconscious experiencing of
microaggressions.
Lower SES has also predicted vulnerability to depressive mood disorders and
substance use through means of disparaging treatment steeped in contemporary forms of
racism (Mulia & Zemore, 2012). Racial and ethnic minorities have not enjoyed the increase
in weekly wage and salary income that Whites have traditionally enjoyed in the last two
decades. The lower financial security and success that racial and ethnic minorities face also
impact their ability to access health care. Racial and ethnic minorities, specifically African
American and Hispanic populations, have been found to suffer lower birth rates and
overall, higher death rates for many minority populations when compared to their White
counterparts (Geronimus, Bound, Waidmann, Hillemeir & Burns, 1996; Levin et al., 2001;
MacDorman, Kirmeyer, MacDorman & Kirmeyer, 2009).
Socioeconomic status is very much connected to subversive, culturally entrenched
forms of racism that has the potential to affect access to medical care, mental health, and
employment. In this way access to health care and equal wages can be conceptualized as an
environmental microaggression. Behavioral and psychological factors are a large part of
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the reason racial and ethnic minorities experience poorer mental and physical health,
which affects their ability to access and utilize health and social services (Williams,
Lavizzo-Mourey & Warren, 1994). The worsening socio-economic situation for many
minorities is directly associated with their worsening mental and physical health (Williams
& Collins, 1995; Williams, Yu, Jackson & Anderson, 1997) and racism is the central force
that perpetuates the seen discrimination, prejudice and differential out-group treatment of
racial and ethnic minorities.
It has been identified through various psychological, sociological, religious and
spiritual, academic sources that Atheists are a unique group of individuals with their own
values and concerns that are infrequently addressed in academia and society. It is
anticipated that the study of microaggressions will prove to be a valuable heuristic in
examining discriminatory attitudes and beliefs towards Atheists. Therefore utilizing the
theory of Microaggressions as a means to guide scale development, the deleterious effects
of discriminatory beliefs held towards irreligious and nonreligious minorities like Atheists
will be made concrete. Overt as well as subtle, behavioral, verbal and environmental
microaggressions will be represented on the final scale.
Atheists and Atheism
The purpose of this scale development project is to provide a scale by which to
measure prejudice and discrimination towards Atheists. Atheists are growing minority
(Gallup, 2010), and a unique, marginalized group deserving of attention utilizing a specific
lens through which to examine their distinctive needs. Recent investigated Atheist
demographics, quality of life and worldview. This information can be used to develop scale
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items that are appropriate to their intended audience, provide implications for future use
of the scale, and the impact it such a scale might have.
Demographics of Atheists
The number of Americans with no traditional religious identity began to surge in
the 1970s, reaching about 11% by the year 1990. After some vacillations over the
preceding 20 years, 16% of Americans now have no religious identity or chose not to
answer the question about religious affliation (Gallup, 2010). While some measures report
78% of Americans identify with Christianity, specifically Protestantism, in America today
(Gallup, 2009), Atheists make up approximately .4% of the general United States
population and 2.0% of the world’s population. Estimates of as much as 500-900 million
non-believers are estimated to cohabitate with their religious counterparts worldwide
(Zuckerman, 2005).
Many people acknowledge a desire to leave their religion behind and approximately
13% of religiously affiliated Americans wish to do so. Only approximately 40% of those
that consider leaving their religion actually do so according to the 2006 Portraits of
American Life, a panel study on religion in the United States. If everyone that actually
wanted to leave their religion acted on their desire that would be a considerable number of
religiously unaffiliated. Utilizing data from this panel study, Vargas (2011) investigated how
the variables of age, race, education, gender, marital status, parental status, political
orientation and household income predicted leaving a religious affiliation. A divergent
view from traditional, conservative political beliefs and conservative religious thought was
found to be associated with leaving religion. Religious skepticism too, is significantly
associated with leaving ones religion. Surprisingly, life stressors do not have a uniform
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directional effect on disaffiliating from ones religion. It was found that being younger,
White and male increases the chances of disaffiliating from ones religion as well (Vargas,
2011). Merino (2012) examined individuals raised without religion in recent birth cohorts
and found that not only were there more individuals raised without religion than previous
cohorts, but that they are staying unaffiliated more so than previous cohorts. These
individuals raised with no religion were found to be more distrusting of organized religion,
more secular in their thinking, politically liberal and married to a religiously unaffiliated
spouse as well, if they chose to marry at all.
In 2012, the most recent Pew Research survey on religious identification found a
.8% increase in those identifying as Atheists from 2007 until 2012 and an increase from
15.3% to 19.6% in those choosing not to identify with a religion (Pew Research Center,
2012). While Atheism is still a minority, the majority of American adults were not
Protestant Christian. Protestant Christians, the previous majority only claimed about 48%
of the population. This marks the first time in Pew Research Center surveys and in the
history of the United States that the Protestant share of the population has dipped
significantly below 50 percent. In 2007, 38% of people who reported they seldom or never
attend religious services designated themselves as religiously unaffiliated. In 2012, we see
yet again, a move away from religion as 49% of infrequent attenders taken from the total
sample of 2,942 abjure any religious affiliation. That is a change of 11% from 2007. As the
United States slowly moves away from identification with traditional religion towards nonreligious and secular identification, understanding the needs and untold experiences of our
non-religious minorities, specifically Atheists, is important. If psychology and other
disciplines do not begin to address this increasingly significant minority, the United States
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may run the risk of alienating and pushing away a growing and remarkable portion of its
citizens.
Concerns with Contemporary Studies of Religion and Spirituality
Although not a popular minority, as it will be demonstrated, Atheists have arguably
been present in American society since its inception. Unfortunately the plethora of
research conducted on religion, spirituality and belonging in society has not adequately
studied Atheists and Atheism. In general the study of religiosity, related topics and
measures used to study them are not necessarily apt to addressing Atheism (Bullivant,
2008; Hwang, Hammer & Cragun, 2011). Utilizing surveys to measure religious identities,
let alone non-religious or irreligious identities, is a difficult issue (Alwin, Felson, Walker &
Tufiş, 2006).
For example, a common relationship discussed when researching religion in
psychology and sociology is the protective factors of religion for mental health and social
well-being (Ellison & Levin, 1998; Koenig, 2008; Seybold & Hill, 2001). These studies did
not consider exploring what protective factors Atheists may have in their design thereby
implying that non-belief is not a healthy lifestyle. It has been shown that societies with
higher rates of secularism and “organic Atheism,” that is Atheism which is not forced
upon a society by its government (state Atheism in Albania post World War II for
example), is positively correlated with multiple measures of progressive human
development, lower infant mortality rates, lower poverty rates and gender equality (CIA
World Fact Book, 2004; Zuckerman, 2006).
The above studies also suggest that it is easier for religious identifying individuals
to derive meaning and purpose from their live due to their religious identification and

	
  

44

faith. A recent study showed that when compared to a representative sample of religious
individuals and religious “nones,” Atheists show poorer degrees of meaningfulness
(subjectively experienced meaningfulness derived from experiences of transcendence and
self-actualization ) compared to religious individuals (p< .001) and those that do not
identify with a religion (“religious nones”) (p= .022). They do not undergo crises
ofmeaningany more often than religious individuals and nones(Schnell & Keenan, 2011).
Successive cluster analyses showed that the differences in ways individuals identify with
Atheism, specifically ones level of commitment to their Atheist identity, should be
considered. They found that individuals that are more committed to their Atheist identity
and are able to self-actualize, or achieve ones full potential and demonstrate no crises in
meaning making.
According to Schnell and Keenan (2011) Atheists in general demonstrated
generally high levels of well-being and social affiliation relative to the religious sample and
those that did not identify with a religion. They found that individuals that are not strongly
committed to their Atheism however experience more frequently crises of meaning and
have low amounts of meaningfulness. They also found that Atheists in their sample
demonstrate strong commitments to individualism, knowledge, comfort, insight and
freedom. One could argue if academia were to focus on the benefits of that are afforded
to Atheists and secular countries (as suggested by Whitley, 2010) a great stride in the study
of coping skills, health and psychological well-being could be made and added to the
benefits shown to be associated with religious involvement and identification.
There is a need for more studies about the potential benefits of secularism and
Atheism as the field of religion and spirituality as a whole has been neglectful of affirming
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secular individuals (Hwang et al., 2011; Sherkat, 2008). It is argued that the religious and
spiritual literature that supports the relationship between religiosity and positive mental
health may be spurious, connecting studies with problems of construct validity, sampling
difficulty and problematical analyses (Hwang et al., 2011). Meta-analytic work cites a very
unclear relationship between the religion, mental and physical health according to Hackney
and Sanders (2003). They cite some studies finding positive, moderate relationships
between religion and well-being and others finding no relationship or a negative
relationship.
Others assert that it is not religion in and of itself that serves as a protective
factor, instead it is the component parts that make up religion that form the protective
factors. Examples include the social connectivity and sense of belongingness bound by
common ideals that are offered to individuals in a religious group (Parganment, 2002) or
the sense of control it offers its adherents in dangerous and critical circumstances
(Pargament, 2001). Recognizing these benefits that religions offer their members Scheitle
and Adamczyk (2010) hypothesized that individuals that stay in more fundamental and
sectarian (e.g., Mormons from The Church of Latter Day Saints and African American
Protestants) will report higher levels of general health and secondly, individuals who leave
or switch from sectarian religions will face poorer levels of general health. They believed
that because of the high expectations of conformity and participation expected sectarian
individuals will most likely engage in less unhealthy activities, have access to more
resources (such as pastoral counseling and financial support for healthcare) and be
supported in a large group that shares the same worldview.
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Their results provide their first hypothesis, that individuals who stay in sectarian
religions have higher levels of general health, being significantly more likely to describe
their health as “excellent” (Scheitle & Adamczyk, 2010). Their expectation that those who
leave or switch to another religion from a sectarian groups will report poorer health is also
substantiated. Interestingly while highly sectarian religions were shown to retain more
members (Sectarian religions retaining 64.3% compared to only 57.6% retention for
mainline protestants), a high percentage of those that do switch affiliations end up
identifying as having no religious affiliation (12.8%). Those that were raised without
religious affiliation show a low retention rate, as 47% of those raised unaffiliated in their
study identify with a religion later in life. Those who are raised unaffiliated and remain so
still report that their health is “good.” What this means for the study of Atheists and
Atheism is that affiliating with religion may be a very good way to disseminate healthy and
pro-social behaviors as well as promote feelings of belonging. Atheists if initially raised in
religion, having some of the requisite health and interpersonal skills, may not feel the need
for the religious narrative in their lives anymore as the narrative itself does not seems to be
the critical part to a healthy life and subsequently leave religion.
Unfortunately, in relation to the groups that form surrounding religion, ones that
are measured as highly fundamental have been shown to form hurtful and bigoted groups
that espouse hatred towards LGBT populations, Atheists, and Jews (Altmeyer, 2003;
Altmeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, 2010). While organized
religion certainly does aid in bringing people together under a common belief and cause,
religion and a belief in a deity is not required to benefit from belonging to a group and
feeling connected. Non-religion has been associated with higher indexes of health in
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various secular societies in the world and serve as an excellent example of how large
groups, entire countries can benefit (Zuckerman, 2005; 2006). These findings have not
been fully appreciated, explored and implemented in the improvement of general health in
countries that are striving to keep up to standards or health and well-being.
How religious and secular individuals view and utilize different kinds of coping
skills is new to the field of religion and spirituality. Krägeloh, Chai, Shepherd and
Billington (2010) hypothesized that the use of religious specific coping skills (turning to
religion for example) compared to other coping skills is mediated by one's level of
religiosity and spirituality. They found that individuals with higher levels of spirituality,
religious coping was most associated with active coping strategies, not maladaptive ones,
while the opposite was found for those with low levels of spirituality. Those with low
levels of spirituality had their religious coping skills loaded with maladaptive ones, most
often associated with “self-distraction, denial and behavioral disengagement” (p.11).
Another common type of coping skill religious individuals used is church attendance, a
factor also used to measure levels of spirituality. Used as a measure of religious behavior,
this facet of religiosity is inherently problematic for many reasons.
The first reason and perhaps the least complex is that only healthy and able-bodied
individuals are able to attend religious services and participate in these surveys. The more
complicated issue that is important to consider is the the phenomenon of many Atheist
and agnostic individuals still attending religious services just to maintain peace in the home
or within a larger family unit (Hwang et al., 2011). Utilizing data from the 1988-2000
General Social Surveys, Sherkat (2008) examined the relationship between different types
of beliefs about God in two different ways, the first being identification with a religious

	
  

48

group and participation in religious organizations. Secondly, he also examined different
developmental and demographic factors on many different beliefs about god including
Atheism, Agnosticism, belief in a higher power, but not a personal god, and the spectrum
of doubt that plays out in belief.
Results of demographics show that only 4.4% chose the more doubtful response
of sometimes believing in God. More than 8% reported that they don’t believe in a God
but do believe in a higher power, 4% of which identified as Agnostic and 2.5% identified
as Atheists. The denominations with the highest rating of certainty about God’s existence
are Baptists, Sectarians, and Mormons. Liberal Protestants, Jews, and those with no
religious affiliation are more likely to report Agnosticism, just fewer than 5% and 23%
respectively. Atheists however are fairly rare; with about 14% of respondents that identify
with religious affiliation endorse Atheism. Least likely to endorse Atheism are Moderate
Protestants, Lutherans, Baptists and Catholics. Respondents that believed in solely a higher
power and not a personal god were less likely to attend religious activities and participate
in their organizations, with Agnostics attending church even less. Interestingly, Atheists
were found to attend church with more regularity than agnostics (Sherkat, 2008).
Hwang et al. (2011) argue that the literature in the field of religion and spirituality
is one of convenience, that it most generally utilizes Jewish and Christian samples, as they
are the predominant religions in many countries. The research is however not presented as
“Jewish and Christian” studies, it is placed in the umbrella definition of religion and
spirituality, implying that other religions and the non-religious are not as deserving of
attention. The authors point out that some religions do not have regular religious service
attendance in their set of beliefs like Hindus or Buddhists. When participants are primarily
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limited to Jewish and Christian faiths, they write that they should be portrayed accordingly.
Sherkat (2008) also identifies that studies of religion and spirituality are oftentimes binary
as well, forcing the hand of participants to choose between belief and non-belief, thus
playing into misconception of religious belief being stable throughout ones life and not a
fluid experience that can wax and wane throughout ones lifetime.
Hwang et al. (2011) assert that there is too much connection given between
spirituality and factors of well-being such as peacefulness and harmony as well as an
identified lack of Atheist control samples in many studies. Many measures in the field of
religion and spirituality are used to measure levels of religiosity or spirituality, very few
measures exists that measure the level of secularity. Placing all individuals who identify as
“none” as Atheists reject the multiple interpretations and lived experiences of Atheists.
They reported that there needs to be a more standard taxonomy of the various levels of
non- religion and secularity to assist in recognizing Atheists as a “separate and unique class
of individuals” (p. 616).
Atheists and others that may identify as nonbelievers such as humanists or free
thinkers are neglected portions of society with regards to multiculturalism and diversity
(Bullivant, 2008; Edgell, 2006; Streib, & Klein 2012). D'Andrea and Sprenger (2007) report
performing a literature search in an effort to find articles that would assist counselors in
determining interventions and treatment modalities for Atheists. Unfortunately they found
nothing substantive. They believe that Atheists may not be getting attention because of the
controversy it may draw in the current sociopolitical system of the United States, where it
is not acceptable to discuss what is still considered taboo—not having religion and not
believing in a god or gods. Goodman (2009) proceeds with this idea and proposes that
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due to stigmatization of Atheists as “immoral, evil, or god hating” (p. 55) they as a group
and as individuals are marginalized and disregarded to the point of invisibility.
Discrimination and Marginalization of Atheists
Atheists are not unfamiliar with discriminatory beliefs held against them similar to
many other minority groups. With the majority of the world believing in some sort of
religion it is important to acknowledge the discrimination built into the cannons of
religious scripture, considered to be the main sources of revealed knowledge. The
Christian Bible has passages about how the faithless and the unbelievers should be viewed
and treated: “The wicked, through the pride of his countenance, will not seek after God: God is not in all
his thoughts” (Psalm 10:4, KJV) and “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Corrupt are
they, and have done abominable iniquity: there is none that doeth good” (Psalm 53:1, KJV). The
Quran too encourages negative views about Atheists and those that do not share their
monotheistic view of the universe, “Indeed, they who disbelieved among the People of the Scripture
and the polytheists will be in the fire of Hell, abiding eternally therein. Those are the worst of creatures”
(Surat Al-Bayyinah 98:6, Sahih International). Apart of the Islamic hadith (a system of
scriptures used at times to supplement the Quran and provide guidance in manners of
jurisprudence) states, “The Prophet said, "Whoever possesses the following three qualities will have the
sweetness (delight) of faith: The one to whom Allah (swt) and His Apostle becomes dearer than anything
else, who loves a person and he loves him only for Allah's (swt) sake, who hates to revert to Atheism
(disbelief) as he hates to be thrown into the fire” (Sahih Bukhari, 1:2:15).
Saying and reading the words “Atheist” may bring about negative reactions to
many people. This label is a potentially multi-layered words, with different and intersecting
meanings (Bullivant, 2008). An Atheist defined as one who does not believe in the
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existence of a god or gods, was only defined as such by 51.2% from a survey administered
to over 700 Oxford University students, a university known for its more secular minded
students. To gain a total of 75%, the additional caveat would be a qualification of
conviction, being a “hardcore” or an “out and out” Atheist (p. 366). To contrast and
clarify as “Atheist” is sometimes confused with “Agnostic,” traditionally Agnostic, means,
one who believes that it is impossible to confirm or deny the existence of a higher power,
but colloquially has become defined as “someone who can’t make up their mind”
(Bullivant, 2008, p. 366).
Other definitions of Atheism, such as “positive” Atheism, the aggressive and more
public stance on their disbelief in god and “negative” atheism, a passive more discreet
absence of belief in god are also ways individuals describe and view Atheists (Martin,
2007). Results imply the image of Atheists incorporates both notions of combativeness
and abnormality; something that one needs to come out with. Not only does identifying as
an Atheist automatically trigger assumptions and judgments, even being described as an
individual that simply does not believe in god without an Atheist label can activate antiAtheist prejudice and bias with equal effect (Swan & Heesacker, 2012). For the sake of this
project Atheism is defined as a definitive proclamation that no god or gods exist (Baker & Smith, 2009).
Atheists as “Others” in society. Saad (2009) writes that if the movie Guess Who's
Coming to Dinner (1967) were to be reproduced today, the outrageous guest will no longer
be a highly accomplished, educated, and sophisticated African American man but a highly
accomplished, educated, and sophisticated [A]theist.”According to Edgell, Gerteis, and
Hartmann (2006) when they surveyed over 2,000 Americans as a part of the American
Mosaic Project, Atheists were both more likely than any other religious or LGBT minority
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to be considered as not congruent with their “vision of American Society” and most likely
to be disapproved of if their child wanted to marry one. Although religious tolerance and
diversity may be increasing in America, it is clear that it is not always extended to those
that identify as Atheists or non-religious.
Women, African Americans and the elderly are more likely to reject Atheists,
whereas those with higher levels of education, and whose fathers had more education, are
more accepting of Atheists as belonging in American society. Significant factors they
found, that predict the lack of public acceptance of Atheists are religious involvement,
identifying as a social conservative, identifying as Protestant, believing in the inerrancy of
the bible, believing that God controls the development and passage of our lives, and that
laws should be based on God’s law. Those living in communities with a lower SES and
more diversity are also more likely to reject Atheists as belonging to American society as
well (Edgell et al., 2006).
The high degree of fundamentalism that predicted the lack of acceptance of
Atheists and Atheism in Edgell et al.’s (2006) study has additional empirical support as
well. Galen, Smith, Knapp, and Wyngarden (2011) conducted three experiments where
highly fundamental religious individuals and low fundamental individuals rated videotaped
interviews of a student that was identified as religious or non-religious in three different
ways: their presented demographics (identifying as Christian or identifying as a religious
“none”), reason for participating in a Habitat for Humanity event and the logo on an
article of clothing worn (a reformed Christian or pro-evolution symbol). An overall
favorable impression formed when the high fundamentals viewed the student with the
Christian identity. The high fundamentals reported wanting to spend more time with the
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reformed Christian compared to the non-religious student. Low fundamentals did not
show the difference between the religious and non-religious conditions. Highly
fundamental participants rated the student from the religious condition higher than the
student from the other, non-religious condition on goodness and morality as well, whereas
the low fundamentals rated the different conditions similarly (Galen et al., 2011).
An example of Atheist discrimination and stigmatization within the last decade that
speak to the concept of Atheists as not belonging in American or being viewed as an outgroup is an Eagle Scout from Port Orchard, Washington being asked to leave the Boy
Scouts of America in 2002, a private organization, because he was deemed an unfit
member as an Atheist (Associated Press, 2009). In 2004, an Atheist of Hardesty,
Oklahoma, was kicked off of her high school basketball team after she refused to recite a
prayer before a game (Stossel, 2007). Recently in 2012, a young cadet at West Point
dropped out of the prestigious academy due to the unconstitutional proselytization and
discrimination against the non-religious he witnessed and was subjected to regularly. He
has since been heavily criticized for his defamation of the United States military’s training
(Page, 2012).
The former West Point cadet is not alone in his experience, other Atheists in
higher education as well as in the broader society are also seen as “evil, god hating, and
immoral” (Goodman & Meuller, 2009, p. 55), forcing them to stay invisible and hide their
identity. In education there is an acknowledged dearth of diversity education related to
Atheists and other nonbelievers according (D'Andrea & Sprenger, 2007; Harper, 2007;
Liddell, & Stedman, 2011). Goodman and Mueller write there that there is an absence of
support and understanding from both the students and faculty. They argue that until
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educators acknowledge the nonbelievers perspective and challenge misconceptions about
them, Atheist students will continue to remain marginalized and stigmatized in higher
education.
Trust as a central factor of atheist discrimination. Baker and Smith (2009)
report that in regards to attitudes about politically and often religiously charged topics in
the United States such as abortion, gay marriage and embryonic stem cell research,
Atheists, Agnostics and unchurched believers (those that believe in a god, but have had an
overall low rate of religious attendance) are more likely to go against the grain in
contemporary America. Atran and Henrich (2010) argue that rivalry among diverse
societies and establishments with dissimilar faith-based beliefs and practices has gradually
linked religion with both within-group prosociatlity and between-group hostility through
various evolutionary mechanisms. This plays on a belief that we can bond diverse groups
of people into a unitary, constant and unalterable people—god’s people. Their argument is
steeped in the concept of in-group and out-group thinking and selection (Allport, 1979) as
a means with which to promulgate discriminatory beliefs and further prejudiced behaviors.
Small, fundamental comnunities are believed to value trust and acceptance more so
than larger communities, and that may explain some of the predictors of anti-Atheist
prejudice (Edgell et al., 2006; Altmeyer, 2003). Trust has been shown to be a factor that
Atheists have to deal with and makes up a portion of their psychological distress (Weber et
al., 2011). In the broad context of humanity and our species trust has been argued to
function as a way to meet selective adaptive pressures in the context of human evolution
(Henrich & Henrich, 2007). Charles Darwin (1874) writes, “[An] advancement in the
standard of morality and an increase in the number of well-endowed men . . . who, from
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possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and
sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the
common good, would be victorious over other tribes…[S]elfish and contentious people
will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected” (p. 166).
Demonstrating trust may look like engaging in risky, religious behaviors that are a
detriment to individual or group survivability and well-being. These behaviors may serve as
an indicator for trust and devotion to one’s group. Devoting one’s self to a religious war in
which there is an elevated chance of death, as is with all war, is historical and
contemporary example in many cultures. Another example would be throwing babies
from atop a tower onto a sheet held 50 feet below by a group of men, a 500-year tradition
practiced by Muslims and Hindus in the district of Solapur, Maharstra West India in order
to bring the children good luck and health. Fasting is additional, common illustration of
demonstrating commitment to a cause or community seen in multiple religions including
eastern orthodoxy, Greek Catholicism, and Islam—all potentially harming ones chances at
reproduction and survival.
Regarding reproduction, more recent scholarly work has focused more on the roles
of reproductive values and practice as predictors of religiosity. Weeden and Kurzban
(2013), after reviewing previous work on the relationship between within-group
cooperation, found that the relationship is often modest and not too predictive of facets of
religiosity. More limiting reproductive values were significant predictors of higher levels of
religiosity in multiple regions around the world, with the extent of the relationship being
small in less affluent regions and large in more affluent ones. Their results contradict the
more prominent belief that religiosity has a essential relationship with cooperative morals
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and values. It would appear that countries and individuals’ associations with religious
groups are more closely allied with reproductive tactics.
Trust has been identified as an important factor in reliant, social relationships to
reduce perceived vulnerability (Cottrell, Neuburg & Li, 2007). It is hypothesized that
because Atheists do not believe in any deities watching over them that they are more likely
to commit crimes, be less trust worthy and generally make more morally questionable
decisions (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Religious individuals may hold discriminatory
beliefs towards Atheists because they are not concerned with supernatural punishment (a
reality for religious individuals), and may free-ride in a system that allows their presence. A
lack of trust for Atheists in this sense may have co-currently evolved with group
cooperation in homo-sapiens expressed in the rules, traditions and expectations of
religions (Johnson & Krueger, 2004).
Religious individuals on the contrary are believed to be more trustworthy. For
example individuals that are subtly acknowledged as believing in God as opposed to
neutral, secular individuals are more likely to be given and trusted with money (Shariff &
Norenzayan, 2007). However, a religious individual being more pro-social in general is a
pervasive misbelief according to Galen (2012). He writes in a meta-analytic work that a
well-documented stereotype is that not only are religiously affiliated, attired and described
individuals automatically more trusted, but they are pronounced more likeable and
intelligent as well. Religious individuals have been shown to more often, only be pro-social
and giving towards other religious individuals, persons presumed to be a part of their ingroup. The opposite of this is true for Atheists, he writes that they have consistently been
found to be rated as less likable and less trustworthy. These results are at times spurious,

	
  

57

Galen writes, as the literature does not separate religious versus secular recipients of
charitable giving, citing that as families grow in commitment to their religion their giving
becomes more focused on their specific religious group, thus providing more evidence for
the assertion that religion is used as a pro-social, in-group specific boundary to establish
and maintain trust.
Gervais, Shariff and Norenzayann (2011) examined through a sociofunctional and
cultural evolutionary lens the effect that trust has on the prejudice that many hold towards
Atheists, looking to expand the work of Edgell et al., (2006). Their first study was
comprised of 351 Americans, with a varying array of religious identification 67% Christian,
1% Jewish, 3% Atheist, 4% Agnostic, 17% identifying with no religion and 9% identifying
as “other”, 49 out of the 351 participants, about 14% indicating that they did not believe in
God. Their sample of participants rated Atheists and gay men, another marginalized
population often seen as menacing to majority religious values and morality, on a “feeling
thermometer” to measure levels of prejudice, the same instrument used in Edgell et al.
(2006).
Then a “distrust” and a “disgust” thermometer were completed afterwards to
measure how disgusting and distrustful the participants found Atheists and gay men.
Replicating the results of Edgell et al. (2006), Atheists were rated as being less favorable of
a group than gay men in general. Atheists were found to be significantly more distrustful
than gay men, but gay men were significantly found to evoke more disgust. This shows
that trust is a big component of Atheist prejudice whereas disgust exemplifies anti-gay
prejudice. Looking at specific items in demographic information taken from the sample
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the rating about the “importance of God in your life” predicted both feelings of distrust
towards Atheists and disgust towards gay men.
Their second study compared Atheists with other groups including Muslims,
another marginalized, often denigrated religious group in North America. They presented
105 students at a Canadian university (chosen for their high number of non-religious
students) with a description of an untrustworthy person. This person was purported to
have committed selfish deeds and the study manipulated what group he may belong to, for
example, was it more probably that the man was a teacher or a teacher as well as a
Christian, Muslim, rapist or Atheist. Those four other options were offered independent of
one another to the participants, evenly broken into 4 groups. It was predicted that the
participants would commit a conjunction fallacy--a logical fallacy that occurs when it is
presumed that particular conditions are more likely than a solitary, general one. As
hypothesized, participants were significantly more likely to report that the man in the
vignette was a teacher and an Atheist or rapist more so than a Christian or Muslim. There
was no significant difference between the rapist and Atheist groups. This means that the
selfish, fraudulent acts committed in the vignette were only seen as representative of Atheists and rapists,
not religious individuals. Atheists were viewed as morally equivalent to rapists in this study.
In the third study, the conjunction fallacy was again found when both the variable
of distrust was used to describe the vignette character when having the option to denote
him an Atheist. This result was not replicated when the group could denote him a
homosexual. The option of denoting the character as unpleasant was equally rare for both
homosexuals and Atheists, further supporting that distrust is a significant factor
contributing to anti-Atheist prejudice. The fourth study repeated the results with the
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additional options of the character being Jewish or a Feminist. Participants were
significantly more likely to commit the conjunction error for an untrustworthy Atheist
character than for a Jewish or feminist character.
Reducing distrust. It has been found that increasing general awareness and the
perception that Atheists are more prevalent reduces distrust by religious individuals.
Gervais (2011) hypothesized that Atheist prevalence would be associated with reduced
anti-Atheist prejudice and tested his hypothesis in a series of studies. In the first study
anti-Atheist prejudice was assessed in 54 different countries with a rich diversity of
religious, economic and political experiences. It was assumed that anti-Atheist prejudice
would be lower in countries with higher proportions of Atheists. As hypothesized, he
reports that Atheist prevalence was in fact negatively related to anti-Atheist prejudice
generally speaking. When controlling specifically for levels of socioeconomic development
and type of culture (individualistic and collective) independently, in both cases prevalence
of Atheists was negatively related to the presence of anti-Atheist prejudice.
It has been demonstrated that reminders of secular authority can also attenuate
anti-Atheist distrust in certain situations, not only anti-Atheist but also distrust towards
out-group members in general (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Undergraduate students
took measures on their attitudes towards Atheists, perceived Atheist prevalence, a measure
of their strength of belief in God and their belief in a dangerous world (Gervais, 2011).
Controlling for the belief in a dangerous world and belief of God, perceived Atheist
prevalence significantly predicted anti Atheist prejudice. Prejudice was diminished when
participants believed Atheists to be more prevalent. The same results held when vignettes
were presented with different prevalence rates of Atheists. If participants were led to
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believe that Atheists were more common, distrust was lessened. In general however,
information and reminders about Atheist prevalence did not significantly increase the
degree to which participants felt generally positive or warmly toward Atheists, just more
trusting of them.
Summary
Throughout history frequent definitions for Atheism have been offered (Cliteur,
2009), these definitions span from having slightly positive undertones (McGarth, 2004) to
highly negative insinuations and consequences. (Johnson, 1996). The common theme is
that there is no belief in or rejection of all gods from all religions. The amount of
individuals who identify as Atheist has been growing at a substantial rate (Zuckerman,
2007; Pew Research Center, 2012). Notwithstanding the current increase of individuals
identifying as Atheist and the increased academic attention towards the topic, the majority
of American society still maintains prejudiced and inequitable beliefs about them.
Some maintain that Atheists tend to be defamed in society as being “evil, god
hating, and immoral” (Goodman & Mueller, 2009, p. 55), consequently making them stay
invisible and disguise their identity. Others assert that the growth in numbers and
attention that Atheists have harvested have made it more tolerable to recognize their belief
in a more public fashion (Goodstein, 2009). Notwithstanding, scientific research on and
about Atheists is increasing. Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006) found that amongst
American respondents, Atheists were rated as the minority group that was least expected
to share the participant’s concept of America and were also rated as the group that would
be condemned of the most if they were marrying a participant’s child.
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A principal theme behind these partialities towards Atheists is distrust and wariness
towards a group that has no belief in a supernatural and mystical agent capable of
witnessing and punishing moral wrongdoings (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). These studies
are some of the first vastly essential studies that have disseminated into academia that
bring to light both the more subtle and overt aggression Atheists encounter in society
today. While Atheism could be conceivable delineated as a form or type of religion
because it has to do with the belief in and of a deity, the fields traditional stance of no deity
does set it outside what would be mainstream religion. Hwang, Hammer and Cragun
(2011) more specifically address these methodological concerns about the fields of religion
and spirituality.
This paper has demonstrated thus far that Atheists are not perceived well, that they
are tolerated at best. Atheists and other non-religious minorities have not been researched
to the extent of other religious minorities, let alone racial and ethnic minorities. To
remedy this lack of information one way the field of psychology can begin to investigate
the experiences of Atheists is to create a scale to measure their day-to-day experiences of
discrimination. While measures of microaggressions do exist for other minorities, no
measures that look at microaggressions perpetrated towards Atheists exist.
Measuring Microaggressions
It has been demonstrated that Atheists are not perceived well for multiple reasons
by multiple populations. These discriminatory beliefs are just now being studied in
comparison to other types of minorities. The effects of these discriminatory beliefs and
how they impact Atheists have yet to be studied. Researchers studying discriminatory
beliefs and unconsciously perpetrated insults through the theory of Microaggressions have

	
  

62

produced psychometrically sound scales that can serve as exemplars for studying the
experiences of Atheists. Examining current inventories that address microaggressions and
race related stress such as the Racial & Ethnic Microaggressions Scale (REMS, Nadal,
2011) and the Inventory of Microaggressions towards African American Individuals
(IMABI, Mercer, Zeigler-Hill, Wallace & Hayes, 2011) it is apparent that the use of the
established taxonomy of Microaggressions are generally appropriate for studying
minority’s experience of discrimination and oppression. The construction of these
inventories and others is similar in their methodological design and the scales are valuable
sources with which to cross-validate the creation of this scale.
Racial and Ethnic Minority Scale
The REMS was originally based on the original microaggression taxonomy
presented by Sue et al. (2007) as well as previous literature on racial and ethnic minorities.
Initial exploratory factor analysis utilized a racially diverse sample totaling 443 participants.
With evidence of sampling adequacy, orthogonal rotation proceeded with principal axis
extraction revealing 6 factors which when rotated accounted for 57.82% of the variance.
All factors were significantly correlated with one another (r= .219-.589, p <.01). Overall
scale internal consistency was at .928 with all factors having coefficient’s alphas over .80.
Confirmatory factory analysis, reliability and validity studies ensued with a new
sample Nadal (2011) found that for the REMS, the confirmatory one-factor analysis
indicated that the overall model was a good fit and significant, χ2 (945, N=2620) 1400.74, p
< .001, [CFI] = .60, [RMSEA] = .07. Some weakness of the REMS scale validation process
would be that in the exploratory principal components analysis, the pre-rotated model
specified that the entire scale accounts for only about 27% of the total variance, with a
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single component accounting for the biggest proportion of the variance. Also, the authors’
assertion that the model fit during the confirmatory factor analysis was “good” is perhaps
a little too optimistic. For example, the lower bound cutoff to be considered for “good or
acceptable fit” for the CFI is generally measured to be at or exceeding .90. For “excellent
fit”, a value of .95 or higher is the oft accepted standard (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Inventory of Microaggressions towards Black Individuals
The IMABI is largely based on the original taxonomy of Sue et al.’s (2007)
taxonomy of racial microaggressions and additional measures of self-esteem, affective
presentation and stress for example were also included in order to address the relation of
perceived microaggressions on overall health. Weaknesses of this scale validation process
included not utilizing focus groups of individuals to generate and revise the item pool, and
exploratory factor analysis, IRT and CFA analysis was used on the same group of
participants. With 385 participants initial exploratory factor analysis revealed four factors
with eigenvalues above 1.0 and a parallel analysis suggested that the first two were unlikely
to have occurred by chance. Given that the first two factors were highly correlated
(r=.79), the presence of cross loadings after orthogonal rotation and the first factor
explaining the majority of the scale variance, they concluded that scale unidimensionality
was partially supported. An internal consistency reliability estimate revealed a coefficient
alpha of .94.
During confirmatory factor analysis Mercer et al. (2011) report that while the chisquare was statistically significant for the one-factor model, χ2(945, N =385) = 1978.74,
p< .001, approximate fit indices suggested the model fit the data satisfactorily: CFI = .99,
TLI = .99, RMSEA = .05. In general the factors of the IMABI were able to reflect a high
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level of endorsement for its items instead of true differences in content. The
unidimensionality of the IMABI was endorsed by the results of the CFI, TLI, RMSEA and
the large amount of variance explained by one of two highly correlated factors. The
IMABI was reported to generally be a reliable measure of microaggressions, specifically
focused more on microinsults and microinvalidations towards African American
individuals. It was deemed an appropriate way to measure some of the emotional stressors
experienced by this minority population. It was found to be correlated with other related
measures that attend to race related stress and especially global perceptions of life and
emotional stress (Mercer et al, 2011). The amount of total variance accounted for was not
clearly presented. Similar to the REMS, another identified limitation is that the very nature
of self-report is subjective and difficult to consistently and appropriately assess.
Hammer, Cragun, and Smith (2012)
Broadly speaking there are multiple scales that support the theoretical significance
of the Microaggressions modal as a viable lens to address minority experiences and more
than sufficient evidence that there is a pervasive view of Atheists that is discriminatory and
marginalizing, thus lending support for the a proposed scale of microaggressions scale for
Atheists. To date, there is but one attempt at adapting scales to addresses specifically, the
demeaning and haranguing day-to-day experiences of Atheists. Acknowledging the lack of
quantitative information about the types and frequency of discrimination experienced by
Atheists Hammer, Cragun, Hwang and Smith (2012) were the first to explore this dearth in
the literature through a mixed method study with 796, self-identified Atheists in the United
States.
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Without utilizing confirmed taxonomies and themes of microaggressions as a
means with which to understand and conceptualize Atheist discrimination and
marginalization, the authors wanted to measure perceived discrimination, level of
association with the Atheist worldview, level of outness with various social and family
circles, and strictness of family expectations about religion during participant upbringing.
The authors also gave respondents the opportunity to provide an open, unrestricted
response about additional stressors they have experienced as a result of their Atheism.
With the exception of the last, open-ended question the authors developed their questions
by adapting scale items from GLBT stress, African American identity, and GLBT outness
inventories.
Results showed that of the 29 different forms of discrimination, the average
participant endorsed experiencing about 10 of them. The most common forms of
discrimination most frequently reported were witnessing anti-Atheist comments in
newspapers or television, being expected to participate in religious prayers against one’s
will, being told one’s Atheism is sinful, wrong or immoral, being asked to attend religious
services or participate in religious activities against one’s will and being treated differently
because of one’s Atheism.
Results from the open ended, narratives revealed 6 inter-related themes: “assumed
religiosity, lack of a secular support structure, lack of a church and state separation,
negative effects on family, unreciprocated tolerance and anticipatory stress.” There was
small, but significant support for their first hypothesis, that individuals identifying more
closely with their Atheism perceiving more discrimination (r = .19, p < .001). Similar
results were found with their second hypothesis—that more out Atheists would report
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experiencing more discrimination (r = .17, p < .001). They found that 41% of their
participants experienced some sort of discrimination, almost double that of those that did
not identify with a religion in previous studies. Greater level of outness, the report, was
able to predict a strong, positive relationship between strictness of family religious
expectations and social ostracism. Anti-Atheist hate crimes such as property damage or
physical assault were reported in 14% of the participants.
Summary
Though the exploration of microaggressions has had growing attention the
microaggression body of literature may still be in its youth. Of particular concern is the
qualitative nature in which most microaggression research is conducted. The majority of
the research that attempts to assess the experiences of marginalized groups uses
consensual qualitative research (CQR) or other qualitative methods. The qualitative
studies that have functioned as the underpinning on which microaggression research rests
have been key in congealing the construct of racial and ethnic microaggressions. However,
because the contemporary research on microaggressions is qualitative in their focus and
character, they provide little in the way of either explicatory power or generalizability.
It is in this framework that more quantitative methodologies to measuring
microaggressions began making a presence in the field of multicultural research. The
Racial and Ethnic Microaggression scale (REMS, Nadal, 2011) was one of the first scales
that measured microaggressions experienced by racial and ethnic minorities. Other similar
measures have been published as well, for example the IMABI (Mercer et al, 2011)
developed to specifically address microaggressions experienced by African American
individuals.
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Still these two diverse inventories are just a subsection of a grander body of work
growing in quantitative approaches towards evaluating microaggressions, these scales,
which were all developed in 2011, feature the innovation of this region of research. The
foremost strength of these established scales is that they have begun to satisfy a need that
was beforehand unmet in the study of microaggressions. These scales afford academics the
ability to gather experimental data that assesses types and themes of microaggressions, and
the bearing of these microaggressions on marginalized individuals and groups.
Summary of Literature Review
According to one estimate there is more than half a billion Atheists in the world,
thus making Atheists the fourth largest religious group in the world, trailing only
Christians, Muslims, and Hindus (Zuckerman, 2007). According to a recent Pew Research
Survey, individuals identifying as Atheists has grown .8% from 2007-2012 and fewer than
half of Americans identify as Protestant Christians. This is the first time in Pew Research
Center surveys that the Protestant portion of the American population has gone below
50%. Unfortunately it has been shown that Atheists are discriminated against
disproportionately in a variety of ways (Baker & Smith, 2009; Swan & Heesacker, 2012).
A central theme behind prejudices towards Atheists is distrust towards a group that
has no belief in a supernatural agent capable of witnessing and punishing moral
transgressions (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). According to Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann
(2006) Atheists were both more likely than any other religious or sexual minority to be
considered as not congruent with their “vision of American Society” and most likely to be
disapproved of if their child wanted to marry one. A recent laboratory study found that
Atheists were deemed more immorally untrustworthy than Christians, Muslims,
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homosexuals, Jewish people, and feminists. Furthermore the study found that only rapists
were distrusted to the same degree, as Atheists were (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan,
2010).
Goodman and Mueller (2009) takes the idea one step further and postulates that
due to the stigma of Atheist as ”immoral, evil, or god hating” (p. 55) they as a group and
as individuals are marginalized to the point of invisibility. Atheism is generally not viewed
to be its own construct and has a tendency to be lumped into the category or field of
spiritualism and religion. Atheists are not studied as much or given the same consideration
in psychology as other populations are. One of the reasons given for this apparent lack is
the tendency for researchers to gravitate towards topics more mainstream and “politically
correct” (D'Andrea & Sprenger, 2007, p. 150). The subject of Atheism, when it is
researched, appears to have more to do with a lack of religiosity rather than the actual
stance of Atheism.
When studying various minority populations Microaggressions have been shown to
be a valued, contemporary lens for analyzing and reviewing more nuanced understandings
of racism, bias, and discrimination. Microaggressions are subtle, often unconscious
indignities perpetrated by the majority group towards a minority. Microaggressions are
important to study because of their detrimental effect on physical and mental well-being.
It has been hypothesized that it is the cumulative effects of discrimination that will erode
minority individuals in a society where microaggressions are perpetrated (see Sue, 2010a).
Microaggressions, racism and internalized oppression have been shown to intensify the
experience of negative psychological states (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2012), heart disease
(Smith et al., 2005) and physical pain (Chae & Walters, 2009).
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The field of Microaggressions has produced numerous taxonomies and themes to
study and understand the discriminatory experiences of Women, African American,
disabled, and GLBT populations to name a few (Capodilupo et al., 2010; Keller & Galgay,
2010; Sue & Caopdiluppo, 2008). Many taxonomies rely on the original taxonomy and set
of themes proposed by Sue et al. (2007) which contains Microassault, Microinsult, and
Microinvalidation. Amongst racial and ethnic minority studies utilizing the theory of
Microaggressions, religious microaggressions are now becoming an established part of this
innovative academic field. To date, the field of microaggressions has only just begun
exploring how a microaggressions lens could be utilized to understand the experiences of
religious minorities, first clearly proposed by Nadal (2008).
Through the development and eventual validation of a scale that measures
Atheist’s experiences of microaggressions psychology may be able to begin addressing the
inequities that Atheists face in a largely religious society. Stark (1999) suggests one possible
reason that Atheism is studied within the context of religion and one could argue not in
the context of microaggressions, because Atheism is possibly viewed as merely the
opposite of faith and not in itself a true and independent stance on faith or spirituality.
This in of itself may be conceived as a microinvalidation, one that puts Atheism and
religion on the same level, thus disregarding and making invisible some of the
discriminations that Atheists and the non-religious experience.
Various scales have been created that rely on the theory of Microaggressions
(Balsam, et al., 2011; Mercer, 2010; 2011) and can serve as comparative models for
developing scales to measure Atheist’s experiences of microaggressions. Nadal et al. (2010)
proposed 6 themes that comprise a taxonomy of religious microaggressions that provide a
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useful hierarchy through which to conceptualize potential, Atheist-specific
microaggressions. Nadal’s taxonomy has already shown promise qualitatively in his study
of Muslim-American experiences (Nadal et al, 2012). American Atheists that both
currently live in the United States and those abroad (United States Citizens) will be
recruited for this study because America is one of the only first world countries where
religion is such a penetrating and present force in politics, government, and many
communities. If individuals that were living more secular countries such as Sweden or
France with higher proportions of Atheists were allowed to respond along with
Americans, external validity could be impacted significantly. Even though there may be
many individuals that do not believe in any higher power, gods, daemons, angels, spirits or
otherwise such as Secular Humanists for example, individuals that identify as specifically
Atheists were only used because of the unique connotations and values associated with the
word (Bullivant, 2008; Swan & Heesacker, 2012).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to develop an instrument to assess the types and
frequency of microaggressions that Atheists experience as survey methodologies are a
common design utilized for measuring different forms of discrimination. Scale
development will also address the theoretical underpinnings proposed and see if they are
substantiated. It is hypothesized that combining the theory of Microaggressions and scale
development procedures will create a sound instrument able to assist in investigating the
effects of discrimination on Atheists in and of its self and though pairing it with other
measures of psychological and physiological distress.
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The scale will be constructed utilizing the 6 themed framework laid out by Nadal et
al. (2010) for religious minorities adapted for specific use with Atheists. The following
related dimensions are hypothesized to coalesce under the concept of Atheist
microaggressions, defined as any slights, indignities or putdowns perpetrated by an
individual or group towards an Atheist or Atheists. Those six dimensions are: Endorsing
Atheist Stereotypes, Pathology of Atheist Individuals, Exoticization, Assumption of One’s
Own Religious Identity as Normal, Assumption of Atheist homogeneity, and Denial of
Religious Prejudice towards Atheists. These dimensions will be clearly defined in the third
chapter along with scale construction procedures.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis One
First, it is hypothesized that the pilot version of the SAM will be a 6-factor scale
measuring 6 separate, but related constructs. The constructs will measure Atheist
microaggressions, each factor representing a theme of Atheist microaggressions based
upon the work of Nadal et al. (2010) originally proposed to measure religious minority
microaggressions. The dissertation project will provide evidence of acceptable fit for the
factor structure obtained during exploratory factor analysis during confirmatory factor
analysis through examination of fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and appropriate use of
modification indices (see Hatcher, 1994).
Hypothesis Two
A scale used to measure social desirability independent of psychopathology created
by Crowne and Marlowe (1960) was used to measure if the SAM elicited socially desirable
responses. It was predicted that the scale would serve as a measure of discriminant validity.
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It was predicted that there would be no significant correlations between both the pilot and
dissertation versions of the SAM and this scale, -.20 <r <.20.
Hypothesis Three
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985)
is a measure of global life satisfaction and would serve as a measure of divergent validity. It
was predicted that individuals endorsing more frequent and upsetting experiences of
microaggressions would report lower life satisfaction. It was specifically predicted that
there would be a small, negative correlation between r = -.40 and r = -.20.
Hypothesis Four
The perceived stress scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983) is a
measure of general stress and will be administered as a measure of convergent validity. It is
anticipated that this scale would have a small, positive relationship with the dissertation
SAM at .20 < r < .40.
Hypothesis Five
The ego identity process questionnaire (EIPQ; Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, &
Geisinger, 1995) will be administered as a measure of convergent validity. It is expected
that this scale will have a small, positive relationship with the dissertation SAM and years
identifying as an Atheist at .20< r < .40.
Hypothesis Six
It is hypothesized that the SAM will demonstrate a strong internal consistency, as
evidenced by an alpha coefficient of .80 or higher but not exceeding .90 for both the pilot
and dissertation scales.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study is to develop a scale that measures Atheist’s experiences
of microaggressions. This chapter is outlined in two sections; the first describes the
methods and procedures in the pilot study. The second section describes the methods and
procedures used in the procurement and evaluation of the validation sample for the
dissertation. In regard to the first section, the purpose of the pilot procedures were to
provide initial information about the factor structure, scale reliability and validity, and item
strength in regard to the newly created scale. DeVellis’s (2003) scale construction
procedures were followed to create the pilot measure, including determining clearly what is
to be measured, generating an item pool, determining the format for measurement, having
item pool reviewed by experts, considering the inclusion of validation items, administering
items to a development sample, evaluating the items, and optimizing scale length. The
first section of this chapter describes the methods, includes participants, measures and
procedures, used in the pilot process.
The second section of this chapter describes the methods involved in the
dissertation project. The dissertation project will involve obtaining and evaluating a
validation sample in order test (through confirmatory factor analysis, reliability analysis,
and construct validity analysis) the psychometric properties and viability of the SAM.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis will follow the procedures recommended by Hatcher (1994)
and be further informed by suggested best practices in analysis conduction and reporting
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procedures as outlined in Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow and King (2006) and Jackson,
Gillaspy and Purc Stephenson (2009). These procedures are constructing the confirmatory
factor model, identifying residual terms for endogenous variables, identifying all
parameters to be estimated, verifying that the model is overidentified, reviewing the chi
square test, reviewing the non-normed fit index and the comparative fit index, reviewing
significance tests for factor loadings, reviewing the residual matrix and normalized residual
matrix and finally modifying the measurement model if need be with the use of
modification indices. Construct validity for the validation sample will be evaluated utilizing
the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985), the
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983), the Ego Identity
Process Questionnaire (EIPQ; Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, & Geisinger, 1995) and the
Social Desirability Rating Scale (SDRS; Marlowe & Crowne, 1966) and confirmatory factor
analysis. Reliability analyses will also be conducted.
Pilot Methods
Pilot Participants
Respondent Recruitment and Data Collection. For purposes of conducting an
initial test of the psychometric properties of the SAM, the scale was distributed online to
various social media websites, pages and blogs to find respondents. A benefit of this
sampling method is the ability to draw Atheists from diverse geographic locations. By in
large online sampling has been shown to be an adequate way to collect externally valid
responses from populations that are small and otherwise potentially difficult to contact for
participation (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). The intended population was
adults (18 and older) in America that identify specifically as Atheists.
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Over 6,000 individuals attempted to take the SAM, however only 1,142 were able
to identify as Atheist Americans over the age of 18. Six of the participants of the 1,142 did
not complete one or more of the measures in the study and were subsequently deleted
from the data pool. Due to having more than enough respondents, the sample of 1,136
was randomly split into half, utilizing only 1 half of that data for the EFA. That half
utilized totaled 577 respondents.
Pilot Demographics
Gender. The 577 respondents consisted of 404 males, 166 females, and 7
transgendered individuals, making up 70%, 28.8% and 1.2% of the total respectively; Race
and ethnicity. The respondents were .9% (N = 5) African American/Black, 1.2% (N = 7)
Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 85.8% (N = 495) Caucasian American/White,
1.9% (N = 11) foreign nationals, 5.5% (32) Hispanic/Latino Americans, .2% (N = 1)
Middle Eastern American, .3% (N = 2) Native American/American Indian, and 4.2% (N
= 24) Mixed Race/Bi-racial; Sexual orientation. Heterosexual respondents made up the
majority of the sample at 499 (86.5%) whereas gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals made
up 3.1%, 1.6%, and 8.8% respectively; Marital status. Over half of the participants were
single at 57.4% (N = 331), 33.6% (N = 194) of the participants were married, 8.7% (N =
50) were divorced and .3% (N = 2) were widowed. A majority of the participants were
childless (70.9%); Personal Income. Regarding income, 165 respondents or 28.6% made
under $15,000, 16.5% (N = 95) made between $15-$25,000, 15.8% (N = 91) made
between $26-40,000, 17.2% (N = 99) made between $40-60,000, 11.8% (68) made between
$60-90,000, 3.8% (N = 22) made between $90-120,000, 3.1% (N = 18) made between
$120-150,000, and 3.3% (N = 19) made above $150,000; Education. College goers made
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up the majority of the sample with 37.3% (N = 215) having some college, 11.6% (N = 67)
having a 2-year degree and 24.6% (N = 142) having a 4- year degree. Masters degrees were
held by 11.1% (N = 64) and 4% (N = 22) of the sample had doctorates (Ph.D’s) or
professional degrees (J.D for example); Location. Every state in the US was represented,
with at least 1 respondent. California was the most representative state with 12.8% (N =
74) respondents residing there. Texas was the second most representative state with 7.3%
(N = 42) of the total sample and Florida was third with 5.9% (N = 34). Washington state
and New York were tied for the fourth most representative state each with 5.5% (N = 32)
of the total sample residing there. Table 1 provides more detail of the demographic
information.
Table 1
Pilot Respondent Demographics
N

%

Age
18-20

91

15.8

21-23

67

11.6

24-29

121

21.0

30-34

111

19.2

35-44

108

18.7

45-54

51

8.8

55-64

14

2.4

65 and over

14

2.4

577

100

Female

166

28.8

Male

404

70.0

7

1.2

577

100

Total
Gender

Transgender
Total
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Table 1 continued
N

%

Ethnicity
African American

5

.9

Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander

7

1.2

495

85.6

Foreign National

11

1.9

Hispanic/Latino American

32

5.5

Middle Eastern American

1

.2

Native American/American Indian

2

.3

Mixed Race/Bi-Racial

24

4.2

Total

577

100

499

86.5

18

3.1

Lesbian

9

1.6

Bisexual

51

8.8

577

100

Single

331

57.4

Married

194

33.6

Divorced

50

8.7

Widowed

2

100

577

100

Under 15,000

165

28.6

15,000-25,000

95

16.5

26-40,000

91

15.8

40-60,000

99

17.2

60-90,000

68

11.8

90-120,000

22

3.8

120-150,000

18

3.1

150,000+

19

3.3

577

100

Caucasian American/White

Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual
Gay

Total
Marital Status

Total
Personal Income

Total
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Table	
  1	
  continued	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

N

%

	
  

Highest Level of Education
Less than High School

5

.9

61

10.6

215

37.3

2-year College Degree

67

11.6

4-year College Degree

142

24.6

Masters Degree

64

11.1

Doctoral Degree

12

2.1

Professional Degree (e.g., M.D & J.D)

11

1.9

577

100

Alabama

3

.2

Alaska

1

3.5

Arizona

20

1.4

Arkansas

8

12.8

California

74

1.9

Colorado

11

.3

Connecticut

2

.2

Delaware

1

.5

District of Columbia

3

5.9

Florida

34

2.4

Georgia

14

.2

Hawaii

1

.2

Idaho

1

2.6

Illinois

15

1.9

Indiana

11

.9

Iowa

5

1.2

Kansas

7

.9

Kentucky

5

1.2

Louisiana

7

.2

Maine

1

1.2

Maryland

7

.3

Massachusetts

2

2.6

15

2.6

High School/GED
Some College

Total
50 States, D.C and Puerto Rico Location

Michigan
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N
%

Minnesota

15

.7

Mississippi

4

1.6

Missouri

9

.2

Montana

1

.2

Nebraska

1

1.0

Nevada

6

.2

New Hampshire

1

2.1

New Jersey

12

.9

New Mexico

5

5.5

New York

32

3.1

North Carolina

18

.5

North Dakota

3

4.3

25

1.0

6

3.6

Oregon

21

3.6

Pennsylvania

21

.5

Rhode Island

3

1.2

South Carolina

7

.3

Tennessee

12

2.1

Texas

42

7.3

Utah

7

1.2

Vermont

1

.2

Virginia

16

2.8

Washington

32

5.5

6

1.0

Wisconsin

16

2.8

Wyoming

1

.2

I do not reside in the United States

4

.7

Ohio
Oklahoma

West Virginia

Total

	
  

577

80

100

Pilot Measures
In addition to completing the Scale of Atheist Microaggressions (SAM) evaluated
in this study, participants also completed a demographics questionnaire, the Right Wing
Authoritarianism Scale, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and the Satisfaction
with life Scale.
The scale of atheist microaggressions (SAM; Pagano, McCullagh, Austin,
Fuller & Grant, 2012). The SAM is a 65-item scale developed to measure Atheists
experiences of microaggressions. The SAM was developed utilizing the guidelines of scale
development set out by DeVellis (2003). Item development was also guided by DeVellis
in addition to Bradburn et al. (2004). The initial 113 items of the SAM were evaluated and
reviewed by expert reviewers in order to ensure content and construct validity in addition
to item clarity. The feedback from the expert reviewers led to the adjustment of many
items and the exclusion of 48 items. The resulting 65 items were used in this research.
Individuals responded to items of the SAM using a 5-point Likert-type scale that asked
them to recall events and situations that may have occurred to them (1= This has never
happened to me; 5= This event happened and I was extremely upset). There are no
reversed scored items on the SAM and the SAM was developed so that higher total scores
on the SAM are more indicative of stress as a result of experiencing microaggressions.
Descriptions of the hypothesized scale dimensions are listed below.
Atheist microaggressions. Generally speaking are subtle, often unconscious slights and
put-downs perpetrated by those in the majority (often religious identifying individuals)
towards a minority (Atheists) (Pagano, McCullagh, Austin, Fuller & William., 2012; Sue et
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al., 2007). These microaggressions may be verbal, non-verbal (behavioral), or
environmental affronts experienced by those that identify as Atheists. Additionally, it is
believed that Microaggressions towards Atheists and Atheism may at times, be more often
perpetrated consciously with an intention to upset, demean or disgrace. This type or
category of microaggression is the one under which the subsequent themes of Atheist
microaggressions are encompassed.
Endorsing atheist stereotypes. This occurs when a perpetrator stereotypes Atheists
through religiously biased statements and behaviors (Nadal et al., 2010). This dimension
implies that Atheists are inferior and do not deserve to be learned about. This dimension
is differentiated from the “Pathology of Different Religious Groups” dimension in that
items may speak about Atheists or Atheism more broadly. Examples of microaggressions
in this dimension, may ask questions of Atheists about their attitudes or experiences (e.g.,
“Someone has asked me if I worship the devil?”), rather than telling individuals directly
who and what they are and what they believe (e.g., “I have heard someone say Atheists are
devil worshipers.”), which would be more appropriate for the dimension “Pathology of
Different Religious Groups.” Individuals who perpetrate items in this dimension may be
acting more unconsciously and may not be aware of the harmful effects of such questions
and statements. Thematic stereotypes from the literature on Atheists and Atheism revolve
around: not believing in anything, amorality and immorality, conduct
problems/criminality, being unhappy, being associated with the sociopolitical left, being
evil, being angry or militant and being anti-religion (Edgell, et al., 2006; Gervais et al.,
2011).
Pathology of atheist individuals. This dimension usually exemplifies a more conscious
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belief and expression that there is something wrong or abnormal with someone who
identifies as an Atheist (Nadal et al., 2010). This may mean that dominant culture values
steeped in religion are the norm and that those who do not have religious beliefs are not
respected or honored. This dimension implies that there is a right way and a wrong way to
behave and believe. Beliefs grounded in this dimension may lead to behaviors, statements
and questions in which Atheists may be punished, negatively judged or mistreated. This
dimension is differentiated from “Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes” because the alleged
amorality is a more often directly stated, possibly action oriented, overt attack. According
to Nadal et al., (2010) microaggressions in this dimension may be similar to those
experienced by racial minorities (Sue, 2010).
Exoticization. Microaggressions in this dimension may be similar to those
experienced by racial minorities (Nadal et al., 2010). Those perpetrating the
microaggression believe and act as if Atheists are “foreign” or “bizarre” (Park, 2008).
Another example of this category is when identifying as an Atheist is viewed as trendy or
as a fad. The message conveyed may be that Atheists are strange or different because they
do not hold the religious beliefs of the dominant society. Other messages implied by items
in this dimensions may be that “I have the right to ask you whatever I want,” and “Your
belief system is exotic, and aspects of it can be used as a trend.” It can occur when parts
of Atheism are culturally appropriated in a way that implies it is something to be played
with instead of something to be treated with respect and dignity.
Assumption of one’s own religious identity as normal. This dimension of microaggression
implies a belief that others belong to the same religion or that everyone identifies with a
religion. Microaggressions from this dimension imply that Atheists are inferior or not as
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important. For example, because in the United States the majority of people identify with a
religion, individuals may be able to forget that not everyone worships a deity (Nadal,
2008). Examples of implied messages are that everyone should believe in a higher power
or engage with religious traditions, a lack of religion is immoral, and Atheist beliefs do not
matter. The use of specific language (i.e. “In God we Trust” or “I will pray for you.”) may
convey assumptions of one’s own religion as being the norm (Nadal et al, 2010).
Assumption of atheist homogeneity. This dimension is characterized by the belief that
Atheists all look, act and behave the same. This dimension is one in which Atheists are
thought to belong to a homogeneous group (Nadal et al., 2010; Sue et al., 2007). This type
of microaggression assumes that there are certain, current and past, universal life
experiences descriptive of Atheists. Beliefs in this dimension may place expectations on
how Atheists should act, think, and appear. An example of this type of microaggression is
asking an individual to be a “spokesperson” for all Atheists. This implies that Atheists are
interchangeable or non-descript. The message is that there is no individuality or
uniqueness to a persons’ expression or development of Atheism.
Denial of religious prejudice towards atheists. This dimension is characterized by
religious individuals lacking awareness of their religious biases. They may say “I don’t see
you for your Atheism and beliefs” or “we’re all the same” (Nadal et al, 2010). These types
of statements may take away from a non-religious identity. Statements in this category may
invalidate the reality of an individual in which Atheism is a salient part of their lives.
Implied messages in this dimension include “Your religious identity doesn’t matter,” and
“I cannot be prejudiced.” Other themes may include likening Atheism to religion or
putting religion and Atheism on equal standing, thereby not acknowledging religious
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privilege. This dimension has its roots in racial “color blindness” (Sue, 2009).
Demographics questionnaire. General demographics information about the
respondents was collected through the administration of a demographics questionnaire.
Respondents were asked to respond to demographics related information in order to
identify their age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, marital status, income, education
and location in the U.S.
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (MCSD; Marlowe & Crowne,
1966). A scale used to measure social desirability independent of psychopathology created
by Marlowe and Crowne (1960) was used as a measure of discriminant validity. The
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS, Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985) is a measure
of global life satisfaction and will be utilized as a measure of convergent validity. The
SWLS scale was correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne Measure of social desirability at .02,
suggesting it did not evoke a socially desirable response set. Internal consistency for the
Marlowe-Crowne scale was found to be at .88. This scale was normed on American,
college-aged students.
Satisfaction with life scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin,
1985). The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) is an 18 item self-report scale for use in
evaluation research to assess aspects of subjective satisfaction with life of adults. The
SWLS evaluates an individual’s level of satisfaction with his or her current life in the
following four domains: Living Situation, Social Relationships, Employment/Work, and
Self and Present Life. The SWLS was found to have a coefficient alpha of .86, considered
to be a high and respectable measure of internal consistency. The SWLS has been normed
on multiple, diverse American populations including substance abusers to individuals with
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disabilities. There is also normative data from different countries from around the world
(see Pavot & Diener, 1993). Blais, Vallerand, Pelletier and Briere (1989) found that the
SWLS has evidence for its construct validity having a (r = -.72, p = .00) between the SWLS
and the Beck Depression Inventory.
Pilot Scale Construction Procedures
The Scale of Atheist Microaggressions (SAM) was initially a 65-item scale
developed to measure Atheists experiences of microaggressions. The SAM was developed
by Pagano, McCullagh, Austin, Fuller, and Williams (2012) utilizing the 8 steps of scale
development set out by DeVellis (2003). The first step consisted of clearly determining the
construct to be measured—Atheist Microaggressions. Considerable time was spent
reviewing and revising the taxonomy of Nadal et al. (2010) to make it fit for an Atheist
population, resulting in 6 hypothesized dimensions. The dimensions are described in more
detail previously in the methods section. During the 2nd step of scale construction an item
pool was developed, driven by theory. Item construction was informed by generally
accepted, best practices in psychometrics and scale development (Bradburn et al, 2004;
Develis, 2003; Worthington &Whittaker, 2006).
Correspondingly a team of four graduate students from the same counseling
psychology program and a fifth from the experimental psychology program participated in
initial item construction. Guidance and support from three faculty members from both the
counseling and clinical psychology were provided (Pagano et al., 2012). Team members
were diverse in their own religious and non-religious identification, representing Atheism,
Christianity and Agnosticism. The team consisted of 4 males and 1 female, four identified
as White and one identified as bi-racial.
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Pagano et al. (2012) created 113 items based upon the religious minority taxonomy
of microaggressions created by Nadal et al. (2010) that were further adapted to specifically
meet the needs of an Atheist population. As in the taxonomy, there were six themes
initially created which later served as scale dimensions (see scale description, methods
section). Sufficient attention was given so that each theme had close to equal amounts of
items representing each theme so content validity could be maximized (Allen & Yen, 1979;
Devellis, 2003). The initial item pool resulted in 113 items, which was approximately three
times the amount of items Pagano et al. hypothesized the final scale to contain. After the
initial dimensions were created along with their associated items, the four other graduate
students were brought together in a team to provide informed feedback about both
dimension and item construction. Subsequently both the description of the constructs and
item wordings were appropriately changed to enhance content validity and readability.
In line with Devillis’ (2003) third step of scale construction, the format for
measurement was determined. Consistent with other microaggression and race related
stress scales such as the Daily Racial Microaggression (DRM) Scale (Mercer, Zeigler-Hill,
Wallace & Hayes, 2010) and the Index of Race-Related Stress (IRRS) (Utsey & Ponterotto,
1996), the respondents responded to the items using a 5 point likert scale (Likert, 1932)
recalling on events and situations that may have occurred to them (1 = This has never
happened to me; 2= This has happened to me but it did not upset me… ; 5 = This event
happened and I was extremely upset). There are no reversed scored items on the SAM and
the SAM was developed so that higher total scores on the SAM are more indicative of
stress as a result of experiencing microaggressions.
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The fourth step of the scale’s construction (DeVellis, 2003) was to have it
evaluated by experts. The 113 initial items of the SAM were evaluated and reviewed by
expert reviewers in order to ensure content and construct validity in addition to item
clarity. The feedback from the expert reviewers led to the adjustment and exclusion. Five
academics were solicited to provide expert feedback on the items and scale dimensions in
order to improve content and construct validity (Allen & Yen, 1979; Devellis, 2003;
Hardesty & Bearden, 2004). The academics were all considered to be authorities on either
microaggression theory or discriminatory beliefs about Atheists. The experts first reviewed
the pool of items for inclusive language, clarity, and phrasing. They were then instructed to
sort items into dimension areas based on definitions provided to them. They were also
offered two additional categories to provide feedback. One option allowed them to denote
items that did not fit into any one of the 6 dimensions, but was still an Atheist
microaggression and a second option to denote that an item did not fit into any of the 6
dimensions and was not an Atheist microaggression.
The first expert reviewer was Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, Ph.D., an Israeli professor
of psychology at the University of Haifa, Israel. In 1970 Beit-Hallahmi received a PhD in
clinical psychology from Michigan State University. He is a renowned author of the
combined fields of psychology and religion. He has authored and co-authored numerous
books such as Psychoanalysis and Religion: A Bibliography (1982), Prolegomena to the Psychological
Study of Religion (1989), The Annotated Dictionary of Modern Religious Movements (1994), and The
Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience (1997). He was one of two individuals
asked to serve as an external advisor to the APA taskforce on Deceptive and Indirect
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Techniques of Persuasion and Control, which investigated such phenomenon as
brainwashing and cults.
The second reviewer was Ryan Cragun, Ph.D. an assistant professor of sociology
at the University of Tampa who specializes in the sociological study of religion, focusing
on Mormonism, the nonreligious and secularization. His research has been published in a
range of journals, including: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Sociology of Religion, Nova
Religio, and Journal of Contemporary Religion. The third reviewer was Will Gervais, Ph.D, an
assistant professor of social psychology at the University of Kentucky. Broadly, he studies
how evolution and culture shape peoples beliefs about the world including why do some
people turn to gods, why others do not believe and why are Atheists disliked.
The fourth reviewer was Christina Capodiluppo, Ph.D., an adjunct professor of
psychology at the University of Hartford. She currently researches microaggressions,
focusing on gender and sexual orientation microaggressions. She has published with D.W.
Sue, Ph.D. and Kevin Nadal, Ph.D. The fifth reviewer David Rivera, Ph.D, an assistant
professor of psychology at William Paterson University. He is co-author of the
Microaggressions in Everyday Life blog with D.W. Sue, Ph.D., a part of Psychology
Today.com. He has received multiple recognitions for his work, including national honors
from the American Psychological Association and the American College Counseling
Association.
The five experts sorted the original 113 items into 49 items that had at least four
out of five experts sort the items into the same scale dimensions. Four of those 49 items
were eliminated for redundancy and poor wording. There were 35 items that were sorted
by three out of the five experts into the same dimension that were again reviewed by the
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research team Pagano et al., (2012) for inclusion for the pilot test and EFA. Twenty items
of those 35 were retained. The 20 that were kept were theoretically representative of
specific dimensions and were able to help build the required minimum of items to include
a dimension in the instrument for the pilot test and EFA (Devellis, 2003). The final scale
length for the pilot test and EFA after the expert review was 65 items.
The fifth step of scale construction (DeVellis, 2003) was to consider the inclusion
of validation items. While no validation items were included directly into the scale, the
Marlowe-Crowne (1960) social desirability scale was separately used as a measure of
discriminant validity to ensure that the SAM did not inspire any socially desirable
responses. The sixth step (DeVellis, 2003) was to administer the scale to a development
sample, which was done with 577 individuals, which far exceeds the minimum of 200
recommended by DeVellis (2010). The seventh step in scale construction (DeVellis, 2003)
involved item evaluation (e.g., evaluating item-scale correlations, item variance) and factor
analysis. The information from the seventh step informed the eighth and final step of
optimizing the scale length. Optimizing the scale length involved eliminating poorly
performing items based on information obtained from the seventh step. More detail
about the seventh and eight steps follows the methods section.
Pilot Results
The purpose of the pilot portion of this scale development project was to initiate
and test initial psychometrics on a scale the measures Atheists experiences of
microaggressions. The initial development of the Scale of Atheist Microaggressions
(SAM) is discussed in length. Scale items were developed and experts subsequently
reviewed the items. Specific analyses were conducted to evaluate the psychometric
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performance of the items, and factor analyses were conducted in order to explore the
factor structure of the initial scale. Scale reliability was also assessed and in order to
establish convergent and discriminant validity, the Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale
(RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1988), the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons,
Larsen & Griffin, 1985) and the Social Desirability Rating Scale (SDRS; Marlowe &
Crowne, 196) were used.
Item Analysis
The first task of item analysis is to investigate the intercorrelation between the
items, whether or not individual items are representative of the entire scale (Devellis,
2003). The 65-items of the SAM were analyzed with the purpose of evaluating their
performance within the SAM. Initial item analysis of the 65 items revealed a range of item
to total correlations between .174 and .725. Items that were the most highly correlated
with one another (item to total correlation above .6) were chosen to investigate how they
loaded and hung together. Higher item to total correlation values suggest scale
homogeneity (Clark & Watson, 2003). As a result of this selection process, 7 items were
chosen. Subsequently 4 more items were added with an item to total correlation above .5
in an attempt to represent the a priori hypothesis of 6 factors for a total of 11 items. As
suggested by Devellis (2003), no items with correlations below .30 were considered and
every effort was made to only utilize items with item to total correlations above .40, which
DeVellis considers acceptable. See Table 2 for item information on item means, standard
deviations and item to total correlations (I-Tr).
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Exploratory Factor Analysis
Guidelines for conducting factor analysis. The purpose of the exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) is to reveal how many latent variables are contained within a set of
items, condensing information into a smaller number of variables when possible and to
account for the latent variables that caused the most variation in the set of items as a larger
whole (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Kahn, 2006). The first step is to perform an extraction.
There are multiple ways to conduct the extraction of the factors, the two most common
being Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA has
commonly been criticized for not accurately obtaining parameters that reflect latent
constructs or factors and produce deceptive results (Gorsuch, 1997; Widaman, 1993;
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). PAF was utilized for this scale development project
specifically because it has been cited as being able to more accurately produce factor
loadings not unlike population values and assumes error, whereas PCA does not (Gorsuch,
1983).
PAF is considered to be the most appropriate extraction method when developing
new scales as its primary goal is to understand structure and latent factors (Worthington &
Whittaker, 2006). With PAF Kahn (2006) reports that it is most common to utilize the
squared multiple correlation as the initial estimate of communality to best take advantage
of the shared variance that researchers desire to understand. Shared variance should be
separated from both unique and error variance in order to appropriately extract the
factors, which PFA allows for, while PCA keeps shared an unique variance together.
In order to make sense of the data and utilize factor analysis to its fullest, rotation
takes place after extraction as a means to arithmetically organize a set of factors in simplest
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form (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995). The two ways of rotating data utilize oblique and
orthogonal rotations. Simply put, oblique rotations assume correlated factors while
orthogonal assumes un-correlated factors. The most common forms of oblique and
orthogonal rotation are Promax and Varimax, respectively. It has been demonstrated that
both forms of rotation will sometimes give only modestly different accounts of factor
structure and that choosing which rotation to use can be guided by the theory guiding
scale construction. However it is important to keep in mind that it is the rotation that
provides the simplest structure that is to be utilized. It is indicated to utilize Promax
(oblique) first to see how the factors come out and items load. If the factors are correlated
it will be demonstrated in the rotation as would uncorrelated factors. Benefits to utilizing
Varimax (orthogonal) rotation are that it offers a simpler and easier to interpret factor
structure (Kahn, 2006; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).
After extraction and factor rotation, when considering the number of factors to
retain it is common to utilize Kaiser’s criterion--a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher
(Costello & Osborne, 2005; Kaiser, 1960; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Kahn (2006) reports
that this is most often only appropriate to the use of PCA and not PFA, though it is still
commonly done. The number of factors retained has typically been decided by whether or
not factors cross and eigenvalue of 1.0. An eigenvalue represents the extent of information
or variance captured by a factor. Utilizing the Scree Test (Catell, 1966) may be another
way to addressing the potential problem of having eigenvalues only slightly above or
slightly below 1.0. It utilizes the relative values in place of the absolute values. This
method looks at the magnitude of eigenvalues across successive factors, examining the
drop in information, referred to as the “elbow.” Factors beneath the elbow on a plot will
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be eliminated and those above will be maintained. Kahn (2006) recommends utilizing the
scree plot to determine the number of factors retained when PAF is the method of
extraction. Devellis (2008) however warns that utilizing the scree plot can be difficult if the
elbow is not clear and it is gradual. Given that deciding on how many factors to retain can
be confusing having factors meet multiple standards and criteria is most appropriate (see
Gorsuch, 1983; Tinsley & Tinsely, 1987).
When examining how individual items load to or hang together within a particular
factor Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest a minimum loading value of .32. The precise
factor extraction method depends on a variety of factors such as data distribution and
multivariate normality for example (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Items that load weakly,
that is below .35 in a principal factor analysis or below .40 in a principal components
analysis are commonly considered first for removal as they may suggest only a modest
correlation with other items (Clark & Watson, 1995). Factors with fewer than three items
are generally considered too weak and unstable whereas factors with at least 5 or more
items that have a strong loading value of .50 or better constitute a stable and unyielding
factor (Clark & Watson, 1995; Hatcher, 1994).
Pilot factor analysis. Worthington and Whittaker (2006) recommend that an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) be conducted before conducting a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA). Therefore an EFA was conducted on the 65-items that resulted from the
expert review utilizing the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0.0.
The SAM underwent principal axis factoring with exclusion of cases listwise as a means of
identifying potential factor solutions. Table 2 provides detail of the initial item level results
of this analysis.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was measured at
.955 which surpasses the minimum value of .50 suggested proceeding with factor analysis.
A Bartlett’s Test of Sphereicity revealed a χ2 of 18677.05 (df= 2080, p>.000) also providing
evidence for sampling adequacy and proceeding with factor analysis (Norman & Streiner,
2007). In order to discern the number of factors to retain, as recommended by DeVellis
(2003) three criterion were utilized: (1) analysis of the scree plot, (2) interpretation of the
total variance explained, and (3) individual factor loadings of .30 or higher. To increase
the standard of item loadings, the suggested loading of .32 as suggested by Tabachnick and
Fidell (2001) was implemented. Total variance explained by the 65 items indicated 12
components with eigenvalues of 1.00 or higher, with the first factor (initial eigenvalue of
19.576) explaining 30.117% of the variance. Together the first three factors explained
39.865% of the total variance. The rest of the initial 12 factors explained and additional
28.123% of the variance for a total of 67.988% cumulative variance. The initial scree plot
revealed an elbow that suggested the presence of two factors. Due to the proposed final
structure having 4 factors (which will be explained further on), initial item loadings for the
first three factors are presented (see Table 2).
The initial, un-rotated factor matrix of the initial 65 items revealed an array of
quality, high factor loadings and negative, low factor loadings. Therefore the 11 items
identified previously based upon item analysis (see previous section) were submitted to a
promax (oblique) rotation with a Kappa value of 4. The items were rotated obliquely
because there is sufficient support from the theory of microaggression that the themes of
religious minority microaggressions and the proposed Atheist microaggression themes are
related as a coherent taxonomy (Nadal et al., 2010; Sue, 2010a; Sue 2010b). Recent scales
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utilizing the theory of Microaggressions have also utilized oblique rotations (see for
example Nadal, 2011), further providing support for the chosen rotation and consensus in
the field that microaggression themes are psychometrically correlated.
Table 2
Item Analysis and Initial Item Loadings (Principle Factor Analysis)
F1
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Someone has placed
religious holiday
decorations in a
public place I
frequent.
Someone has been
surprised about one
of my beliefs
because they
assumed an Atheist
would not believe
that.
Someone assumed
that I am an Atheist
because I was
traumatized.
Someone believes
that I can speak for
all Atheists.
I have noticed that
there is a strong
emphasis on the
religious
identification of
political candidates
in the United States.
Someone has asked
me what church I
attend without first
asking if I identify
as a religious
individual.

F2

F3

M

SD

.367

.351

.078

.363

2.51

.750

.521

.021

-.036

.514

2.44

1.042

.423

-.167

.107

.411

2.09

1.384

.506

-.198

-.003

.493

2.04

1.184

.383

.292

-.114

.380

4.38

.807

.515

.117

.113

.503

2.34

1.031
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F1
7.

8.

9.

I have been asked
what keeps me
from doing bad
things because I am
an Atheist.
Someone has found
it bizarre or strange
that I do not believe
in a higher power.
I have heard
someone say that
Atheist’s cannot
lead fulfilling lives.

10. I discovered that I
was not elected to a
leadership position
because I am an
Atheist.
11. Someone has said
to me that Atheists
think they are better
than everyone.
12. I have heard
someone say that
Atheists are selfcentered.
13. Someone has been
surprised that I am
spiritual because
they believed all
Atheists were not.
14. I have been told
that I do not act like
an Atheist.

F2

F3

M

SD

.665

-.073

-.215

.651

2.96

1.392

.564

.289

-.187

.545

2.83

1.040

.668

-.119

-.274

.650

3.22

1.400

.205

-.001

.114

.205

1.24

.878

.581

-.141

-.151

.562

2.37

1.329

.645

-.221

-.177

.628

2.42

1.393

.275

-.026

.063

.270

1.45

.871

.444

-.051

.160

.432

1.71

1.009
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F1
15. Someone
questioned my
beliefs as an
Atheist, but was
unwilling to
question their own
beliefs.
16. I have been asked
why Atheists are
intolerant.
17. Someone told me
my life is without
purpose because I
am an Atheist.
18. Someone told me
they were surprised
that I do not believe
in a higher power.
19. Someone has
wished me a “Merry
Christmas.”
20. Someone told me
that they could
relate to my
experiences of
Atheist
discrimination even
though they are not
an Atheist.
21. I have not been
included in a social
group because I am
an Atheist.
22. Someone has told
me they do not
judge individuals in
terms of their
religious beliefs.

F2

F3

M

SD

.581

.132

-.228

.569

3.42

1.247

.669

-.267

-.090

.654

2.42

1.475

.728

-.167

-.253

.706

2.92

1.503

.538

.186

-.075

.520

2.33

.914

.177

.390

.060

.174

2.12

.429

.384

-.131

.153

.377

1.36

.737

.419

.011

.218

.415

1.70

1.155

.197

.024

.054

.194

1.87

.638
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F1

F2

F3

M

SD

23. I have been asked
why Atheists are
angry.

.615

-.204

-.092

.599

2.01

1.187

24. Someone has
likened Atheism to
religion.

.547

.063

-.281

.533

3.14

1.303

25. Someone was
surprised that I am
an Atheist and a
nice person.
26. I have been told
that I am bringing
dishonor to my
family because I am
an Atheist.
27. I have been told
that I complain too
much about things
related to my
Atheist beliefs.
28. Someone told me I
am not a good
neighbor because I
am an Atheist.
29. Someone has told
me I should be
ashamed of myself
for being an
Atheist.
30. I have heard people
say that Atheists are
immoral.
31. I have been told
that my life is
without meaning
because I am an
Atheist.

.641

-.023

-.015

.622

2.38

1.219

.489

-.135

.243

.479

1.74

1.346

.533

-.016

.034

.526

1.89

1.295

.197

-.086

.250

.194

1.08

.452

.591

-.122

.153

.581

2.06

1.449

.646

-.058

-.363

.627

3.41

1.358

.747

-.102

-.256

.725

2.82

1.503
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F1
32. I have been told
that I am going to
hell because I am an
Atheist.
33. Someone expressed
surprise that I do
not believe in God.
34. I have heard
someone say that
Atheists are not
willing to accept
other’s viewpoints.
35. Someone has
included a blessing
or prayer in a social
gathering (like a
business meeting,
ceremony, or dinner
for example) I have
participated in.
36. I have been told
that I must not care
for others because I
am an Atheist.
37. I have been asked if
being an Atheist
means I am antireligion.
38. I have been asked if
I have had a bad
experience with the
church because I
am an Atheist.
39. Someone has called
me selfish because I
am an Atheist.

F2

F3

M

SD

.579

.025

-.097

.564

2.74

1.316

.440

.230

.036

.424

2.26

.758

.646

-.135

-.123

.628

2.67

1.313

.403

.563

.033

.394

3.08

1.071

.694

-.216

.014

.678

2.26

1.500

.532

-.041

.164

.517

1.86

.834

.548

-.068

.216

.535

1.90

1.017

.632

-.187

.068

.622

1.88

1.299
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40. I have been told
that that my
negative
experiences do not
compare to the
negative
experiences
religious individuals
endure.
41. Someone assumed
that my interests
and hobbies were
strange because I
am an Atheist.
42. My experiences as
an Atheist have
been dismissed as
an overreaction.
43. I have been asked if
I believe in
witchcraft because I
am an Atheist.
44. I have been told by
someone that
because they have
an Atheist friend,
they are not antiAtheist.
45. I have been told
that I am bringing
dishonor to my
community because
I am an Atheist.
46. Someone has
questioned my
values because I am
an Atheist.
47. I have noticed that
“In God We Trust”
is written on all
American Currency.

	
  

F1

F2

F3

.576

-.195

.121

.565

2.00

1.434

.514

-.046

.324

.502

1.41

.901

.587

-.025

.107

.579

2.15

1.380

.467

.032

.250

.460

1.63

1.079

.489

-.111

.312

.480

1.41

.779

.422

-.189

.310

.414

1.35

.973

.742

-.065

-.195

.725

2.90

1.418

.424

.524

-.110

.412

3.59

1.067
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F1

F2

F3

.690

-.091

-.142

.675

2.36

1.264

.580

-.204

.232

.571

1.89

1.475

.560

.427

.002

.552

3.21

1.305

.466

.041

.189

.455

1.87

.965

.649

-.212

-.128

.632

2.40

1.295

.635

-.177

.071

.626

2.45

1.669

54. Someone has
offered to pray for
me.

.429

.462

.014

.420

2.98

1.145

55. I have heard people
say that Atheists are
without morals.

.682

-.020

-.323

.664

3.35

1.374

.627

-.112

.175

.609

1.99

.969

.556

-.221

.146

.541

1.99

1.343

48. I have been asked
what purpose in life
I have as an Atheist.
49. Someone told me
that I am not
trustworthy because
I am an Atheist.
50. I have been told to
express thanks to
God for an event.
51. Someone asked me
an incessant amount
of questions about
my Atheist beliefs.
52. I have heard
someone say that
Atheists are
arrogant.
53. Someone has called
me “Un-American”
for being an
Atheist.

56. I have been asked if
I hate religion
because I am an
Atheist.
57. Someone told me
that Atheists are all
the same.
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F1
58. Someone expressed
disbelief that I do
not believe in God.
59. I have been told
that discrimination
against Atheists
does not compare
to the war on
religion.
60. I have been asked
to pray for
someone.
61. Someone has said
“God bless you” or
“Bless you” to me
after I have
sneezed.
62. Someone has told
me not to complain
about religion.
63. Someone has said
to me that they do
not have a problem
with me being an
Atheist, but their
behaviors suggest
otherwise.
64. I have noticed the
words “under God”
in the Pledge of
Allegiance of the
United States.
65. I have been asked
to pray for a cause.

F2

F3

I-Tr

M

SD

.546

.195

.077

.531

2.49

1.203

.686

-.128

.085

.675

2.47

1.642

.445

.602

.093

.433

2.69

1.109

.245

.421

.226

.240

2.21

.611

.637

.024

.080

.629

2.50

1.465

.615

-.001

.134

.607

2.42

1.358

.436

.527

-.071

.424

3.73

1.082

.458

.591

.102

.442

2.75

1.139

From the 11 items rotated two factors were revealed. Those 11 items were largely
made up of items sorted into the Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes (factor 1) and Denial of
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Atheist Prejudice (factor 2). In order to attempt to produce a third factor items 1, 50 and
18 were added, which created the third factor, representing the Assumption of Religious
Identity as Normal dimension (factor 3). Those three items rose the scales overall
reliability coefficient as well. Item 31 was removed and 17 was added in its place due to
similar item content and same expert sorted dimension. Item 31 reads “ I have been told
that my life is without meaning because I am an Atheist” and item 17 reads, “Someone
told me my life is without purpose because I am an Atheist.” Item 17 loaded to the factor
more clearly with better cross loadings. Items 31 and 17 were sorted to different
dimensions as a result of the expert panel results, Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes and
Pathology of Atheist Individuals, respectively. Pagano et al. (2012) however were
supportive of their interchangeability due to very similar item content and discussion of
the two dimensions potentially being able to collapse into one another. As a result, 20
loaded more clearly with the intended factor.
Item 6 was added to increase the total of items in factor three in an attempt to
have an equal number of items per factor. Item 33 was added to equal the number of items
per factor in factor 1. It loaded clearly onto factor 1 and even slightly improved overall
scale reliability. Item 35 was also added to factor 3 in order to make equal the number of
items per factor. Reliability was subsequently unaffected. Item 44, the last item added, was
added to equal the number of items per factor in factor 2. At this point in development,
there were 18 items total, 6 items per dimension. Items 15 and 23 however still had
problematic cross loadings with less than .15 separating the factors onto which they
loaded. Item 15 was removed because its loading was the poorest and as a result item 23’s
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loading was slightly improved and the amount of cumulative variance was also increased.
This resulted in a final scale length of 20 items.
Factor structure. Promax rotation, with a principal axis factoring extraction of the
20 items revealed that there were again, there were four factors with initial eigenvalues
above 1.0. All items had factor loadings above .32 for their respective dimensions (see
Table 4). The pattern matrix over the structure matrix was looked to primarily as it
demonstrated a simpler structure with which to conceptualize the data, a strength that has
been argued to separate the two matrices (Hatcher, 1994). The pattern matrix has been
reported to be more helpful when the factors are already known (Gorsuch, 1983) as is the
case with our a priori hypothesis on factor structure modeled after the Nadal et al. (2010)
proposed taxonomy. Our initial hypothesis of finding 6 factors was not supported. Item
to total correlations were all above .40 with the exception of two items—33 and 35. The
range of item to total correlations was from .34 to .66. The factor structure is only
minimally substantiated by the scree plot demonstrating an elbow approximately at 2
factors, possibly 3 factors. All four of the factors were positively correlated with one
another (see Table 3).
Table 3
Factor Correlation Matrix (Principal Axis Factoring) and Consistency
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.

	
  

Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes (F1; items 11, 12, 16, 17,
23 & 34)
Assumption of Religious Identity as Normal (F2; items
6, 18, 33, 35, & 50)
Denial of Atheist Prejudice (F3; items 40, 42, 44, 59, 62
& 63)
Pathology Of Atheist Individuals (F4; items 26, 29, 45)
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2.

3.

-

α
.86

.52

-

.74

.71

.56

-

.81

.59

.43

.62

.71

The four factors are Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes (F1 items 11, 12, 16, 17, 23 & 34)
explaining 36.16% of the variance, Denial of Atheist Prejudice (F2 items 40, 42, 59, 62 & 63)
explaining 8.60% of the variance, Assumption of Religious Identity as Normal (F3 items 1, 6, 18,
33, 35, & 50) explaining 6.47% of the variance, and Pathology of Atheist Individuals (F4 items
26, 29, & 45) explaining 5.41% of the variance. The items in each factor were fittingly
sorted as such by the experts prior to factor analysis. See Table 4 for item loadings.
Table 4
SAM Items Final EFA (Pattern Matrix, Promax Rotation, Principal Axis Factoring)

	
  
	
  
	
  

Items
11. Someone has said to me that Atheists think
they are better than everyone.
12. I have heard someone say that Atheists
are self-centered.
16. I have been asked why Atheists are intolerant.
17. Someone told me my life is without purpose
because I am an Atheist.
23. I have been asked why Atheists are angry.
34. I have heard someone say that Atheists are not
willing to accept others' viewpoints.
40. I have been told that that my negative
experiences
as an Atheist do not compare
to the negative experiences of religious
individuals.
42. My experiences as an Atheist have been
dismissed
as an overreaction.
59. I have been told that discrimination against
Atheists does not compare to the war on
religion.
62. Someone has told me not to complain about
religion.
63. Someone has said to me that they do not have
a problem with me being an Atheist, but their
behaviors suggest otherwise.
1. Someone has placed religious holiday
decorations in a public place I frequent.
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F1
.79

F2
.02

F3
-.09

F4
-.04

.78

-.02

-.04

.01

.68
.52

-.11
.05

.17
.12

.02
.13

.49
.62

-.05
.02

.32
.15

-.08
-.09

.08

-.1

.68

-.00

-.02

.12

.50

.08

.10

-.01

.73

-.00

.09

.15

.53

-.01

.02

.16

.42

.14

-.15

.51

.21

-.09

Table 4 continued
Items
6. Someone has asked me what church I attend
without first asking if I identify as a religious
individual.
18. Someone has acted confused when I told them
I do not believe in a higher power.
33. Someone expressed surprise that I do not
believe in God.
35. Someone has included a blessing or prayer in a
social gathering (like a business meeting,
ceremony).
50. I have been told to express thanks to God for
an event.
26. I have been told that I am bringing dishonor to
my family because I am an Atheist.
29. Someone has told me I should be ashamed of
myself for being an Atheist.
45. I have been told that I am bringing dishonor to
my community because I am an Atheist.

F1
.05

F2
.43

F3
.09

F4
.09

.31

.48

-.18

.07

.22

.47

-.16

.02

-.17

.79

.03

-.10

.04

.61

.06

-.01

-.09

-.03

-.03

.87

.06

.09

.06

.55

-.00

-.12

.07

.62

Measures of Validity for Pilot Study
Discriminant validity with the Crowne-Marlowe (1960) scale of social
desirability and right wing authoritarianism scale. It was hypothesized that CrowneMarlowe (1960) scale of social desirability would not correlate with the pilot version of the
SAM. This hypothesis was supported. Social desirability was not correlated with the SAM,
yielding non-significant results utilizing a correlation analysis revealing a Pearson’s
correlation coefficient of r = .04, p = .37 (two tail).
Divergent validity with satisfaction with life scale. It was hypothesized that the
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985) would have
a moderate, negative correlation with the pilot version of the SAM scale between the
values r = -.4and r = -.2. This hypothesis was not substantiated. The correlation analysis
revealed a negative correlation r = -.05, p = .097 (one tail) however the results were not
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significant at either the .01 or .05 level. Reasons as to why this hypothesis was not
supported will be elaborated upon in chapter 5.
Reliability
Internal consistency. It was hypothesized that the pilot version of the SAM
would demonstrate strong internal consistency, as evidenced by a Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient of .80 or higher. Results of the initial reliability analysis of the original,
unrotated 65 items was strong, as evidenced by a coefficient alpha of .96. After individual
item analysis, consideration of factor loadings, subsequent removal of 48 items, and factor
rotation, another reliability analysis was conducted. The 20-item final scale’s reliability
analysis revealed a coefficient alpha of .90, considered to be a very strong indicator of
internal consistency.
Dissertation Methods
Procedures
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is the next logical step in scale construction
to explore the psychometric properties of the SAM. The purpose of a CFA is to see if the
theoretical structure obtained in the EFA will be the same across a new sample of
respondents (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Ford, McCallum & Tait, 1986). CFA is a refining
measure to improve construct validity and identify method effects. The CFA allows for
clear predictions about which factors exist, how they relate to the variables and how they
relate to one another (Gorsuch, 1997). CFA is a confirmatory technique and best practices
indicate that the planning of the analysis is driven by theory, including theoretical
relationships among both the observed and unobserved variables (Schreiber, et al., 2006).
The first step to developing measures with confirmatory factor analysis (Hatcher, 1994) is
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to construct the basic confirmatory factor model (or program figure) comprised of the
factors (or latent variables) found in the EFA. Coefficients will be set to 1 between error
terms and observed variables as well as between observed variables and latent variables.
The reason the paths are fixed at a specific value is so that the model is encouraged to
minimize the number of parameters estimated (Schreiber et al., 2006).
The second step (Hatcher, 1994) is to identify residual terms of endogenous
variables (a variable that is predicted to be causally affected by other variables in the
model). Next, the third step requires that all parameters to be measured are clearly
identified including item factor loadings, covariances between factors, and variances for
exogenous variables (constructs influenced only by variables that are outside the
confirmatory factor model). The final and fourth step in constructing the required model is
verifying that the model is overidentified--for example, verifying that the number of data
points in the analysis is larger than the number of parameters to be estimated (thus the
large sample sized required).
Once the factor model has been developed the model is then tested to see if it fits
the data obtained from the new validation sample (Hatcher, 1994). Ideally the model
delivers a good fit, which is evaluated by reviewing overall goodness of fit indices and
assessment of fit indices. The first index Hatcher recommends to review is the chi-square
test. If the factor model is a good fit it will have a small chi-square value and a large p value
ideally above .05 and nearer to 1.00. An additional recommendation for this first step is to
observe the ratio between the degrees of freedom (df) and the chi-square value, requiring a
ratio of less than two. Hatcher warns that models evaluated with the chi-square test often
provide a chi-square statistic that is significant even if the model does show goodness of fit
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with other models due to large validation sample sizes. The second step (Hatcher, 1994) is
to review non-normed and comparative fit indices such as the CFI (Bentler, 1990) and the
NNFI (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) for example.
Third, Hatcher recommends that significance tests for factor loadings be reviewed
where a non-significant factor loading indicates that the involved indicator variable
(measured scale item) is not adequately measuring the factor. If indicator variables are nonsignificant, this may require the item to be removed from the model or moved to another
factor. Finally, the residual and normalized residual matrices will be reviewed for matrix
entries of zero or near zero values for model goodness of fit. From there the measurement
model can be revised based upon modification indices if the earlier consulted indices
denote a poor fit of model to data (Hatcher, 1994).
Jackson, Gillaspy and Purc Stephenson (2009) recommend the consideration of
additional models of fit that are theoretically plausible and identify conceivable comparable
models to be considered for confirmatory factor analysis. Therefore in addition to the 3factor model found in the pilot EFA other potential factor solutions including a single
factor, forced rotation of the items with the 6 hypothesized dimensions serving as content
areas instead of latent factors will be explored for psychometric viability during the CFA
procedures. Best practices for evaluating confirmatory factor models indicate including
additional, multiple indices of fitness not discussed at length in Hatcher (1994) to ensure
the factor model fits the observed data from the new sample (Jackson, et al., 2009). These
may include but are not limited to the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA, Steiger & Lind, 1980) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI, Tucker & Lewis, 1973).
This additional information will be utilized to assess the confirmatory factor model along
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with the information obtained from the chi-square goodness of fit test and Comparative
Fit Index (Bentler, 1990).
Dissertation Participant Demographics
Consistent with general practices in scale development (DeVellis, 2003), a
minimum sample size of 200 is required for continued factor analysis and a sample of 300
is desirable. Participants were be recruited using similar methods as in the pilot
procedures—online sampling. Various online social media sites and blogs were utilized to
collect a diverse sample of American Atheists. The SAM was administered on Qualtrics
through the University of North Dakota’s subscription.A new sample was collected using
similar recruitment procedures used in the pilot study. Special efforts to improve
respondent recruitment procedures were implemented so that a more diverse sample of
individuals was sampled. For example, instead of listing the survey participation link on
websites and blogs for Atheists generally, specific female Atheist or African American
Atheist blogs and websites were contacted for participation.
Consistent with recommended sample size requirements (e.g., DeVellis, 2003;
Jackson, 2001), 378 respondents were used during the CFA procedure as a validation
sample. Gender. The 378 respondents consisted of 184 males (48.7%) and 191 females
(50.5%). Fortunately having almost equal percentages of males and females we have
enough data to calculate an independent samples T-test to see if there is a mean difference
for total SAM scores between males and females. Male SAM scores (M = 47.12, SD =
14.49) were not significantly different than Female SAM scores (M = 49.30, SD = 14.44), t
(373) = -1.46, p = .15. This result suggests that gender does not impact stress experienced
as a result of Atheist microaggressions as measured by the SAM. ; Race. The respondents
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were 89.7% Caucasian/White. A Fisher’s r to z transformation was completed to explore
differences between the White and non-white participants. Perceived stress was correlated
with the SAM for White participants, r (332) = .115 p < .05 (two tailed) but not for the
non white participants, r (46) = .261. The difference between these correlations is not
statistically significant at the .05 or .01 level, Z = . 935. ; Sexual Orientation.
Heterosexual respondents made up the majority of the sample aa 322 (85.2%) ;
Education. College goers made up the majority of the sample with 31.0% (N = 117)
having some college, and 30.7% (N = 116) having a 4-year degree . Masters degrees were
held by 12.4% (N = 47) and 6.4% (N = 24) of the sample had doctorates or professional
degrees. See table 5 for more detailed demographic information.
Table 5
Dissertation Respondent Demographics
______________________________________________________________________
N
%
_________________________________________________________________
___________
Age
21
5.6
18-20
21-23
27
7.1
24-29
59
15.6
30-34
66
17.5
35-44
110
29.1
45-54
55
14.6
55-64
30
7.9
65 and over
10
2.6
Total
378
100.0
Gender
Female
Male
Transgender
Total

	
  

184
191
3
378
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48.7
50.5
.8
100.0
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  %	
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	
  
Ethnicity
African American
5
1.3
Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander
2
.5
Caucasian American/White
332
87.8
Foreign National
1
.3
Hispanic/Latino American
14
3.7
Middle Eastern American
1
.3
Native American/American Indian
2
.5
Mixed Race/Bi-Racial
21
5.6
Total
378
100

	
  

Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual
Gay
Lesbian
Bisexual
Total

322
14
5
37
378

85.2
3.7
1.3
9.8
100

Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Total

148
173
52
5
378

39.2
45.8
13.8
1.3
100

Income
Under 15,000
15,000-25,000
26-40,000
40-60,000
60-90,000
90-120,000
120-150,000
150,000+
Total

73
66
66
58
59
31
16
9
378

19.3
17.5
17.5
15.3
15.6
8.2
4.2
2.4
100
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  %	
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
How many children do you have?
0
192
50.8
1
61
16.1
2
84
22.2
3
31
8.2
4
7
1.9
5
3
.8
Total
378
100

	
  

Are you currently enrolled in school (e.g., college,
graduate school, professional school)?
Yes
No
Total

107
271
378

28.3
71.7
100

Highest Level of Education
Less than High School
High School/GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree (e.g., Ph.D.)
Professional Degree (e.g., M.D & J.D)
Total

5
23
117
46
116
47
20
4
378

1.3
6.1
31.0
12.2
30.7
12.4
5.3
1.1
100

50 States, D.C and Puerto Rico Location
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

5
1
10
4
38
21
1
1

1.3
.3
2.6
1.1
10.1
5.6
.3
.3
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________	
  
District of Columbia
20
5.3
Florida
13
3.4
Georgia
2
.05
Hawaii
4
1.1
Idaho
10
2.6
Illinois
12
3.2
Indiana
4
1.1
Iowa
4
1.1
Kansas
11
2.9
Kentucky
2
.05
Louisiana
5
1.3
Maine
3
.08
Maryland
10
2.6
Massachusetts
7
1.9
Michigan
8
2.1
Minnesota
18
4.8
Mississippi
14
3.7
Missouri
1
.3
Montana
2
.5
Nebraska
3
.8
Nevada
8
2.1
New Hampshire
1
.3
New Jersey
15
4.0
New Mexico
6
1.6
New York
1
.3
North Carolina
9
2.4
North Dakota
3
.8
Ohio
10
2.6
Oklahoma
11
2.9
Oregon
4
1.1
Pennsylvania
8
2.1
Rhode Island
20
5.3
South Carolina
4
1.1
Tennessee
2
.5
Texas
11
2.9

	
  

115

	
  
Table 5 continued
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  N	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  %	
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	
  
Utah
20
5.3
Vermont
5
1.3
Virginia
3
.8
Washington
2
.5
West Virginia
1
.3
Wisconsin
5
1.3
Wyoming
1
.3
I do not reside in the United States
10
2.6
Total
378
100
How long have you identified as an Atheist?
(in years)
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2
20
21
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
30
31
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30
44
6
9
1
2
16
5
9
5
2
24
26
2
6
3
9
2
4
2
19
17
2

7.9
11.6
1.6
2.4
.3
.5
4.2
1.3
2.4
1.3
.5
6.3
6.9
.5
1.6
.8
2.4
.5
1.1
.5
5.0
4.5
.5
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________	
  
32
2
.5
33
3
.8
34
2
.5
35
7
1.9
36
2
.5
37
1
.3
38
3
.8
4
25
6.6
40
12
3.2
41
1
.3
42
1
.3
43
1
.3
44
1
.3
45
3
.8
46
1
.3
48
2
.5
49
1
.3
5
24
6.3
50
4
1.1
52
2
.5
55
1
.3
58
1
.3
6
9
2.4
60
1
.3
67
1
.3
7
12
3.2
8
8
2.1
9
2
.5
Total
378
100.0

Convergent and Divergent Validity on the Revised Scale
The measures of convergent and divergent validity used in the EFA will be again
used to improve construct validity of the SAM. The hypothesized correlation values from
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the pilot will remain the same for the dissertation project. Two additional scales were
added to the dissertation procedures to evaluate the construct validity of the SAM. These
two scales are reviewed below.
Reliability of the Dissertation Scale
Reliability will again be assessed utilizing coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) as a
measure of internal consistency. Coefficient alphas for the entire, revised scale and its
factors will be obtained. It is hypothesized that all coefficient alphas obtained will be
between .80 and .90.
Measures
Scale of atheist microaggressions (Pagano, McCullagh, Austin, Fuller,
Grant, 2012). The reliability and validity information regarding this scale is listed above in
the pilot scale results section.
Demographics questionnaire. General demographics information about the
respondents was collected through the administration of a demographics questionnaire.
Respondents were asked to respond to demographics related information in order to
identify their age, number of years identifying as an Athiest, gender, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, marital status, number of children, income, education and location in the U.S.
The validation sample demographics are listed above in Table 5.
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (MCSD; Marlowe & Crowne,
1960). See above for reliability and validity information regarding this scale. It is expected
that this scale will serve as a measure of discriminant validity. Specifically it is hypothesized
that the MCSD will show a low, non-significant correlation with the SAM.
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Satisfaction with life scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin,
1985). See above for reliability and validity information regarding this scale. It is expected
that this scale will serve as a measure of divergent validity. Specifically it is hypothesized
that the SWLS will have a small, negative correlation with the SAM at - .40 < r <-.20.
The perceived stress scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983).
This scale will be administered as a measure of convergent validity. It has a high measure
of internal consistency ranging from .84 to .86, normed using a sample of American,
college adults. It has a test-retest correlation of .85. This is a general measure of stress
experienced in one’s life that is more extensive than the SWLS. It is anticipated that this
scales would have a small, positive relationship with the dissertation SAM at .20 < r < .40.
The ego identity process questionnaire (EIPQ; Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel,
& Geisinger, 1995). This scale will be administered as a measure of convergent validity. It
is hypothesized that individuals with a more developed ego identity will be more aware of
microaggressions that might be subtly offensive or outside the awareness of other Atheists
individuals with a less developed ego identity. The internal consistency estimates for the
two subscales were both .80 and .86. The test-retest reliability was for the two subscales
was .90 and .76, both significant at p < .01. This scale was normed on American, collegeaged students. It is expected that this scale will have a small, positive relationship with the
dissertation SAM and years identifying as an Atheist at .2 < r < .4.
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CHAPTER IV
DISSERTATION RESULTS
This chapter outlines the results of the dissertation project including an
examination of factor structure utilizing information obtained from standard regression
weights, use of modification indices and fit indices. Reliability and validity of the
dissertation version of the SAM is also explored. The statistical procedures conducted for
the results section of this dissertation project were done utilizing Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0.0.0 and SPSS AMOS version 21.0.0 (build 1178)
obtained through the University of North Dakota’s subscriptions. Fortunately the large
sample size allows for a greater degree of confidence regarding the parameter estimates of
the model and its stability (Marsh, Balla, McDonald, 1988; Schrieber, et al., 2006).
Hypotheses
Hypothesis One: Factor Structure
Factor loadings. As recommended by Brown (2006), the minimally acceptable
standardized loading sizes (sometimes referred to as regression weights) for items in a CFA
are considered to be .40 or higher. Loading sizes indicate how much the latent variable is
expressed by the individual item or indicator variable. Loading size is one piece of
evidence that the hypothesized, theoretical model maps well onto the confirmatory
sample. Table 5 lists the initial standard regression weights and squared multiple
correlation weights (the extent that a factor can explain the variance in a manifest variable)
for the SAM obtained during the CFA prior to modification. A maximum likelihood
120	
  
	
  

method was utilized to estimate the parameters. A Bollen-Stine bootstrap (Bollen & Stine,
1992) was added as well in order to account for the skewed nature of the data. The data
demonstrated a distribution with a skewness of .56 (SE=.13) and kurtosis of .37 (SE=.25).
The squared multiple correlation (R2) is the communality estimate for an indicator
variable. The communality measures the percent of variance in a given indicator variable
explained by its factor and may be construed as the reliability of the indicator. Hooper,
Coughlan, and Mullen (2008) recommend a minimum squared multiple correlation value
of .20. This ensures that items will be relatively error free with regards to the percent of
variance in a given indicator variable explained by its latent variable (factor). Squared
multiple correlations can be considered as the reliability of the indicator (item).
Table 6
4 Factor Unmodified Model*
Standardized
Regression
Weights**

2

Squared Multiple Correlations (R )

EAS

<---

AthMicro

.82

.66

DAP

<---

AthMicro

.97

.95

ARIN

<---

AthMicro

.58

.34

PAI

<---

AthMicro

.67

.45

Sam11

<---

EAS

.64

.42

Sam12

<---

EAS

.71

.50

Sam16

<---

EAS

.74

.55

Sam17

<---

EAS

.66

.43

Sam23

<---

EAS

.67

.45

Sam34

<---

EAS

.69

.48
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Table 6 continued
Standardized
Regression
Weights**

2

Squared Multiple Correlations (R )

Sam40

<---

DAP

.75

.56

Sam42

<---

DAP

.73

.54

Sam59

<---

DAP

.75

.56

Sam62

<---

DAP

.65

.43

Sam63

<---

DAP

.56

.32

Sam6

<---

ARIN

.60

.36

Sam18rw

<---

ARIN

.61

.38

Sam33

<---

ARIN

.65

.42

Sam35

<---

ARIN

.59

.35

Sam50

<---

ARIN

.57

.33

Sam1

<---

ARIN

.44

.19

Sam26

<---

PAI

.65

.42

Sam29

<---

PAI

.89

.78

Sam45

<---

PAI

.65

.43

EAS = Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes, DAP = Denial of Atheist
Prejudice, ARIN = Assumption of Religious Identity as Normal,
PAI = Pathology of Atheist Individuals
*Before covariation of error variables through use of
modification indices.
**Each factor’s ability to predict their respective items regression
weights is significantly different from zero at the .001 level (twotailed).
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Best Practices for fit indices. Fit indices are statistical estimates that act as a
second piece of evidence to determine how well the hypothesized model works with the
confirmatory sample (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980) . There are multiple types of fit indices
that are used to evaluate a model. Absolute fit indices (Steiger & Line, 1980) presume
that the best fitting model has a fit of zero. The measure of fit then determines how far
the model is from perfect fit without use of an alternative model (Sun, 2005). Absolute fit
measures suppose that the best fitting model has a fit of zero, so such measures of fit
indicate how far the model is from perfect fit. Consequently, larger values suggest worse fit
between the model and the data. The most common example of an absolute fit index the
χ2, which should be non-significant to prove a significant fit. This statistic, as a measure of
model fit, is often considered unsatisfactory in providing evidence for fit (Hatcher, 1996).
It is very difficult to reduce the χ2 to non-significant levels as it is sensitive to sample size
(i.e., larger samples leading to more significant values (a type I error) and smaller samples
too likely to accept poor models (a type II error). It is presented in a ratio over the df
often as a matter of tradition with values at or below 2.0 as evidence of good fit. Another
common absolute fit index is the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The
Root Mean Square Analysis (RMSEA: Steiger, 1990) is an index that rewards larger sample
sizes and less complex (i.e., less variables) models. The RMSEA is unique as it assumes a
non-central distribution of the chi-square (normally considered centrally distributed with
some other absolute fit indices). Relative fit indices compare the hypothesized model with
a baseline model effectively comparing the chi-square statistics of the two models. A
common example is the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), sometimes known as the Non-Normed
Fit Index (NNFI) (Sun, 2005). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI: Bentler, 1990) is another
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relative fit index that, like the RMSEA, assumes a non-central chi-square distribution when
testing the model. The CFI is an incremental fit index where a value of zero signifies the
worst model fit to the data and a value of 1 indicates the best possible model fit to the
data. Parsimony fit indices (Mulaik, James, Van Alstine, Bennett, Lind, & Stilwell, 1989)
are models that favor appropriately, simpler models. As Kenny and McCoach (2003) write,
such indices as the CFI and TLI favor complex models and it is important to have
contrasting fit indices. Two common measures of parsimony are the Parsimony adjusted
CFI (or PCFI) and the Parsimony adjusted NFI (or PNFI). Table 6 provides a summary
of fit indices and their suggested cutoffs (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008).
Schrieber, et al. (2006) report that the most popular fit indices are the TLI, CFI,
and RMSEA with suggested cut offs of RMSEA < .06, TLI, > .95, CFI >. 95 (as informed
by Hu and Bentler, 1999) suggesting excellent fit. Those three indices are also congruent
with Jackson, et al.’s (2009) suggested indices in order to detect model misspecification and
lack of dependence on sample size. Additionally, a measure of parsimony (e.g., PNFI or
PGFI) is suggested for inclusion to measure model fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest a
two-index presentation strategy that relies on the use of the (SRMR) paired with the TLI
(or NNFI), RMSEA or CFI. They suggest a cutoff for the SRMR of .09 or lower. There
has been substantial deliberation in recent years about the practice of utilizing hard cut-off
standards for model fit (e.g., Vernon & Eysenck, 2007,).
Following these recommendations the fit indices for the unmodified model are:
TLI = .84, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .08 (90% CI =.07-.09), PCFI= .75, SRMR = .07 and
PNFI = .71. The chi squared information is as follows: a χ2 = 561.83, df =166, χ2/ df =
3.39, p = .000. In order to be thorough for this dissertation project, the above fit indices

	
  

124

cover both sample and population based discrepancy assumptions involved at both the
absolute and relative level of the model (Sun, 2005), providing a breadth of information
appropriate for analysis. Table 6 provides a summary of fit indices and their suggested
cutoffs (Hooper et al., 2008).
Table 7
Fit Indices Common to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Hooper et al., 2008)
Fit Index

Acceptable Threshold Levels

Chi-Square χ2

• Low χ2 relative to degrees of freedom
with an insignificant p-value (p > 0.05)

Relative χ2 (χ2/df)

• 2:1 (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007) ; 3:1
(Kline, 2005)
• Values less than 0.07 (Steiger, 2007)
represent acceptable fit.
• Values less than 0.03 represent
excellent fit.
• SRMR less than 0.08 (Hu and Bentler,
1999)

RMSEA

SRMR

TLI (NNFI)

• Values greater than 0.95, suggesting
excellent fit, greater than .90 suggesting
an acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

CFI

• Values greater than 0.95, suggesting
excellent fit, greater than .90 suggesting
a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
• Values greater than 0.95, suggesting
excellent fit, greater than .90 suggesting
a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

PCFI

PNFI

	
  

• Values greater than 0.95, suggesting
excellent fit, greater than .90 suggesting
a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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Description
• Presented alone, not a good
index of fit, but still
traditionally presented.
• Adjusts for sample size.
• Has a known distribution.
Favors parsimony.

• Standardized version of the
RMR.
• Easier to interpret due to its
standardized nature.
• Non-normed, values can fall
outside the 0-1 range. Favors
parsimony.
• Performs well in simulation
studies(Sharma et al, 2005;
McDonald and Marsh, 1990)
• Normed, 0-1 range.
• Measure of Parsimony based
on the CFI.
• Measure of Parsimony based
on the NFI.

Best practices for model modifications. Because confirmatory models are based
on hypothesized theoretical relations among observed and latent variables, reduced fit of a
model (as indicated by fit indices) may be seen by some as evidence that the confirmatory
model is not plausible or is poorly comprehended. However, others may view poor fit of a
hypothesized model to a confirmatory model as evidence of specification errors
(systematic statistical correlations) in the model—meaning there may be a discrepancy
between a theoretically plausible model hypothesized and the true model in the population.
Covarying error terms allows for us to account for the specification errors without
implying a causal relationship (Whittaker, 2012). The specification errors could be
attributed to a number of influences, including similar item stems and item content. Items
within the same factor are theoretically related, logically alike and similar by virtue of their
shared latent construct, but they do not have any causal ties to one another (Whittaker,
2012). Several authors (Jackson, et al., 2009; MacCallum, Rozonowski, & Necowitz, 1992;
Schrieber, et al., 2006) have cited concerns about modifying models without justifiable,
theory driven reasons, citing this practice as capitalization on chance. When modifying the
CFA model it is important to report the modification test used, why it was used and
whether or not the modification makes theoretical sense for the model, otherwise the
chance of making a Type 1 error increases with each modification (Schrieber, et al., 2006).
For this project, in order to maintain theoretical justification and to be congruent
with best practices, only error variances within factors were correlated based upon the size
of the modification index (abbreviated MI in AMOS), which is a univariate version of the
Lagrange multiplier (Hatcher, 1996). The univariate version of the Lagrange multiplier has
been shown to perform equally well in modification procedures when compared to the
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multivariate version (Hutchison, 1993). Utilizing the MI, improvement in fit is measured
by a reduction in the chi-square value and requires no missing data in the model. MIs with
large values, specifically larger than a chi square value of 3.84, df =1, at an alpha level of .05
are able to be examined for covariation (Whittaker, 2012). This corresponds to an MI
value of 10 on AMOS (Muthén & Muthén, 2007).
Following Whittaker’s (2012) recommendation, in conjunction with MI, the
expected parameter change value (EPC) was also considered. The EPC is the estimated
change in the new path coefficient when the model is altered. It is the estimated coefficient
when adding bi-directional correlation arrows (freeing up variables to covary). The EPC
value is, in effect, the regression coefficient for the added arrow in the model. Since there
is limited information on official cutoff values for MIs, it is ideal to have both a significant
and large MI and EPC when considering the addition of new parameters (Whittaker,
2012). EPC absolute values have been previously recommended for model modification
(e.g., Luijben & Boomsma, 1988).
Whittaker recommends that if either the MI or EPC are not significant and large, to
not freely estimate the parameter. Like the MI, a large and unstandardized EPC (greater
than .10 or .20 for a standardized EPC, statistically significant at p < .05 level or higher)
provides evidence for allowing variables to freely covary. All EPC’s produced by AMOS are
unstandardized. The large size of the current dissertation sample (N = 378) attenuates some
the risk inherent in modifying the model utilizing MI’s and EPC’s (Brown, 2006;
MacCullum, et al., 1992; Whittaker, 2012). A large sample size does this because it
increases the chances that we have more statistical power to appropriately detect
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specification errors in a theoretically plausible model (as opposed to an ill-fitting model to
the population).
Results of error covariation. Best practices in error covariation suggest that each
pair of error variances to be covaried be presented in a step-by-step fashion. After each
pair is presented, the resulting change in relevant fit indices will be presented so that
progressive improvement of the scale can be observed. Following this, the final standard
regression weights and squared multiple correlation weights will be presented for the
modified model.
1.

The first error variances that were contenders for covariation belonged to
Sam18rw and Sam33, both in the Assumption of Religious Identity as
Normal factor. The MI value for those two terms was 120.73 and the EPC
was .24, clearly strong candidates for covariation. The results of this
covariation are as follows: χ2 = 404.22, df =165, χ2/df = 2.45, p =
.000. TLI = .90, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .05-.07), PCFI= .80,
SRMR = .06 and PNFI = .75.

2.

The 2nd pair of error terms to consider for covariation belonged to Sam11
and Sam12 with an MI of 28.202 and an EPC of .192. Their covariation
resulted in the following changes: χ2 = 373.20, df = 164 =, χ2/df = 2.28, p =
.000. TLI = .92, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .06-.07), PCFI = .80,
SRMR = .06 and PNFI = .76.

3.

The third pair considered for covariation belonged toSam35 and Sam1
with an MI of 19.22 and an EPC of .17, resulting in the following changes:
χ2 = 346.82, df = 163, χ2/df = 2.12, p = .000. TLI = .93, CFI = .94,
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RMSEA = .05 (90% CI = .05-.06), PCFI = .80, SRMR = .05 and PNFI =
.76.
4.

The fourth pair considered for covariation belonged to Sam62 and Sam63
with an MI of 13.73 and an EPC of .24, resulting in the final scale
properties: χ2 = 332.23, df = 162 =, χ2/df = 2.05, p = .000. TLI = .93, CFI
= .94, RMSEA = .05 (90% CI = .05-.06), PCFI = .80, SRMR = .05 and
PNFI = .76.

No other MI’s and EPC’s for additional model modifications meet Whittaker’s (2012)
suggested standards. Table 7 contains the final values for fit indices after model
modification through use of error covariation. For comparison, the other model derived
from the EFA which contains 3 factors is presented alongside having underwent the same
model modification procedures.
Table 8
Fit Indices Post Model Modification for 4 and 3 Factor Models
CMIN/DF

CFI

RMSEA SRMR

TLI

PCFI PNFI

4 Factor

2.05, p = .000

.94

.05

.05

.93

.80

.76

3 Factor

2.44, p = .000

.94

.06

.08

.92

.75

.72

Table 8 contains the standard regression weights and squared multiple correlation weights
for the modified model.

	
  

129

Table 9
*4 Factor Modified Model
Standardized
Regression
Weights**

2

Correlations (R )

EAS

<---

AthMicro

.84

.70

DAP

<---

AthMicro

.98

.95

ARIN

<---

AthMicro

.62

.34

PAI

<---

AthMicro

.67

.45

Sam11

<---

EAS

.60

.36

Sam12

<---

EAS

.67

.45

Sam16

<---

EAS

.74

.55

Sam17

<---

EAS

.66

.44

Sam23

<---

EAS

.68

.47

Sam34

<---

EAS

.69

.48

Sam40

<---

DAP

.75

.56

Sam42

<---

DAP

.74

.54

Sam59

<---

DAP

.77

.56

Sam62

<---

DAP

.65

.43

Sam63

<---

DAP

.60

.31

Sam6

<---

ARIN

.58

.34

Sam18rw

<---

ARIN

.44

.20

Sam33

<---

ARIN

.49

.24

Sam35

<---

ARIN

.61

.37

Sam50

<---

ARIN

.67

.45

	
  
	
  

Squared Multiple
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Table 9 continued
Standardized
Regression
Weights**

Squared Multiple
2

Correlations (R )

Sam1

<---

ARIN

.44

.20

Sam26

<---

PAI

.65

.42

Sam29

<---

PAI

.88

.78

Sam45

<---

PAI

.65

.43

*EAS = Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes, DAP = Denial of
Atheist Prejudice, ARIN = Assumption of Religious Identity as
Normal, PAI = Pathology of Atheist Individuals
**Each factor’s ability to predict their respective items regression
weights is significantly different from zero at the .001 level (twotailed).
After model modification there were three items (all apart of the Assumption of
Religious Identity as Normal factor) that performed adequately with regard to their
standard regression weight, but had low squared multiple correlation weights—items 18rw,
33, and 1. With the exception of item 1, which demonstrated mild improvement after
modification, the other items’ squared multiple correlation weights were reduced. Given
that all of these items were a part of error covariation pairs, these results are not surprising.
With regard to the structure of the scale, it is justifiable to keep these items because they
are required to maintain the factor structure observed in the exploratory factor analysis.
Theoretically, it is important to have these items as they make up almost half of the
items in a factor that has increasingly strong support for its presence in the lives of
religious minorities (Cragun et al., 2012; Hammer et al., 2011; Nadal, 2008; Nadal et al.,
2010; Nadal et al., 2012). These items express the institutional pervasiveness of religion in
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public and secular environments (Sam1) as well as the bewilderment and disbelief when an
individual discloses their Atheist Identification (Sam18rw; 33). Particularly for Sam18rw
and Sam33, their retention is important because recent research has shown that a large
amount of discrimination Atheists experience is directly tied to self-identifying as an
Atheist (see Cragun, 2012). See Figure 1 for the post-modification model.
Figure 1. Post modification model

Hypothesis Two: Discriminant Validity
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A scale used to measure social desirability independent of psychopathology created
by Crowne and Marlowe (1960) was used to measure if the SAM elicited socially desirable
responses. It was predicted that the scale would serve as a measure of discriminant validity.
It was predicted that there would be no significant correlations between both the pilot and
dissertation versions of the SAM and this scale, -.2 < r < .2. Social desirability was not
correlated with the SAM, yielding non-significant results utilizing a correlation analysis
revealing a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r = -.03, p = .57(two tail). These results do
corroborate the hypothesis.
Hypothesis Three: Divergent Validity
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985)
is a measure of global life satisfaction and would serve as a measure of divergent validity. It
was predicted that individuals endorsing more frequent and upsetting experiences of
microaggressions would report lower life satisfaction. It was specifically predicted that
there would be a small, negative correlation between r = -.4 and r = -.2. The correlation
analysis revealed a negative correlation r = -.11, p = .04 (two tail) significant at the .05 level.
This is an improvement over the non-significant, less negatively correlated results from the
SAM’s pilot scale data, however the results do not corroborate the hypothesis.
Hypothesis Four: Convergent Validity
The perceived stress scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983) is a
measure of general stress and was administered as a measure of convergent validity. It is
anticipated that this scale would have a small, positive relationship with the dissertation
SAM at .20 < r < .40. The correlation analysis revealed a positive correlation between the
PSS and the SAM with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r = .13, p =.01 (two tail)
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significant at the .05 level. These results do not corroborate the hypothesis.
Hypothesis Five: Convergent Validity
The ego identity process questionnaire (EIPQ; Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, &
Geisinger, 1995) was administered as a measure of convergent validity. It was expected
that this scale would have a small, positive relationship with the SAM and years identifying
as an Atheist at .20 < r < .40. Ego Identity was positively correlated with the SAM with a
Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r = .17, p =.00 (two tail) significant at the .01 level. Ego
Identity was positively correlated (non-significant) with years identified as an Atheist r
= .03, p = .51 (two tail). The results do not corroborate the hypothesis.
Hypothesis Six: Internal Consistency
It is hypothesized that the SAM would demonstrate a strong internal consistency,
as evidenced by an alpha coefficient of .80 or higher but not exceeding .90 for both the
pilot and dissertation scales. Consistent with the pilot version of the SAM, the dissertation
project had an internal consistency of .90 as well. This result does corroborate the
hypothesis.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Interpretations, implications, and limitations of the Scale of Atheist
Microaggressions’ (SAM) construction are considered herein. The purpose of the SAM’s
construction was to create a psychometrically sound instrument to measure the effects of
small, often subtle forms of discrimination (i.e., microaggressions) that Atheist’s
experience. This is an important endeavor for research and multiculturalism as Atheists
and other non-religious groups are a growing minority within the United States, a country
in which religion plays an important part in numerous facets of society.
Factor Structure and Internal Consistency of Scale
Nadal et al. (2010) proposed six types of microaggressions that may be relevant to
religious and non-religious minorities. These six types of microaggressions served as the
theoretical framework from which the items of the SAM were developed. The factor
structure found in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA), informed by Nadal et al.’s work,
fit the confirmatory sample satisfactorily. This is evidenced by three sources of
information: standardized regressions weights, squared multiple correlations and theory.
The factor structure examined during this study by means of confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) is partially supported by relevant literature on contemporary forms of
discrimination—specifically microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007). The theory of
microaggressions was applied to discrimination that Atheists may face, informed by the
suggested taxonomy of microaggressions that religious and non-religious minorities may
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face by Nadal et al. (2010) as recent research has shown that Atheists experience forms of
discrimination that are unique to their particular non-religious identification (e.g., Edgell et
al., 2006; Hammer et al., 2012).
To date, their proposed taxonomy has only been studied qualitatively with MuslimAmericans (Nadal, Griffin, Hamit, Leon, Tobio, & Rivera, 2012), where it was found that
two of the original six where not as prominent for Muslim Americans, Assumption of
Religious Homogeneity and Denial of Religious Prejudice. Similar to that study, this
project did not generate all six proposed factors. During the scale construction procedure
enough items were generated by Pagano et al. (2013) for each factor so that each one had
an opportunity to persist throughout the expert review of the items and the EFA, both of
which function as not only a way to improve construct and content validity, but also as an
item reduction procedure.
Nadal et al. (2012) wrote that the remaining two types of microaggressions were
not present in their final results because they were not as prominent of a concern for their
sample as the two new ones generated. Similarly, some of the hypothesized factors for the
SAM may not have persisted through expert review and the EFA because they are not as
relevant to Atheists as other forms of microaggressions are. For example, the factor of
Exoticization (instances where people view other religions as stylish, foreign, or mysterious)
is not a concern for many Atheists like it might be for Muslim American women that wear
a hijab. There is less support from the literature on forms of Atheist discrimination for this
particular form of hypothesized microaggression—the central theme of Atheist
discrimination according to recent research (e.g., Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayann, 2011)
being trust.
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All of the items of the SAM in the modified model load to their respective factors
according to the suggested cutoffs proposed by Brown (2006). All of the items are
considered acceptably reliable according to their squared multiple correlation values
(Hooper et al., 2008). Regarding model fit, there are individuals and groups that study
psychometrics and structural equation modeling that would accept the SAM’s modified
model only with great caution due to the model modification that took place (e.g.,
MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). They may claim that the final model after
modification benefited form a capitalization on chance. However, as has been explained,
there are also others who would also argue that poor fit of a hypothesized model to a
confirmatory model as evidence of specification errors in the model—meaning there may
be a discrepancy between a theoretically plausible model hypothesized and the true model
in the population (e.g., Whittaker, 2012). Efforts to utilize best practices took place during
model modification to maintain statistical and theoretical justification of the modifications
(Hatcher, 1994).
When comparing the practice of assessing model fit of the SAM to other scales
that measure frequency and severity of microaggressions experienced, the SAM contends
well amongst them. The REMS (Nadal et al., 2011) reported the following fit indices: χ2
(945, N=2620) 1400.74, p < .001, CFI = .60, RMSEA = .07. The IMABI (Mercer et al.,
2011) considerably strong values for their fit indices: χ2 (945, N =385) = 1978.74, p < .001,
CFI = .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .05. Balsam et al. (2011) did not conduct a confirmatory
factor analysis on their instrument and therefore no information regarding model fit can
be ascertained at this time. Much to their disadvantage, none of these other instruments
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reported measures of parsimony, therefore direct comparisons between them and the
SAM’s performance cannot be made.
Regarding internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951)
the SAM across both the EFA and the CFA demonstrated an appropriately high level of
internal consistency without being overly redundant. An adequate level of internal
consistency was also reflected in the factors or sub-scales of the SAM as well. This
indicates that the scale overall has both statistical and theoretical independence within a
framework that is addressing the same underlying construct—forms of Atheist
Microaggressions. Though the use of Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of reliability for scales
has been debated over time (see Sijtsma, 2008 for detailed discussion of the limitations of
Cronbach’s alpha), it is still one of the most widely reported and utilized measures of
internal consistency.
Construct and Content Validity
Validity in scale construction is important as it differentiates psychology as a
science from other, nonscientific methodologies to the exploration and investigation of
human behavior. Having a scale with strong evidence for its validity in various domains
allows its users to have confidence that it is accurately assessing what it is supposed to
measure, therefore having strong utility in both applied and research domains. It was
predicted that the SAM would have a small negative correlation with the Satisfaction with
Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985) and small positive correlations with the Perceived Stress
Scale (Cohen et al., 1983) and Ego Identity Process Questionnaire (Balistreri et al., 1995).
The SAM did not at either point of the scale construction project (during the EFA or
CFA) provide sufficient evidence for the hypotheses made regarding both convergent and
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divergent validity (forms of construct validity). The SAM did, however, demonstrate
divergent validity through assessment of whether or not it elicits a socially desirable
response set.
Compared to other instruments’ validity, the SAM performs adequately. To its
disadvantage, the SAM did not have any other measures of Atheist discrimination or
religious minority stress to pair itself with in order to assess construct validity like other
measures did. For example, the Racial and Ethnic Minority Scale (Nadal et al., 2011) had
strong, positive correlations with the Racism and Life Experience Scale-Brief Version
(between r = .40-.70 for the whole scale and sub-scales), a short measure that assesses
levels of perceived racism for racial minorities and the accompanying stress. The Inventory
of Microaggressions Against Black Individuals (IMABI; Mercer et al., 2011), like the
REMS, has reported strong correlations with other measures of racism to evaluate its
construct validity. While it did perform well with these other measures (e.g., r = .84 with
the Index of Race Related Stress) its correlations with other instruments measuring general
stress and more clinically significant psychological problems were more moderate
(between r = .30 and .40). No other, non-race or ethnicity based measures were used to
assess its validity. Balsam et al.’s (2011) instrument and its subscales only achieved lower
levels of correlation (between r = .05 and .25) with measures of construct validity that
examine depression and general stress.
One reason for the lower than expected correlations with measures to establish the
validity of the SAM may have to do with its limited length and item content. For example,
the author received an email from a participant that criticized the scale for not having
enough items that addressed the microaggressions potentially experienced by those that
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are not public or “out” about their Atheism for fear of being ostracized, banished from or
even physically harmed by family and community. This individuals concern speaks specifically
to the SAM’s content validity, that is, an instruments ability to represent all of the aspects
of a particular construct. Through item and scale development procedures, the author
attempted to have the SAM represent all of the proposed non-religious microaggression
factors authored by Nadal et al. (2011).
Physical harm coming to someone however may not be appropriate to investigate
through a microaggressions lens, even when conceptualizing it as a microassault. Physical
harm coming to someone is perhaps too blatant a form of discrimination and animosity
that may be better addressed in a different structured or semi-structured assessment that is
not focused on the more subtle forms of discrimination. There is some early data from
Hammer et al. (2012) that supports the continued investigation of hate crimes as defined
by the FBI (e.g., being physically threatened or actually assaulted because of one’s
identification as an Atheist). They reported that 14% of their all-Atheist sample (n = 817)
experienced some form of hate crime at least once in their lifetime.
Microaggressions, by their definition, are oftentimes subtle, slights and snubs and
may be outside of the conscious awareness of both the perpetrator as well as the victim
(Sue et al., 2007). This also implies that the stress potentially encountered from
experiencing a microaggression may not be within the immediate awareness of the
individual as well. The potential serious mental and physical health problems associated
with exposure to Microaggressions occur within the context of individuals’ cumulative
exposure over time (Sue, 2010a; 2010b). This means that, while significant for some in
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certain situations, the effect of a single microaggression towards an individual is
deemphasized in favor of the cumulative effect of the exposure.
Regarding the validity of the SAM, this suggests that obtaining the high levels of
stress and awareness that would validate the instrument with other measures of stress and
well-being may not be obtained very easily. This assertion is corroborated by the itemlevel and scale-level information that demonstrated positive skew (i.e., generally, the
respondents did not find the examples of microaggressions on the SAM very upsetting).
Outcome measures that address more construct-specific forms of stress and well-being
(e.g., depression, self-esteem, anxiety) may also be helpful in assessing the level of
perceived discrimination and stress in individuals that have a lot of privilege. As Operario
and Fiske (2001) recommend, with an awareness of privilege comes an awareness of
disadvantage, therefore assessing levels of White individuals’ awareness of their own
privilege is important in understanding perceived stress and associated reactions.
There are numerous forms of discrimination that minority individuals and groups
can experience that range from small, verbal slights to large, effusive and aggressive
behavioral acts. Discrimination can also be rooted in institutions that systemically block
minorities from obtaining equal rights and maintain group level inequalities. Developing a
single scale to measure all forms of discrimination is not always a necessarily feasible or
wise. The more factors present (representing distinct forms of discrimination) in a scale,
especially when they are related, make for an increasingly complicated scale construction
project that may not yield a psychometrically sound instrument. Having multiple forms of
discrimination on a single instrument is not only difficult to create, but would tax the time
and energy of the respondents with what would likely be a larger number of items. The
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development of the SAM attempted to retain as many factors as supported by theory and
psychometric data while taking into consideration the amount of effort respondents had
put forth to complete the SAM and its measures of construct validity.
To its benefit, the SAM was able to broadly address its construct validity to an
extent through detailed and thorough scale constructions procedures as informed by
DeVellis (2003). The SAM was grounded in scientific and theoretical literature regarding
contemporary forms of discrimination (most specifically Microaggressions). This is critical,
Clark and Watson (1995) say, because the most accurate and efficient measures are those
with recognized construct validity that are expressions of constructs in an articulated
theory that are sustained by empirical data. In addition to being grounded in theory and
consistent with DeVellis, five academics were solicited to provide expert feedback on the
items and scale dimensions in order to improve content and construct validity (Allen &
Yen, 1979; Hardesty & Bearden, 2004). The academics were all considered to be
authorities on either microaggression theory or discriminatory behaviors and beliefs about
Atheists.
Another important area to discuss is the application of the theory of
Microaggressions to Atheists, a generally understudied population that is comprised of
generally privileged individuals—White males. The theory and study of Microaggressions
up until the last few years have focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic minorities.
It was not until recently that this theory has been applied to sexual identity minorities,
individuals with disabilities and religious minorities. Regarding the validity of the SAM, it is
important to consider a number of factors related to the privileged identities (e.g., White,
Cisgender) of this study’s respondents. First the respondents may have been more resilient
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to stress due to having less discrimination perpetrated against them, possibly having more
mental and emotional reserves as well as access mental health services (see Cook, Zuvekas,
Carson, Wayne, Versper & McGuire, 2014) to cope with.
Race based discrimination has been linked with a deterioration in mental health in
multiple racial and ethnic minorities, including to African Americans (see Carter, 2007),
two-spirit American Indians and Alaskan Natives (Chae & Walters, 2009), Asian
Americans (Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal & Torino, 2009), and Latinos (Gee et al, 2006). Metaanalysis has further demonstrated the connection between perceived discrimination and
both mental and physical health (e.g., Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 2012). Second, because
microaggressions are subtle and White individuals do not experience the same levels of
discrimination and powerlessness in society, the White majority in both of the samples
may not be used to observing and processing microaggressions perpetrated towards
portions of their identity in their everyday lives.
Regarding this second validity issue, it is important to consider socialization
processes and the personal as well as group level racial awareness of White individuals.
One way individuals and groups become aware of their race is, unfortunately, by having
their race disparaged or discriminated against. A recent study reported that many White
individuals believe that they are now subject to new, generalized anti-White bias in
America (Norton & Sommers, 2011). The study’s White participants believed that the
anti-White bias is more prevalent than the anti-Black bias. The authors write that these
results indicate that “not only do Whites think more progress has been made toward
equality than Blacks, but Whites also believe that progress is linked to a new inequality—at
their expense” (p. 217). However, the title and dynamic of racism is not generally applied
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to White individuals experiences, the authors reported, once a critical eye is directed
towards relevant literature on power in society and racial identity development.
For example, Ridely (2005) writes that racism is not the same as racial prejudice;
racism always contains harmful behavior, whereas racial prejudice only encompasses
negative attitudes, opinions and intentions. Therefore, racism is more behavioral and racial
prejudice is dispositional he concluded. Most importantly, he asserts that true racism
requires power to implement. Specifically, this power is used to deny access and
opportunities or privileges to members of one racial group while allowing members of
another group to enjoy said opportunities. Models of White racial identity development
(see Rowe, Bennett & Atkinson, 1994) also support this notion that White individuals do
not experience the same oppressive environments as those experienced by other minority
groups. We can see that this is largely the case as White individuals tend to outperform
ethnic and racial minorities in a number of critically important socio-economic factors
such as: employment, income, access to healthcare, and staying out of the criminal justice
system (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Krueger, Rothestein, & Turner, 2001; Tonry,
2010, Williams & Rucker, 2000).
Models of White racial identity development further support the idea that White
individuals are privileged in such a way that allows them to remain ignorant of their
privilege. For example, Scott and Robinson’s Key model (Scott & Robinson, 2001) details
that those early in their racial development may tend to deny, overlook or minimize issues
and interactions surrounding race, which is allied with the study of colorblind racism
(Bonilla-Silva, 2003a) and forms of microinvalidations (Sue et al., 2007). This form of
ethnocentrism, they report, is consistent with the “no-contact” type, similar to the study of
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aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). The authors also acknowledge that those
operating in this type may tend to ignore and minimize other privileged aspects of their
identity as well, such as gender.
Operario and Fiske (2001) investigated the extent to which ethnic identity and
group identification affects perceptions of discrimination in both a White and Minority
group (comprised of Asian, Black, and Latino identified individuals) in one study. They
did not list the gender or religious demographics of their participants. The concept of
personal/group discrimination discrepancy (see Taylor, Wright, Porter, 1994) served as the
study’s theoretical foundation. The concept states that members of stigmatized groups
acknowledge that their group is subject to discrimination but deny that it affects them
personally to the same extent.
Operario and Fiske found that ethnic identity did not moderate the personal-group
discrepancy among Whites, in other words, low and high-ethnic identified White
participants reported non-significantly different amounts of personal versus group
discrimination. Minority group members however, perceived more prejudice than do their
White counter parts at the personal and group discrimination level overall. The level of
ethnic identification moderated the discrepancy phenomena for minorities only at the
personal level (i.e., higher ethnic identity equals more perceived personal discrimination) but
not for White participants. What this means for the dissertation project is that generally
speaking, White individuals may not perceive as much discrimination in their lives, as
Operario and Fiske (2001) discuss, due to their amount of privilege in society. However,
taking into account the amount of perceived discrimination by the ethnic minority group
with consideration to their level of identification with a stigmatized portion of their
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identity (ethnicity), those with higher identification with a stigmatized portion of their
identity may perceive more discrimination.
For their study examining the role of ethnic identity in perception of
discrimination, Operario and Fiske (2001) delved further into their data by investigating
the extent to which level of ethnic identity interacts with perception of prejudice in highambiguous discriminatory experiences (i.e., subtle forms of discrimination akin to
microaggressions) and low-ambiguous conditions (more obviously discriminatory). Their
sample was comprised of Black, Latino and Asian individuals, again with no mention of
their religious or gender identification. Interestingly, they found that those who scored
highly on ethnic identity were significantly more reactive to the subtle forms of
discrimination. This supports the theory and research around surrounding
microaggressions that “…[t]he internal conflict between explicit and implicit messages
creates an exceptionally stressful situation because it fosters confusion between the overt
message and one’s experiential reality” (Sue, 2010b p. 88).
There is other research that supports the role of identification with perceived
discrimination and stress. For example, different aspects of ethnic identity have been
shown to affect the amount of perceived discrimination and depression as well as selfesteem in Asian Americans (Greene, Way, Pahl, 2006; Lee, 2005). There is early research
that supports these phenomena with Atheists as well. Atheists who more strongly
identified with their atheism, who are “out” about their Atheist identity to more people,
and who grew up with harsher familial religious expectations reported experiencing and
perceiving more frequent discrimination (Hammer et al., 2012).
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As Hammer et al. acknowledge, this concept of being more public with one’s
identity and its affect on discrimination has been studied more extensively with LGBT
populations. Previous research provides evidence that a larger degree of outness leads to
more frequent victimization (e.g., D'Augelli, Pilkington, & Hershberger, 2002; Waldo,
Hesson-McInnis, & D'Augelli, 1998), However it is not uncommon for both out and
closeted LGBT individuals to report similar levels of victimization (Gortmaker & Brown,
2006). This is related to the concept of “passing” which is when an individual actively
attempts to hide a stigmatized portion of their identity in order to maintain congruence
with the majority. While some believe it is permissible to pass and conceal a stigmatized
identity in certain situations and environments (e.g., Anderson & Holliday, 2005), there is
evidence that this process is associated with depressive symptoms (Lewis, Derlega, Griffin
& Krowinski, 2003) and higher overall psychological distress (Morris, Waldo & Rothblum,
2001).
There has also been some limited research into the interaction of Islamic identity,
perceived discrimination and well-being for Muslims. Jasperse, Ward and Jose (2012)
found that individuals who strongly identified psychologically with Islam reported
significantly diminished life satisfaction and a higher presence of psychological symptoms
under conditions of high amounts of perceived discrimination. Jasperse et al. also
reported mixed results about outward and behavioral forms of Islamic identification with
women’s use of the hijab. She reported that though women often reported feeling more
connected to Allah (swt) and to their culture while wearing it, quantitatively women
wearing the hijab reported experiencing more discrimination. Wearing the hijab also did
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not moderate the effect between perceived religious discrimination and psychological wellbeing.
There is some limited support of the research on level of identity and identity
development’s applicability to the dissertation project’s largely White male samples. More
specifically, one measure of convergent validity looking at ego identity demonstrated a
small but significant, positive correlation with the SAM. Those results suggest that those
who have a more fully developed identity (incorporating their non-religious beliefs) were
more likely to perceive discrimination and find it stressful. Future research on
discrimination towards Atheists, or largely White groups of non-religious or nontraditionally religious individuals may benefit from exploring a number of additional areas
including the level of identity development specific to the particular portion of their
identity that is disparaged. The level of openness or outness with one’s Atheist identity
also likely affects their perception of discrimination and stress from that perceived
discrimination.
Implications
Research Implications
As Atheists are a relatively understudied population, the effects of exposure to
forms of discrimination like microaggressions are largely unknown. This dissertation
project is an attempt to create a measure to study the effects of microaggressions on
Atheists. The SAM is a theoretically grounded and data driven instrument that has
demonstrated a consistently high level of internal consistency over two large samples. The
factors of the SAM have evidence to support both its theoretical and statistical
independence. The utilization of the SAM is congruent with the growing body of literature
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studying contemporary forms of discrimination (i.e., microaggressions). The most salient
implication for the use of the SAM in the research domain is pairing its use with other
scales of well-being and health, much like researchers studying the impact of racism on
physical health outcomes have done. The continued use of the SAM and similar scales is
important because religious and non-religious beliefs continue to have a powerful impact
on political, social and economic issues in the United States. The impact of religion can be
observed in many domains of life for the millions of religious adherents in the United
States, therefore studying how the Atheist population experiences a largely religious
country and world is important.
Microaggressions have a significant effect on racial and ethnic minorities’ feelings
about many aspects of their lives, including themselves, their community, and their
academic experiences, to name a few. It is hypothesized that the study of microaggressions
perpetrated towards Atheists will show similar effects. The SAM can serve as one useful
tool to investigate this claim and inform the development of new scales that measure how
Atheists experience discrimination. Research that utilizes the SAM in conjunction with
general outcomes of mental health and well-being might be a first step in testing this
hypothesis. Specifically it would be hypothesized that as SAM scores increase measures of
mental health and well-being would be lower. If corroborated, the results can inform
policy and legislation to promote equality in the United States for non-religious
populations.
Furthermore, this scale could explore the development of group specific norms
with consideration to specific different demographic variables that may impact individuals’
experiences of discrimination differently. A study to further investigate the impact of
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group specific norms, namely region of the country, would be an exciting place to start.
Recent research has shown that there are significant differences in discrimination with
regards to regional variation. Reported discrimination for individuals identifying as Atheist
or Agnostic is significantly higher for those living in the East South Central region
(Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama) of the United States for example when
compared to other regions (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012). Rural
communities too are also more likely to foster more hostile attitudes and environments
towards Atheists (Hammer et al., 2012).
Another demographic variable to investigate that has received recent attention is
being in the military. In 2007, a U.S. Army soldier, Jeremy Hall, was threatened with
military disciplinary actions by a commanding officer for trying to hold a meeting of
Atheists and non-Christians in Iraq. He reported physical harassment, ostracization and
even death threats by his peers and higher-ranking non-commissioned officers after
revealing his Atheist identification (MSNBC, 2007). Today, there are some mixed reports
about the levels and types of discrimination Atheists and non-religious individuals face in
the military.
Cragun et al. (2012) found in their study of Atheist discrimination that very little
perceived discrimination was found in the military. Participants were more likely to
perceived discrimination at substantially higher rates socially and in the family context.
Reported discrimination, they report, was lowest in circumstances where it is possible take
up legal action against those who discriminate. The authors suggested that Americans are
becoming more cognizant of the possible legal consequences for discriminating in specific
contexts. These results are important because they imply that social interactions that may

	
  

150

contain subtle forms of discrimination in language and behaviors (i.e., microaggressions)
may be the driving force of discrimination experienced in the military context. At The
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute’s Biennial Equal Opportunity/Equal
Employment Opportunity (EO/EEO) Research Symposium in 2001, it was reported that
despite only a little over 2% of self-identifying soldiers (approximately 28,000 uniformed
victims) reporting religious discrimination, potentially all non-religious soldiers are
discriminated against because so few dare to identify. Because non-religious minorities are
generally small, they may be more susceptible to discrimination and suffer it quietly in
silence the report asserts (Preiss, 2001).
To conduct these studies, researchers could utilize the SAM to measure levels of
discrimination experienced in that region of the country and in the military. Results from
this study could alter the factor structure of the SAM and if given the opportunity to give
qualitative responses about other forms of discrimination, could present new and more
relevant items to that demographic group. This new information on group norms and
experiences would allow researchers to more fully understand the breadth and diversity of
possible discrimination experienced. Following this, pairing the new norms and data with
other measures of physical and psychological health could lead to research that has the
potential to create more far-reaching effects in larger systems such as workplace
environments or government structures.
Specific forms of research. A particular type of research that could be
completed is the self-report correlational study (Harrell et al., 2003). It is one of the most
common forms of research conducted when examining the effects of discrimination on
health outcomes. Self-report correlational studies would allow the SAM and related scales
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to provide correlational statements about relationships among events, personality and
physiological activation. For survey and correlational studies, social desirability should be
measured, much like what was done in the development of the SAM. Harrell et al. (2003)
additionally recommend including measures of neuroticism as well when evaluating
discrimination’s impact on health as those with high levels of neuroticism may exaggerate
reports of discriminatory and negative life events. Further development of the SAM for
different group may benefit from including measures of neuroticism as a safeguard to
preserve construct and content validity.
In the context of the two examples of specific demographic variables (regional
differences and being in the military) it is expected that discrimination of Atheists would
increase in those environments. Specifically, more subtle form of discrimination like
microaggressions may be more present in the military where only egregious and explicitly
obvious forms of discrimination are forbidden. In different regions of the country, the
bible belt and the deep south for example, where individuals and groups are not beholden
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, it would be
expected that more blatant forms of discrimination or perhaps microassaults would be
present. Therefore, total scores on the SAM would likely be higher in military
environments than in rural, southern regions of the country. Measures correlated with the
SAM that measure life satisfaction and general stress would also like show poorer
outcomes than studies looking at urban, non-military environment along the coastal
regions. Expressed discrimination in these environments (as measured by the SAM and
similar instruments) would likely correspond to decreases in work satisfaction and overalllife satisfaction in the military and rural, southern regions of the country respectively.
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Societal implications: Secularism and pluralism. Continuing to demonstrate
the ill effects of discrimination suffered by those with non- religious beliefs can help a
society move towards the position that religious and non-religious beliefs are becoming an
increasingly important facet of multiculturalism, as discussed in the writings of Pate and
Bondi (1992) and Burke, Hackney, Hudson, Miranti, Watts, and Epp (1999). Diverse
religious beliefs coming under the auspices of studying privilege and oppression may also
impact society’s value of secularism and pluralism. Secularism, according to the National
Secular Society, is defined as a separation of the state from religious establishments and
additionally that people of different religious and spiritual beliefs (including those with no
religious or spiritual beliefs) are equal in the eyes of the law. Pluralism is generally defined
as a patchwork of various beliefs that is inclusive of all differences in religion and nonreligion (Roof, 2001), that develops “under conditions of civic peace and under conditions
where people interact with each other” (Matthews, 2008 p. 152-153). The value of
secularism and pluralism may be considered because as society becomes more and more
diverse, laws and government policies cannot afford to have biases toward favoring one
religion or set of beliefs over another.
The United States has a history of incorporating Christian values into its laws and
policies (see Banner, 1998; King, 2000). Currently, religious polemics still have a
dominating presence in the discourse about many issues relevant to the study of
multiculturalism including, gay marriage, Muslim workplace rights, and Atheist rights in
the military. Secularism and Pluralism informed by a foundation of sound scientific
literature, is a political and cultural tool that may better equip the United States to protect
and honor an increasingly diverse society fairly and democratically.
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The next steps in research to further develop this hypothesis should continue to
explore the effects of secularism and pluralism on outcome variables that are valued as
indicators of societal wealth, success and health. Such variables could be correlated with
measures like the SAM or other measures that directly explore how non-religious
individuals experience their environment and distally explore a society’s acceptance of
secularism and pluralism. There is already much evidence that many countries with higher
levels of secularism, for example, perform better than the more religious countries in
various standard measures of societal well-being (for extensive review see Inglehart &
Norris, 2004 and Zuckerman, 2008).
Pervious research has demonstrated that cultures with more secular governments
have better purchasing power per capita (Rees, 2009; Verwij, Ester & Nauta, 1997), higher
life expectancy (Inglehart & Norris; Rees, 2009), improved social welfare (Gill &
Lundsgaarde, 2004; Hollinger, Haller, & Valle-Hollinger, 2007[an exception being the
United States]), and better formal education for all citizens (Braun, 2012). Emphasizing
pluralism, with a strong shared foundation, has the potential to make meaning out of
cultural conflicts and come to stable policy decisions as well as social practices (Stout,
2001). Indeed, as Shweder (2000) writes, valuing cultural pluralism is one of the surest
ways to fight discrimination and prejudice in the form of ethnocentrism and religiously
confined paradigms.
Both concepts come with its supporters and dissenters. Though secularists often
boast about the inclusion of all minorities into the political framework, it is at the risk of
removing individuals from their culturally bound, “identity forming contexts” (Habermas,
2008 p. 24). Secularism runs the risk of suppressing genuine, historical and culturally
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significant expressions of religion that are not intended to be solely limited to ones private
home. Secularism, if imposed in an authoritarian manner, risks disinfecting religious pasts
and sterilizing future religious and faith based traditions of expression.
If on the other hand, pluralism is valued and pursued, Yinger (1967) warns that its
cost may be anomie as religious norms, which govern relationships with other groups,
advocate and ban particular actions in the larger society. If each diverse group is allowed to
compete for political and societal ground Yinger writes, controversy will not rise from a
conflict of religious values, but from an aspiration on the part of the individual
communities to sustain themselves and to preserve their advantages. He writes that this in
turn may support a maladaptive cycle of interaction that increasingly weakens the
structures essential for intergroup dialogue, or weaken the effectiveness of culturally
permitted methods to share goals. Similarly, Hunter (2009) warns that a realistic cost of
pluralism is different groups using politics and litigation to attain sponsorship of the state,
its assets and its “coercive power” (p. 1314). Habermas (2008) too adds that advocating
too strongly for pluralism may lead to small, self-isolated groups, each adhering to
different norms that will arise in contest to the formation of a population dedicated to
supporting a cohesive nation.
Even though pluralism and secularism are attempting to achieve the similar goal of
having a liberal society that allows autonomous citizens to coexist in a civilized manner
(Habermans, 2008), they are sometimes presented in a false dichotomy, that a society must
value one or the either. The conflict between religion and secularism, two hegemonic poles
trying to secure a foundational placement in American public culture, place the progress of
modern societies in a frenzy (Hunter, 2009). Acknowledging the diversity in both religious
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groups and secular groups, Hunter claims that both purely secular and purely religious
based societies are untenable realities. Others too have identified the false dichotomy of
secularism versus pluralistic religious influence (e.g., Starrett, 2010).
Instead of deciding between one or the other, it is hypothesized here and in other
sources that advocating for both secularism and pluralism working together in tandem have the
best potential to build foundations of modern, democratic societies that are supportive and
respectful of diversity. In other words, in order for societies that value, pursue and accept
its own pluralism to flourish, a foundation of secularism is needed. Yinger (1967) writes
for example that pluralistic societies that do not have an appropriate amount of secularism
may be incapable of developing the mutual tolerance that religious diversity requires. He
asserts that “if every question of life is a religious question, there is too little shared neutral
ground on which to stand” (p. 27). He advocates for having segments of shared secular
participation in monetary, governmental and educational interests, which will solidify a
foundation for mutual respect in religious matters. Pennings (2010) argues as Yinger has,
for a common core of values that underlies pluralistic intentions at the group and societal
level. Specifically, Pennings asks his readers to consider a foundation of responsibility,
interconnectedness and cultural renewal.
Secularism can serve as a guard to protect diverse groups interests equally in a
pluralistic society, serve as the groundwork for fruitful multicultural dialogue and provide
the language for governmental policies and change. Habermas (2008) discusses the
importance of a secular “language” to assist a society that values its own pluralistic
diversity. In other words, norms that can be legally implemented need to be constructed
and “publicly justified” in a dialect that all the citizens are able to comprehend. He
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continues to write that “[t]he idea of “separation of church and state” calls for a filter
between these two spheres—a filter through which only “translated,” i.e., secular,
contributions may pass from the confused din of voices in the public sphere into the
formal agendas of state institutions” (p.28).
These results and philosophic treatises demonstrate the great potential value
secularity and pluralism has for a global society. As participants in our global society, the
political identity of free persons in the United States may be negatively impacted if it is
continued to be driven by a majority of privileged individuals, including those of a
privileged religious identity (i.e., Protestant and Catholic Christians [most often male, see
Center for American Women and Politics, 2014]). The United States and other countries
would benefit from supposing a secular governmental system that makes room for pluralistic
values and equal rights for religious and non-religious alike. Instruments such as the SAM
can serve as a measure of outcome in testing such hypotheses.
Clinical Implications
The SAM is not intended to be utilized for clinical practice, but studies related to
microaggressions against atheists (including the SAM) could impact clinical psychology
indirectly. These studies could assist in increasing the knowledge and consciousness of
clinicians regarding issues Atheists might face. The SAM has the potential to help explore
the unique stressors facing this population and document outcome based psychosocial or
health effects of such experiences. These studies may inform clinician researchers about
the harmful relationships and experiences that some of their clients may be wishing to
explore and process in session. For example, research utilizing the SAM and other similar
instruments could be utilized to explore some of the interpersonal, epistemological, and
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philosophical experiences of Atheists. These experiences could then be utilized to help
develop models of identity development and inform possible needs and responses to
clinical experiences much like the Cass model for Gay/Lesbian Identity development has
done (Cass, 1984).
Clinicians need to be conscious of the numerous types of microaggressions that
occur in the lives of their clients as well as the manner in which their clients handle such
experiences. Studies that utilize the SAM to explore how different groups of Atheists (e.g.,
southern Atheists, military Atheists) experience and cope different types of
microaggressions in different quantities can assist clinicians in this way. Inspecting these
microaggressions can later assist clinicians to conceptualize the presenting problems of
those they work with, whilst planning for the most applicable and effectual ways to cope
with and address microaggressions when they occur. Studies like this can explore climates
that may be potentially harmful to Atheist or non-religious students. Therefore teachers
and administrators, not just clinicians, must be conscious of the ways that
microaggressions may transpire in all professional environments.
As Hammer et al. (2012) noted, there are few quantitative accounts of positive
interpersonal experiences had by Atheists. It is my hope that the SAM can be used to
initiate and explore the creation of positive and inclusive interpersonal environments for
Atheists. For example, if policies at a school were initiated that aimed to reduce stigma
against non-religious or Atheist students, one would expect that scores on the SAM and
similar instruments would go down. Related to this, the SAM can also be utilized to
quantitatively investigate protective factors that alleviate the negative impact of
microaggressions and other forms of discrimination that Atheists may face by correlating
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itself with measures of coping styles and behaviors (for example, the Multidimensional
Coping Inventory by Endler and Parker [1990]). As protective factors against Atheist
discrimination are increasingly seen one would expect lower scores on measures like the
SAM.
Limitations
Sampling Methods
The SAM scale, while novel in its application of microaggression theory on an
understudied population (Atheists), it is not without its limitations. The first limitation to
discuss is the sampling method. A draw back and limitation to online sampling would be
that it may only grasp individuals that have access to computers, the internet and the
knowledge with which to use them. The integrity of the data from both samples is
unfamiliar to the researcher because respondents were not supervised, and there were no
requirements to follow up with participants. It also may only draw from Atheists that are
out and open about their irreligious identification as online blogs and forums require
identification with their topics and are increasingly non-anonymous (e.g., online newspaper
commentary connected with Facebook accounts to encourage accountability for ideas
posted and shared) (Ruch, 2011). Fortunately, there is some research that suggests that
online sampling is just as adequate if not preferred in some situations (see Birnbaum,
2004).
Another drawback is that because the study requires respondents to self-report
their experiences with microaggressions, it is challenging to gauge the true amount that the
participants may or may not have experienced. Unlike other measures that assess the
amount of discrimination experienced, the SAM only addresses this in a limited fashion.
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Future development of the scale and similar instruments can reproduce other scales
measuring experiences with discrimination and attend more so to the quantity and
frequency at which microaggressions are experienced.
Sample Demographics.
Related to this, the individuals sampled for pilot study participation were largely
homogeneous. The pilot sample was largely White, single, heterosexual, male and between
the ages of 18 and 34. Both the sampling method and the sample itself raise concerns for
the data’s external validity. While our pilot sample demographics are consistent with other
samples of Atheists in the United States (Zuckerman, 2005), our concern is that the
sampling technique may limit participation of Atheists who identify as racial, ethnic, sexual
identity, or gender minorities.
Fortunately, the dissertation sample collected to additionally validate the
instrument was more diverse with regards to gender and age. Moreover, the second sample
collected also provided information regarding current student status, years identifying as an
Atheist, and level of ego identity. One study suggests that a large amount of individuals in
the United States who are Atheists “by belief” do not self-identity as Atheists (Cragun et
al., 2012), possibly due to the stigma associated with the specific word, “Atheist.”
Consequently, these demographically substantial individuals that do not identify as
Atheists were not represented in either of the samples. More thorough population
sampling will be required to assess and understand the experiences of non-identified
Atheists. Further development of this scale would benefit from more rigorous recruitment
methods to include more demographically varied respondent samples.
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Scale Variance
The scale explains a moderate amount of cumulative variance, 56.64% and 58.29%
obtained from the pilot and dissertation samples respectively. Hatcher (1994) writes that
ideally, a scale should explain 70%-80% of the cumulative variance. Given the cumulative
variance and after review of the item means and standard deviations, it would appear that
the items describing microaggression experiences are experienced as minimally stressful for
many of the respondents. As a scale’s variance is directly related to its explanatory power,
rewriting some of the items may not only be beneficial to increasing cumulative variance
but also in producing items more representative of the microaggressions Atheists find
most stressful. The consideration of conceptualizing additional dimensions to write items
might be productive as well. For example, writing items that express the distress about
“coming out” as an Atheist to friends and family or items that describe events where
Atheists have felt they have been forced to attend religious ceremonies and events could
be helpful. Utilizing pilot or focus groups to answer open ended questions about stressful
experiences related to their Atheist identity would also likely produce good information for
further scale development. It should be noted however that even though the SAM’s
percentage of variance may not be high when compared to psychometric ideals, that 70%80% threshold is rarely achieved and the SAM performs satisfactorily in the milieu of
similar scales.
When reviewing other scales that utilize the theory of microaggressions for scale
construction it is clear that though the SAM’s level of variance is not as high as the
established ideals for explained variance (Hatcher, 1994). However, its performance in this
area is still acceptable in comparison to similar instruments. For example, the Racial and
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Ethnic Minority Scale (REMS: Nadal et al., 2011), a 6-factor 45-item instrument, only
explains approximately 27% and 58% of the total variance, pre and post rotation during
the exploratory factor analysis phase respectively. It should be noted that the REMS
utilized principal components analysis as well, which takes into account both shared and
unique variance—therefore presenting a raised level of variance that does not present an
accurate level of the variance specific to the latent construct(s). Variance for the REMS
during the confirmatory factor analysis phase was not reported. The LGBT People of
Color Microaggressions scale (Balsam et al., 2011), a 3-factor 18-item self-report measure
only has a reported 59% level of variance accounted for. Unfortunately, a limitation of that
instrument is that a confirmatory study was not completed, so no further information
about the scale’s variance with a new sample was reported. The Instrument of
Microaggressions against Black People (IMABI; Mercer et al., 2011) does not clearly report
its level of variance accounted for, but the eigenvalues for the factors are reported.
Data Parameters
The data obtained from the validation sample were parametric but non-normal.
The data demonstrated a positive skew indicating that many of the respondents responded
to the SAM likert scale in such a way that they were indicating that the microaggressions
represented in the items were more often minimally stressful instead of moderately or
extremely stressful. Unfortunately, attempts at correcting for the skewed data utilizing
more robust bootstrapping procedures during statistical analysis unfortunately did not
improve model fit. Consistent with the comment made previously, a limitation of the SAM
is that appears to not be representative of the more upsetting microaggressions that
Atheists may face in their day-to-day experiences. There is some difficulty in comparing
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the SAM to other similar scales in regards to data normality. Neither the REMS (Nadal et
al., 2011) nor the LGBT People of Color Microaggressions Scale (Balsam et al., 2011)
report on the distribution of any of their data sets. The development article on the IMABI
(Mercer et al., 2011) only reported “approximately normal distributions” (p. 465) without
data regarding item or scale-level skewness or kurtosis.
Scale response options. An issue not only relevant to the data parameters, but
also to the construct validity of the scale is the scale’s response set. Specifically, it is
measuring two different constructs—one that measures the extent to which an Atheist
microaggression is stressful and the other being an acknowledgement if the specific
Atheist microaggression happened or not. Though this is a response set similar to other
scales based in the theory of Microaggressions it is problematic. Future use of this scale
may explore different ways for respondents to reply to the scale. Additionally, the scale
could be narrowed down further by eliminating all items that have a tendency to elicit the
response that, “This has never happened to me.” This will likely aid in normalizing the
data and improve checks towards its validity.
Conclusion
Atheists in the United States are a steadily growing population representing an
increasingly significant portion of the population (Pew Research Survey, 2012). The United
States, a largely religious country, fosters many negative attitudes and beliefs towards this
particular portion of non-religious individuals that develop into discriminatory actions. To
date there have been few attempts to measure how Atheists experience discrimination in a
largely religious country that does not trust Atheists or feel that they fit with the ideals of
the United States. The purpose of this dissertation project was to create a scale to assist in
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this process of understanding Atheist discrimination utilizing the scholarship surrounding
Microaggressions (e.g., Sue, 2010a; Sue, 2010b) and related theories and forms of
contemporary racism (e.g., Gaerner & Dovidio, 2005). The SAM demonstrates strong
psychometric promise as a useful scale in exploring the experiences and implications of
discrimination towards Atheists.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM
As part of my dissertation, I am trying investigate the degree to which Atheist identifying
individuals experience discrimination in their day-to-day lives. My hope is that the project
can provide some answers as to what can help our society reduce the discrimination and
marginalization of non-religious identifying groups.
My project is internet-based and can be taken completely anonymously. It should not take
more than 15 minutes to complete. Participants can take pauses from the study and come
back later to finish if they need more time (within 1 week after beginning the survey). As
such, participants can close the browser and go back to the study by clicking on the link
again (and their answers will be saved).
This is a continuation of previous work related to the same project. As such, it is
important that a new sample is collected so that the results can be better generalized. If
you have taken this survey (UND IRB-201210-088) already, please do not take it a second
time as it can impact the quality and final results of this study.
In terms of who can participate, I am looking for men and women 18 years or older who
live in the United States who specifically identify as Atheists. There are no anticipated,
direct risks or benefits to participants.
The study can be accessed by going to this link:
https://und.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_081RwSIXtZAcYcZ
I can be reached for questions at louis.pagano@my.und.edu. This project has been
approved by the University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board, project number
IRB-201210-088.
Please continue with the survey if you understand and agree with the information above.
By continuing on you are giving your consent to participate in the project.
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APPENDIX B
DEBRIEFING FORM
Dear Participant:
Thank you for your participation in this study. Your participation will greatly help us in
our understanding of the views and experiences of Atheists. This study was designed to
create an assessment instrument to measure the extent to which Atheists experience
derogatory and stereotypic views perpetrated by those in a religious majority. After the
information from your responses (as well as other responses from other participants) has
been gathered, we will be doing a statistical and factor analysis of the data.
We feel it is important to state that no information from your participation will be
connected to the survey. All answers will be kept anonymous, and all outcomes of the
study will be reported in aggregate form only, ensuring that individuals cannot be
identified as participants in the study. Your responses will remain anonymous such that
only researchers will have access to your data on the survey website server. Identification
codes, rather than names, will also be used to assure your anonymity. We don’t expect you
to experience any negative effects from participating in this study. There are also no direct
benefits to you for participating. We do hope the findings will contribute to improved
understanding of the views of Atheists and other non-religious minorities.
This study is being conducted by student researchers from the Department of Counseling
Psychology and Community Services at the University of North Dakota. If you have
questions for the student researcher, feel free to contact Louis Pagano, the principal
investigator. If you have any other questions or concerns about the study, please call the
Office of Research and Program Development at the University of North Dakota at (701)
777-4279. Please print a copy of this form for yourself if you want it for your own records.
A list of mental health resources local to the university as well as national and international
hotlines are also provided in this section if you feel the need to talk about any troubling
feelings or stress you may have experienced as a result of taking this survey.
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APPENDIX D
THE PERCEIVED STRESS SCALE (COHEN, KAMARCK &
MERMELSTEIN, 1993
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month.
In each case, you will be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way.
Although some of the questions are similar, there are differences between them and you
should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer each question
fairly quickly. That is, don't try to count up the number of times you felt a particular way,
but rather indicate the alternative that seems like a reasonable estimate.
For each question choose from the following alternatives:
0. never 1. almost never 2. sometimes 3. fairly often 4. very often
1. In the last month, how often have you been upset because of something that happened
unexpectedly?
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the
important things in your life?
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and "stressed"?
4 In the last month, how often have you dealt successfully with irritating life hassles?
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were effectively coping with
important changes that were occurring in your life?
6. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your
personal problems?
7. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way?
8. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the
things that you had to do?
9. In the last month, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life?
10. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things?
11. In the last month, how often have you been angered because of things that happened
that were outside of your control?
12. In the last month, how often have you found yourself thinking about things that you
have to accomplish?
13. In the last month, how often have you been able to control the way you spend your
time?
14. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you
could not overcome them?
4, 5, 6, 7, 9 , 10, 13 Scored in the reverse direction.
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APPENDIX E
MARLOWE-CROWNE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE
(MARLOWE & CROWNE, 1966)
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item
and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

	
  

Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
I have never intensely disliked anyone.
On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
I am always careful about my manner of dress.
My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.
I like to gossip at times.
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I
knew they were right.
No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something.
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
I always try to practice what I preach.
I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it.
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings.
I never resent being asked to return a favor.
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
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APPENDIX F
THE EGO IDENTITY PROCESS QUESTIONNAIRE
(BALISTRERI, BUSCH-ROSSNAGEL, & GEISINGER, 1995)
Listed below are a number of statements describing adolescent behavior. Please indicate
how you feel about each statement. Example: Politics are very important in my life.
Write a 1 if you strongly disagree.
Write a 2 if you disagree.
Write a 3 if you slightly disagree.
Write a 4 if you slightly agree.
Write a 5 if you agree.
Write a 6 if you strongly agree.
1. I have definitely decided on the occupation that I want to pursue.
2. I don’t expect to change my political principles and ideals.
3. I have considered adopting different kinds of religious belief.
4. There has never been a need to question my values.
5. I am very confident about what kinds of friends are best for me.
6. My ideas about men’s and women’s roles have never changed as I became older.
7. I will always vote for the same political party.
8. I have firmly held views concerning my role in my family.
9. I have engaged in several discussions concerning behaviors involved in dating
relationships
10. I have considered different political views thoughtfully.
11. I have never questioned my views concerning what kind of friend is best for me.
12. My values are likely to change in the future.
13. When I talk to people about religion, I make sure to voice my opinion.
14. I am not sure about what type of dating relationship is best for me.
15. I have not felt the need to reflect upon the importance I place on my family.
16. Regarding religion, my beliefs are likely to change in the near future.
17. I have definite views regarding the ways in which men and women should behave.
18. I have tried to learn about different occupational fields to find the best one for me.
19. I have undergone several experiences that made me change my view on men’s and
women’s roles.
20. I have consistently re-examined many different values in order to find the ones which
are best for me.
21. I think what I look for in a friend could change in the future.
22. I have questioned what kind of date is right for me.
23. I am unlikely to alter my vocational goals.
24. I have evaluated many ways in which I fit into my family structure.
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25. My ideas about men’s and women’s roles will never change.
26. I have never questioned my political beliefs.
27. I have had many experiences that led me to review the qualities that I would like my
friends to have.
28. I have discussed religious matters with a number of people who believe differently
than I do.
29. I am not sure that the values I hold are right for me.
30. I have never questioned my occupational aspirations.
31. The extent to which I value my family is likely to change in the future.
32. My beliefs about dating are firmly held.
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APPENDIX G
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE SCALE
(SWLS; DIENER, EMMONS, LARSEN & GRIFFIN, 1985)
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line
preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
• 7 - Strongly agree
• 6 - Agree
• 5 - Slightly agree
• 4 - Neither agree nor disagree
• 3 - Slightly disagree
• 2 - Disagree
• 1 - Strongly disagree
____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
____ The conditions of my life are excellent.
____ I am satisfied with my life.
____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.
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APPENDIX H
DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF THE SCALE OF ATHEIST
MICROAGGRESSIONS
Endorsing Atheist Stereotypes
11. Someone has said to me that Atheists think they are better than everyone.
12. I have heard someone say that Atheists are self-centered.
16. I have been asked why Atheists are intolerant.
17. Someone told me my life is without purpose because I am an Atheist.
23. I have been asked why Atheists are angry.
34. I have heard someone say that Atheists are not willing to accept others' viewpoints.
Denial of Atheist Prejudice
40. I have been told that that my negative experiences as an Atheist do not compare to the
negative experiences of religious individuals.
42. My experiences as an Atheist have been dismissed as an overreaction.
59. I have been told that discrimination against Atheists does not compare to the war on
religion.
62. Someone has told me not to complain about religion.
63. Someone has said to me that they do not have a problem with me being an Atheist, but
their behaviors suggest otherwise.
Assumption of Religious Identity as Normal
1. Someone has placed religious holiday decorations in a public place I frequent.
6. Someone has asked me what church I attend without first asking if I identify as a
religious individual.
18rw: Someone has acted confused when I told them I do not believe in God.
33. Someone expressed surprise that I do not believe in God.
35. Someone has included a blessing or prayer in a social gathering (like a business meeting
or ceremony).
50. I have been told to express thanks to God for an event.
Pathology of Atheist Individuals
26. I have been told that I am bringing dishonor to my family because I am an Atheist.
29. Someone has told me I should be ashamed of myself for being an Atheist.
45. I have been told that I am bringing dishonor to my community because I am an
Atheist.
Scoring is obtained by summing responses raw scores.
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Respondent Directions: This is a scale to assess experiences of Atheists. Below are some
situations that you may have encountered. Please indicate with the response options below
whether or not these situations have occurred to you and how upsetting the situations
were. Please answer honestly about your reactions to these situations.
• This has never happened to me.
• This event happened but I was not upset
• This event happened and I was slightly upset
• This event happened and I was moderately upset
• This event happened and I was extremely upset.
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